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ABSTRACT 
 
 
During the peak of apartheid, the South African Defence Force (SADF) killed close to a 
thousand Namibian exiles at Cassinga in southern Angola. This happened on May 4 1978. In 
recent years, Namibia commemorates this day, nationwide, in remembrance of those killed and 
disappeared following the Cassinga attack. During each Cassinga anniversary, survivors are 
modelled into „living testimonies‟ of the Cassinga massacre. Customarily, at every occasion 
marking this event, a survivor is delegated to unpack, on behalf of other survivors, „memories of 
Cassinga‟ so that the inexperienced audience understands what happened on that day. Besides 
survivors‟ testimonies, edited video footage showing, among others, wrecks in the camp, 
wounded victims laying in hospital beds, an open mass grave with dead bodies, SADF 
paratroopers purportedly marching in Cassinga is also screened for the audience to witness the 
agony of that day. Interestingly, the way such presentations are constructed draw challenging 
questions. For example, how can the visual and oral presentations of the Cassinga violence 
epitomize actual memories of the Cassinga massacre? How is it possible that such presentations 
can generate a sense of remembrance against forgetfulness of those who did not experience that 
traumatic event? When I interviewed a number of survivors (2007 - 2010), they saw no analogy 
between testimony (visual or oral) and memory. They argued that memory unlike testimony is 
personal (solid, inexplicable and indescribable). Memory is a “true picture” of experiencing the 
Cassinga massacre and enduring pain and suffering over the years. In considering survivors‟ 
challenge to the visually and orally obscured realities of the Cassinga massacre, this study will 
use a more lateral and alternative approach. This is a method of attempting to interrogate, among 
other issues of this study, the understanding of Cassinga beyond the inexperienced economies of 
this event production. The study also explores the different agencies, mainly political, that fuel 
and exacerbate the victims‟ unending pathos. These invasive miseries are anchored, according to 
survivors, in the “disrupted expectations” or forsaken human dignity of survivors and families of 
the missing victims, especially following Namibia‟s independence in 1990. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  
 
Overture 
 
The war for the independence of Namibia (1966 - 1989) gained new impetus and a “road map” 
following Angola‟s independence in November 1975.1 During the peak of the armed liberation 
struggle, the South West Africa People‟s Organization (SWAPO) which fought a protracted war 
against South Africa‟s colonial occupation of Namibia (mainly from outside Namibia) also 
administered a cluster of camps hosting Namibian civilian exiles who escaped violence in the 
war zones.
2
 Most of these camps were located in southern Angola. Cassinga
3
 was one of such 
camps.  
 
                                                 
1
 Robert S. Jaster, South Africa in Namibia: the Botha strategy (Lanham, New York and London: University Press 
of America, 1985), pp. 20-23. 
2
 Namibian civilian population groups endured untold painful experiences during South African colonial and 
military repression, particularly in Owamboland, with forced displacement of people from their places of birth into 
exile in search of protection, educational opportunities and quite a number joined the People‟s Liberation Army of 
Namibia (PLAN). See International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (IDAF), Namibia: the facts (London: 
IDAF publications Ltd., 1989), pp. 57 - 77.   
3
 According to Tor Sellstrom, “in the early 1976 the MPLA government allocated various sites - including the 
abandoned mining centre at Kassinga - to SWAPO in the southern Huila and Cunene provinces, where the 
organization could set up reception centres for refugees pouring out of Namibia, as well as military bases.” Tor 
Sellström, Sweden and national liberation in Southern Africa: solidarity and assistance 1970 – 1994, Vol. 11 
(Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2002), pp. 350 - 352. So, before the attack, Cassinga was SWAPO‟s largest 
reception centre for exiled Namibians. In northern Namibia, the name Cassinga (situated some 260km from 
Namibia‟s north central border with Angola) is famous as it is historically, long before Angola‟s war for 
independence, linked to crude methods of mining iron ore which was a practice of artisans in certain communities in 
north central Namibia. Blacksmiths from the Oukwanyama communities frequented Cassinga for iron ore extraction. 
This happened before the Portuguese appropriated and developed Cassinga into a modern mining site. Oral history 
gives no clue about the exact period when local artisans frequented Cassinga for iron-ore extraction. Nonetheless, it 
appears that following the collapse of Portugal colonial rule in Angola, the mine at Cassinga was no longer 
productive. At the start of the Angolan Civil War (1975-2002), according to my interview with Paavo Max, a few 
abandoned buildings at Cassinga were temporarily occupied by the Cuban soldiers before they relocated to a 
permanent base at Oshamutete (this local name is often spelled Techamutete). Sometime in 1976, SWAPO settled a 
population of civilians escaping armed violence in northern Namibia at Cassinga. SWAPO named the settlement at 
Cassinga “Moscow.” The naming of this settlement after the capital city of the former Soviet Union emphasized the 
importance of the Soviet Union in providing political and military support to SWAPO during the liberation struggle. 
According to the SADF planning of the attack, Cassinga is code named “Alpha” camp.  
2 
 
The People‟s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN)4 guerilla combat units infiltrated northern 
Namibia from SWAPO military fronts
5
 in southern Angola. In many instances, civilians crossing 
the Namibian northern border into Angola were escorted by armed PLAN fighters on foot. In 
most cases, civilians were first taken to FAPLA camps,
6
 closest to the Namibian border, for rest, 
food, medication, logistics and would wait there for transportation to SWAPO camps. Once they 
did, PLAN fighters who escorted them returned to their operational areas in northern Namibia.  
 
A distance of 10km, on both sides of the border, was uninhabited due to forced removal of 
people who lived there before the war. The South African Defence Force (SADF) had removed 
all vegetation and proclaimed the desolated space a no-go area. The distance along the border 
was fenced with steel wires. Nonetheless, SWAPO fighters demolished the fence regularly, at 
particular points, to allow access and exit into both countries. So, although the SADF had a 
strong presence of combat troops along Namibia‟s north western and north central border with 
Angola, which resulted in unaccounted-for loss of civilian lives, the long border between the two 
countries was nevertheless porous. It was not always possible to maintain security presence at 
every point of the border, especially at night. This is how many people fled from Namibia into 
southern Angola, into SWAPO camps, as refugees. 
 
In response to the unstoppable exodus of civilians crossing the border to seek refuge in Angola, 
the SADF army and air force frequented Namibian exiles‟ camps in neighbouring countries with 
deadly attacks from the air and land. On 4 May 1978 Cassinga, also known as “Moscow,” 
suffered the heaviest single day loss of innocent civilian lives during the entire period of the 
Namibian armed liberation struggle. The camp hosted a population of 4,098 civilians
7
 on the date 
of the attack. The massacre at Cassinga started with the SADF Air force bombardment of the 
camp. This was followed by a drop into Cassinga of SADF paratroopers. According to available 
                                                 
4
 Prior to 1966, PLAN was named South West Africa Liberation Army (SWALA). This army was again renamed 
the Namibian People's Liberation Army (NAPLA) and subsequently, the People‟s Liberation Army of Namibia 
(PLAN). At independence, members of PLAN joined the new Namibian Defence Force comprising of former 
erstwhile fighters.    
5
 SWAPO had three military Fronts or Regions. These were: the North Western Front, Northern Front and the 
Eastern Front. 
6
 FAPLA stands for Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola / People's Armed Forces for the Liberation 
of Angola (English translation). 
7
 International Defence & Aid Fund, “Remember Kassinga and other papers on political prisoners and detainees in 
Namibia.” Fact Papers on Southern Africa, No. 9 (London: Canon Collins House, 1981), pp. 30 - 31. 
3 
 
records, “370 combat troops” jumped into the settlement.8 This number (370 paratroopers) 
contradicts other sources. Edward Alexander reports that on the evening before the Cassinga 
massacre, 498 paratroopers were transported by eight large transport aircraft: four C-130 
Hercules and four C-160 Transalls from Bloemspruit in South Africa to the SADF‟s large 
operational rear-area logistics base at Grootfontein in northern Namibia.
9
 According to SWAPO, 
“a combat force of 1500 South African troops was involved” in the attack.10 It is however not 
reported how SWAPO obtained its figures. Nonetheless, the precise number of paratroopers 
involved in the Cassinga attack does not concern this study as much as the level of unacceptable 
killing of unarmed civilians that the paratroopers are accused of effecting in Cassinga.  
 
Survivors told me that the explosives from the aerial bombardment wounded more people than 
they killed: the greater number of people was killed by the paratroopers on the ground. However, 
the precise number of people killed and missing in Cassinga fluctuates. It varies significantly 
from written report to written report and from one oral account to the other. In To be Born a 
Nation: the liberation struggle for Namibia, it is reported that “out of 3000 (which contradicts 
the other figure given above) people living there, 867 were killed and 464 wounded and over 200 
taken prisoner and hauled off to prison camps in Namibia.”11 However, according to survivors, 
the SADF took no captives from Cassinga: except in „Vietnam‟ or Osheetekela (commonly 
spelled as Chetequera)
12
 where over 200 Namibians were rounded up by the SADF and 
                                                 
8
 Jan Breytenbach, Eagle Strike: the story of the controversial airborne assault on Cassinga 1978 (Sandton: Manie 
Grove Publishing, 2008), pp. 152 & 242. 
9
 Edward Alexander, “The Cassinga raid” (UNISA: unpublished MA Thesis, July 2003), p. 117. 
10
 International Defence & Aid Fund, “Remember Kassinga and other papers on political prisoners and detainees in 
Namibia.” Fact papers on Southern Africa, No. 9 (London: Canon Collins House, 1982), p. 31. 
11
 Department of Information and Publicity (SWAPO of Namibia), To be Born a Nation (London: Zed Press, 1981), 
p. 242. 
12
 Chetequera is perhaps the Portuguese way of writing the name which the South Africans appropriated in their 
planning documents for the Cassinga attack. Osheetekela or “Vietnam” was situated in the area of Oshikango 
shaPopawa, about 2km from Namibia‟s north western border with Angola. This is where the headquarters of 
PLAN‟s north western front which at the time of the attack was commanded by Wilbard “Nakada” Tashiya was 
located. The attack of „Vietnam,‟ was launched by land and air on the noon of May 4, 1978. The commander of the 
raid was Frank Bestbier. Nonetheless, in spite of being a military camp, “Vietnam” also served as a transit camp for 
civilians escaping from Namibia before they were transported to Cassinga. As such, the majority of the people 
captured in “Vietnam” were civilians, en-route to the Cassinga refugee camp. For a summary of the Vietnam attack 
see Appendix E: the author‟s interview with Rev. Samwel Mateus Shiininge, a survivor of the Vietnam attack 
(interviewed at Etunda, 2008); also available in the interview with Rev. Andreas Shomawe, survivor of the Vietnam 
attack (interviewed at Okahao, 2009).  
4 
 
transported overland to prisons in Namibia.
13
 The report by Peter Katjavivi breaks down the 
figures as follows:  
612 Namibian refugees killed (147 men, 167 women and 298 children); 12 
Angolan soldiers and 3 Angolan citizens killed. 611 Namibian refugees 
wounded; 63 Angolan soldiers and 15 Angolan civilians wounded.
14
 
 
Mvula ya Nangolo and Tor Sellstrom replicate the figures provided by Katjavivi. They reported 
“612 dead.” Of this number, “298 were children, 167 women and 147 men. Another 611 … were 
physically wounded, while many more were affected by gas and most of the Cassinga survivors 
… were mentally traumatized by the gruesome events they had witnessed.”15 Survivors (those I 
have interviewed) feel that the number of the people killed in Cassinga is much higher than the 
published figures. Some written reports corroborate survivors‟ position. According to Nangolo 
and Sellstrom, “the precise number of those killed at Cassinga might never be known as some of 
the wounded who died in foreign hospitals were not recorded as Cassinga victims and others 
disappeared during the attack.”16 Much like the exact death toll of civilians which remains 
unknown, the exact number of the missing is also unknown. The general perception in northern 
Namibia, Owamboland, where most of the Cassinga victims came from, is that each family has 
lost a family member(s), relative(s) or neighbour(s) in Cassinga.  
 
The plan for the Cassinga massacre was conceived at a secret meeting held on the Thursday of 
December 29, 1977. On this date, “five key people met with B. J. Vorster, South African Prime 
Minister. They were the Minister of Defence (P. W. Botha), the Minister of Foreign Affairs (R. 
F. „Pik‟ Botha), the Chief of the South African Defence Force (General Magnus Malan), the 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs (Brand Fourie), and the Chief of the South African Army (Constand 
Viljoen).”17 The subject of their secret meeting was the negotiations around South West Africa 
(Namibia) and specifically how to ensure that South Africa‟s supported Democratic Turnhalle 
                                                 
13
 Department of Information and Publicity, To be Born a Nation, p. 242. 
14
 Peter Katjavivi, A history of resistance in Namibia (London and Paris: James Currey, UNESCO Press, 1988), pp. 
110. Cited in the People‟s Republic of Angola “White papers (presented at the UN General Assembly session in 
1983) on acts of aggression by the racist South African regime against the People‟s Republic of Angola, 1975 - 1982 
(Luanda, 1983), p. 15. 
15
 Mvula ya Nangolo & Tor Sellstrom, Kassinga a story untold (Windhoek: Namibia Book Development Council, 
1995), p. 36; Tor Sellström, Sweden and national liberation in Southern Africa, pp. 352-357. 
16
 Annemarie Heywood, The Cassinga event (Windhoek: National Archives of Namibia, 1994), pp. 36-37; Mvula ya 
Nangolo & Tor Sellstrom, Kassinga a story untold, p. 36.  
17
 Edward Alexander, “The Cassinga raid,” pp. 80-91. 
5 
 
Alliance (DTA) could win the UN supervised elections planned for Namibia in 1978. During this 
meeting, Alexander argues that P. W. Botha reasoned as follows:  
To win the political battle in Owamboland (the most populous part of 
Namibia and SWAPO‟s stronghold since the liberation struggle) the 
Ovambo people would need to be convinced of which side was the 
strongest. Political success in Owamboland therefore depended on military 
success. Botha felt that SWAPO needed to be dealt a blow and that the 
SADF should be given the right to go into Angola effectively and to sort 
out SWAPO bases once and for all (… om effektief in te gaan en klaar te 
speel met basisse).
18
 
 
According to one military report, “On 27 February 1978, Magnus Malan submitted a request to 
the Minister of Defence (P.W. Botha) to launch an attack on five SWAPO bases in southern 
Angola … Four of these bases were between 8 and 39km from the Angolan/ Namibian border.”19 
The fifth, Cassinga, was further north as indicated above. The other four bases within the 40km 
radius were Eheke, Mulemba, Dombondola and Chetequera complexes.
20
 However, Malan‟s 
request only received approval to attack four SWAPO bases, “Cassinga was turned down.”21 
This exclusion was based on the reason that there was “less enthusiasm from the ranks of … 
political bosses” to attack a civilian camp.22 Hence, the political front found it quite challenging 
and a dangerous undertaking to attack and annihilate the SWAPO civilian camp at Cassinga. 
Edward Alexander writes the following:  
It had been very difficult to get Balthazar Johannes (John) Vorster (the South 
African Prime Minister at the time of the Cassinga massacre) and his Cabinet to 
agree to the raid … and even the Minister of Defence, P. W. Botha was unhappy 
with the plan.”23 
 
It is also reported that B. J. Vorster, himself, “had (very fresh) painful memories of how the 
political failure of Operation Savannah had destroyed years of covert effort … (for South Africa) 
to reach a form of détente with neighboring states.”24 
                                                 
18
 Ibid, p. 80. 
19
 Chief of the South African Defence Force. “SWAPO ontplooiing in suid - Angola ten noorde van Owambo” (Top 
Secret). Ref. No. AANH A by H / LeeR/ OPS/ 301/2 DD, Feb 78. Source: SANDF Archive, Pretoria. 
20
 Chief of the South African Defence Force. “Military politieke situasie in Suidwes-Afrika” (Top Secret). Ref. No. 
HS OPS/301/2, February 1978. Source: SANDF Archive, Pretoria. 
21
 Edward Alexander, “The Cassinga raid,” p. 82. 
22
 Ibid, p. 80. 
23
 Ibid, p. 92. 
24
 Edward Alexander, “The Cassinga raid,” p. 80. „Operation Savannah‟ was a name given to the South African 
Defence Force‟s 1975-1976 covert intervention in the Angolan civil war. The intention of this operation was to 
6 
 
 
In fact, post-1976 South Africa had embarked on an all-out effort to sway world opinion in its 
favour. Vorster was central to what became known as the “Information Scandal.” It relates to the 
use of the apartheid government funds for pro-South African propaganda. “This became 
particularly evident in investigations … of the late 1970s, when it was disclosed that the 
government was funding groups such as the Right wing Christian groups. These groups, among 
others, espoused extreme conservative politics and justified them with Christian symbols … The 
most obvious example of a faith community propagating state theology was the Dutch Reformed 
Church.”25 Vorster was therefore anxious that attacking Cassinga “would provoke an 
international outcry and place great diplomatic and political pressure on South Africa.”26 
 
Vorster‟s initial advice to the SADF not to “carry on” an attack on Cassinga vindicates the 
argument that the SADF went to Cassinga with the knowledge and authority to kill civilians. In a 
tussle between the SADF and its political front, Constand Viljoen, the Chief of the South African 
Army, was reported to have threatened to abort the whole operation into Angola if Cassinga were 
to be excluded from the SADF planned attacks on the SWAPO military positions.
27
 Some SADF 
sources stated that Viljoen “aggressively lobbied” against the decision regarding the exclusion of 
Cassinga from the list of the SWAPO bases listed for the attacks. He, and perhaps other generals, 
is reported to “have persuaded” the South African Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, who in turn 
“persuaded the Prime Minister, B. J. Vorster for the inclusion of Cassinga in the list of the 
SWAPO bases to be destroyed.”28 
 
On the Wednesday of 8 March 1978, Constand Viljoen sent a memorandum to his immediate 
senior, Magnus Malan (the Chief of the SADF). The memorandum heading reads: “Die rol van 
                                                                                                                                                             
overthrow the MPLA (supported by the former Soviet Union and her allies) government in favour of installing a 
UNITA (supported by the west since the start of the Angolan civil war, 1975 - 2000) led government in Luanda. 
25
 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report presented to President Nelson Mandela on 29 
October 1998. Volume Four, Chapter Three: “Institutional hearing: the Faith Community.” p. 59 - 93. 
26
 Ibid, p. 82. 
27
 By late March 1978, the SADF planned to attack six SWAPO forward operational bases forming the complex at 
Chetequera / Vietnam. This was code named „Operation Bruilof‟ (an Afrikaans word for a wedding). It was to be the 
first SADF military offensive into Angola since Operation Savannah, but targeting SWAPO military bases in 
southern Angola only. Operation Bruilof, however, did not materialize. One reason for its cancellation was that any 
attack on SWAPO bases, without targeting Cassinga [which the SADF considered the „backbone‟ of SWAPO] as 
the primary target would not give a devastating blow to SWAPO.  
28
 Edward Alexander, “The Cassinga raid,” pp. 82 - 84. 
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Cassinga in the Militeê re aanslag teen Suidwes - Afrika” (“The role of Cassinga in the military 
onslaught against South West Africa”).29 The memorandum contained twenty-two items 
implicating Cassinga as a military camp. Viljoen argued rigorously for the inclusion of Cassinga, 
in fact as the principal target, for the SADF planned destruction of SWAPO bases in southern 
Angola. Amongst other reasons why Viljoen insisted that Cassinga should be destroyed included 
his argument that “the Commander of PLAN, Dimo Hamaambo, had his headquarters at 
Cassinga, from where he planned and coordinated the execution of all operations against South 
West Africa (Namibia).”30 Viljoen also alleged that Cassinga provided a space for activities such 
as the planning, control and coordination of all SWAPO military operations against SWA. He 
further argued that Cassinga‟s role also included the intelligence aspect; the logistical planning 
and physical provisioning of SWAPO bases in the eastern Cunene province of Angola; the 
planning and provision of supplies, weapons and ammunition to insurgents operating inside 
central and eastern Owamboland; and that infantry and mine-laying refresher courses were 
presented at Cassinga.
31
 
 
The items listed in Viljoen‟s memorandum to Magnus Malan dominated “the top secret military 
appreciation on the destruction of Cassinga.”32 The top-secret military document on the 
destruction of Cassinga was finally “drawn up by the Chief of Staff Operations and submitted to 
the Chief of the SADF on 1 April 1978.”33 Items highlighted in that document included the 
following: “the role of Cassinga regarding SWAPO; location and weakness of Cassinga; 
occupants of Cassinga; Cuban and MPLA interference; enemy capabilities.”34 
 
Although the Cassinga attack was initiated and planned in Pretoria, the SADF wished to act as if 
the plan for the attack was unknown to them. Ironically, according to the SADF planning of the 
                                                 
29
 “Memorandum from Chief of the South African Army to the Chief of the SADF” (Top Secret), Ref. No. H 
Leer/309/1, 8 March 1978. Source: SANDF Archive, Pretoria.  
30
 “Memorandum from Chief of the South African Army to the Chief of the SADF” (Top Secret). Reference, H 
Leer/309/1, 8 March 1978. Source: SANDF Archives, Pretoria. 
31
 “Memorandum from Chief of the South African Army to the Chief of the SADF” (Top Secret).Ref. No. H 
Leer/309/1, 8 March 1978. Source: SANDF Archive, Pretoria. 
32
 Edward Alexander, “The Cassinga raid,” pp. 52-54. 
33
 Chief of the South African Defence Force. “Vernietiging van SWAPO basisse.” Ref. No. HS 
OPS/310/4/KOSTUUM (Top Secret). Source: SANDF Archive, Pretoria.  
34
 Chief of the South African Defence Force. “Vernietiging van SWAPO basisse” (Top Secret). Ref. No. HS 
OPS/310/4/KOSTUUM. Source: SANDF Archive, Pretoria. 
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attack, “the AG (Administrator General of SWA who represented the South African colonial 
government in Namibia) and the GOC (General Officer Commanding South African troops in 
SWA) would issue a joint or separate statement
35
 to the media explaining why SWA attacked the 
Cassinga camp [see Appendices A, B and C].
36
 Such statements should be followed by a 
statement by an RSA Government spokesman, with a preference for the Minister of Defence to 
avoid the appearance of over–reaction.”37 
 
The SADF mission for Cassinga was code named „Operation Reindeer‟ replacing the aborted 
“Operation Bruilof [wedding].” The Citizen Force soldiers reported to camp in mid-April 1978 
for training. The training ground was outside Bloemfontein, the capital city of what was then 
called the Orange Free State (Free State Province in post-Apartheid South Africa).  
 
Colonel Jan Breytenbach and Brigadier Mike du Plessis were responsible for the training of the 
paratroopers. Breytenbach arrived in the camp on April 17, 1978 and commenced with the 
training immediately.
38
 The timeline for the training was very short, as the D - day for the attack 
… was initially scheduled to take place on May 1, 1978.39 On the morning of 3 May 1978, 
according to McGill Alexander, General Constand Viljoen issued the order to “execute 
Operation Reindeer. D – Day 4 May 1978.” On the night of May 3, the paratroopers boarded 
aircrafts at Bloemspruit near Bloemfontein. Under the cover of dark, they flew to Grootfontein in 
northern Namibia. In the early hours of the morning of 4 May 1978, the SADF paratroopers took 
off from Grootfontein to Cassinga.      
 
                                                 
35
 The „AG‟ and „GOC‟ were the highest ranking political appointees of the South African apartheid government in 
South West Africa (SWA, now Namibia). They were the authority of apartheid-colonial administration and Military 
operations in Namibia. At the time of Cassinga massacre, Jan Geldenhuys was the General Officer Commanding 
South West Africa Military. The administrator-general of South West Africa was Marthinus Theunis Steyn (1977 - 
79). 
36
 Chief of the SADF, “Guidelines for statement by GOC SWA: Appendix A& B to PSYAC planning directive No. 
3 / 78: suggested approach for statement by the Minister of Defence” (Top Secret). Source: SANDF archives, 
Pretoria. 
37
 Chief of the SADF. “PSYAC Planning Directive No. 3 \ 78: Operation Reindeer. Phase Three (D- Day to D plus 
approx 4)” (Top Secret). Also see, Appendices A, B and C of this thesis (AG and GOC statements following the 
Cassinga attack). Source: SANDF Archive, Pretoria. 
38
 Jan Breytenbach, Eagle Strike, p. 168. 
39
 “Memorandum from Chief of Staff Operations to the Chief of the SADF” (Top Secret). Ref. No. HS 
OPS/310/4/Reindeer, 21 April 1978. 
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Methodology 
 
When I began this research in July 2006, I originally relied on “conventional methods” of 
conducting social science research. In fact, this study research proposal outlines that one of the 
objectives of this study is to „disclose‟ survivors‟ untold memories of the Cassinga massacre. I 
was naïve when I initially went into the field hoping that a substantial collection of archival and 
survivors‟ oral testimonies would facilitate an objective writing of survivors‟ experiences of the 
Cassinga events, now and then. I assumed that if I collect a substantial body of visual archival 
data, it would aid memories or oral narratives of my research participants, especially survivors, 
to remember and narrate the experience of the Cassinga event more accurately. In retrospect, I 
knew little about the dynamics, complexities and challenges of unpacking the different 
experiences of the Cassinga violence through visual and oral testimonies. 
 
Following the submission and acceptance of my research proposal by the University of the 
Western Cape in Cape Town, the initial move of collecting data for this research started with my 
visit to institutional archives in Pretoria, South Africa. I went there expecting to mine the 
archives for written and visual „evidence‟ (as I believed at the time) of the Cassinga massacre. 
While in Pretoria, during the first trip, I also visited the National Archives and Records Service 
(NARS) of South Africa and the South African Police Museum and Archives, both located in 
Pretoria. In Cape Town, where I studied, I visited the Western Cape Provincial Archives and 
Records Service and the Mayibuye Centre which is hosted by the University of the Western 
Cape. In Namibia, I visited the SWAPO Party Archive and Research Centre (SPARC) and the 
National Archives of Namibia in Windhoek. 
 
The second approach was to conduct interviews with the war victims, in particular survivors of 
the Cassinga massacre across Namibia‟s thirteen political Regions. However, I concentrated 
mainly in the four northern Regions (Omusati, Oshana, Ohangwena and Oshikoto). This is where 
most survivors of the Cassinga massacre were born and continue to live. I went to visit survivors 
with photographs and other documents that I collected from the institutional archives which I had 
visited in Namibia and South Africa. Disappointingly, survivors were not particularly impressed 
10 
 
by the Cassinga photographs. They argued that the photographs I presented to them were simple, 
unsophisticated realities of the Cassinga massacre. According to survivors, such photographs 
obscure complex realities of the Cassinga episode. Interestingly, while survivors deplored what 
they called the sheer absence of the tangible experiences of the Cassinga brutal massacre in what 
photographs show, survivors own testimonies of the Cassinga episode also failed to disclose 
practical and complicated memories of that episode. 
 
In retrospect, things did not work out the way they were originally understood and outlined in the 
research proposal preceding my experience in the field. In particular, unexpected things unfolded 
during interviews with survivors of the Cassinga massacre, and when I visited institutional 
archives where I expected to find written and visual documentary evidence of the Cassinga 
massacre.  
 
In this connection, dialogues and analysis presented in this thesis are particularly shaped by the 
ambivalence and the silence which visual, oral and written testimonies produce to obscure what 
the victims of that heinous event want the inexperienced „other‟ to see and understand. 
 
In Namibia however, the massacre of May 4, 1978 is the most commemorated day of the lives 
lost during Namibia‟s war for liberation: in every sense it stands as the saddest, most horrendous 
act of violence. Regrettably though, loss of lives, trauma and suffering experienced by the 
victims of the Cassinga massacre are far beyond the reach of visual and oral testimonies that 
attempt to disclose the personal experience of the attack and subsequent suffering. In view of this 
challenge, the central task of this thesis is to examine how the actual and divergent experiences 
of violence on the ground are at variance with the Cassinga survivors‟ desire and longing to 
unveil the experience of violence and ongoing suffering through visual and oral techniques. This 
will be done by way of using testimonies of the survivors of the Cassinga massacre as a method 
of attempting to interrogate and explore the existing traditional or conventional ways of 
presenting Cassinga in public discourse.  
 
In pursuit of this objective, the study uses a „lateral thinking‟ approach, a method of attempting 
to „deconstruct‟ the current public presentation of the Cassinga massacre through photographs 
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and survivors‟ oral testimonies. This approach is intended to help create a new way of thinking 
and seeing the economy of violence beyond the confines of the conventional oral and visual 
representations of the Cassinga event. In exploring the impossibility of unpacking violence 
through oral, visual or written exchange, this study relies mainly on interviews conducted with a 
number of survivors, archival photographs and, to some extent, individual perpetrators‟ written 
accounts of the attack. 
 
Interviews with survivors and the collection of the archival data were conducted between 2007 
and 2010. From the interviews with some thirty Cassinga survivors I gathered a body of oral 
accounts some of which I transcribed, translated (from Oshiwambo into English) and edited for 
the purpose of this work. From the archival collection, mainly from the former SADF archive in 
Pretoria, I assembled a collection of photographs and certain documents of the SADF planning 
and execution of the Cassinga raid. Some photographs of the Cassinga massacre were also 
collected from the SWAPO Party archive in Windhoek (Namibia).  
 
When I visited survivors for the interviews, I carried an album exhibiting some of the 
photographic images of the camp at Cassinga after the SADF attack, for the perusal of survivors. 
Individual survivors‟ testimonies of the Cassinga massacre as well as each survivor‟s reaction to 
the photographs I presented to them provided me with important indications and insights about 
how survivors‟ oral testimonies and the Cassinga photographic images relate to, or do not 
authenticate, different survivors‟ actual experience of the attack and its pervasiveness in the 
contemporary life of survivors and affected families who are still in the dark about what 
happened to their loved ones.  
 
In fact, it transpired that both the visual and the oral representation of the Cassinga massacre 
construct an undesirable hollowness. This hollowness, the lack of visual, oral, political and 
historical accounts to support the tangible Cassinga means that the actual experience of violence 
does not resonate with the way Cassinga is narrated, remembered and commemorated through 
different techniques that attempt to represent the Cassinga violence. In fact, to paraphrase Cathy 
Caruth on trauma and its role in literary texts, the experience of the Cassinga massacre lies not in 
what can be disclosed or concealed through different techniques of narrating and attempting to 
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show the experience of the Cassinga massacre. But the experience of that event lies in the 
“inherent latency within the experience itself”40 that can no longer be displayed to others who 
did not experience it. 
 
Theoretical and conceptual issues 
 
 The relationship between visual and oral testimonies of the Cassinga massacre is contradictory. 
Although both reveal nothing tangible for the inexperienced viewer
41
 or listener, tension features 
predominantly between them. This relates to how each of them attempts to relate the actual 
experience of Cassinga‟s multiple brutal events. In the interviews, some survivors noted with 
unhappiness how visual images of Cassinga, such as the photograph of the Cassinga open mass 
grave, take precedence over survivors‟ suffering and personal stories of the Cassinga events. In 
the interviews, survivors indicated that when remembering and commemorating Cassinga, 
precedence should be given to the practical things that visual and oral testimonies of the 
Cassinga massacre evade or obscure, such as the unresolved humanitarian issues (or the victims‟ 
„disrupted expectations‟ as discussed in Chapter 7) which continue to anger and traumatize the 
victims (dead and alive) since the Cassinga attack.  
 
In spite of the conflict between visual and oral testimonies of the Cassinga massacre, I will 
nevertheless use them interchangeably in the whole of this study. In other words, I will 
problematize the Cassinga visual and oral testimonies as conceptual metaphors. I theorize them 
as such because they both undermine the victims‟ wish to disclose the practicality and 
pervasiveness of the brutality and suffering of Cassinga. In fact, according to this study, their 
sense of abstractness infers that they are both conceptual metaphors.  
 
To put things into perspective, since Namibia‟s independence in 1990, SWAPO has fashioned 
conceptual metaphors as ways of picturing suffering and loss of innocent lives during the period 
of the armed liberation struggle. For example, during each Cassinga anniversary, survivors are 
                                                 
40
 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed experience: trauma, narrative and history (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1996), p. 17. 
41
 The notion of „the inexperienced viewer‟ refers to the public‟s inexperience of the Cassinga massacre physically 
and emotionally. In particularly, this notion evokes the general public lack of awareness that the suffering of the 
victims of the Cassinga massacre has been exacerbated over the years. This is further discussed in Chapter 7.  
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modeled into living testimonies or metaphors of untold human suffering and loss of lives during 
the Cassinga attack. Customarily, at every occasion marking this event, a survivor is delegated to 
unpack, on behalf of other survivors, „memories‟ of Cassinga so that the inexperienced audience 
who has not experienced these events understands what happened on that day. Besides survivors‟ 
testimonies, edited video footage showing, among other things, wrecks in the camp, wounded 
victims lying in hospital beds, an open mass grave with dead bodies, SADF paratroopers 
apparently marching in the camp following its fall, is also screened for the audience to witness 
the agony of that day. Interestingly, such political metaphors are conceptualized as epitomizing 
Cassinga memories and generating a sense of remembrance against forgetfulness.  
 
The central place of war metaphors in the everyday narrating of war experience and suffering, 
such as during official commemorations of the Cassinga massacre, deserve closer examination in 
this project. Specific types of metaphors that are used in Namibia to describe violence and loss of 
lives in Cassinga and elsewhere in Namibia and outside its borders include, amongst others, 
phrases such as ‘bloody’ liberation struggle and ‘their blood waters our freedom.’ In particular, 
Cassinga is singled out as the bloodiest single day massacre in the history of the Namibian 
liberation struggle from South African colonial occupation and apartheid rule.  
 
Here, one becomes inquisitive about exploring the presence of „bloodshed‟ and loss of lives or 
suffering inside or outside such metaphoric statements. However such explorations always end in 
disappointment. This is despite the fact that such conceptual metaphors relate to the untold but 
tangible loss of lives, and the blood of innocent Namibians spilled or shed during the liberation 
struggle. Interestingly, as war rhetoric supposedly depicting death and loss of innocent lives, 
these phrases instead unleash problematic relations with the unambiguous, vivid tangible reality 
of brutal death and suffering of innocent people. The problem is that metaphors disclose nothing: 
they reveal no „bloodshed‟ nor the grief that they lament. Instead, political metaphors as 
conceptual statements break relations with the tangible reality of the suffering, pain, anguish, 
rage, trauma and agony experienced by the dead and the survivors of apartheid‟s brutal violence.  
 
In this context, the rhetoric of war, in the form of political metaphor or testimony of any kind, 
reveals the sheer absence of the truth that each of the witnesses (survivors and perpetrators) of 
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the Cassinga massacre wish to disclose to the inexperienced world. As a result, metaphors invoke 
“verbal dispute”42 between perpetrators and the victims of the Cassinga massacre. Verbal 
dispute, a term coined by James Howe, refers to testimony‟s incapacity to present each side‟s 
argument as tangible evidence. In other words, testimonies or metaphors suggest that violence is 
beyond language, description or any art of attempting to picture it beyond the confines and 
frontiers of the self or the restricted personal memories of the witnesses.  
 
In this relation, this study argues that the figurative framing of the Cassinga massacre invokes a 
number of problematic trajectories because metaphors or testimonies of war and trauma manifest 
themselves across a range of conflicts and contestations with the Cassinga witnesses‟ 
memoryscape. While memory, according to survivors, embodies the victims‟ endless suffering 
(which is implicitly self-evident) and the struggle with the presence of violence‟s unyielding 
dynamics, testimony on the other hand (be it in the form of visual, oral, printed media or political 
metaphors) translates into the obvious conceptual statements or metaphysical representation of 
Cassinga‟s physical violence. Conceptual or metaphysical statements are a “form of an empirical 
hypothesis, but in fact immune from empirical testing and therefore literally meaningless,”43 as 
they cannot be proven by tangible or concrete evidence of the object that testimony claims to 
represent.  
 
In fact, testimony as metaphor, of any kind, obscures the experience of the Cassinga violence for 
the inexperienced other. In this relation, while memory is ever inundated with the reinvention of 
the continuing and unstoppable sufferings of the wounded body and the wounded emotions of 
the victims, the former, testimony, deconstructs any tangible act of violence. As a practice of 
reporting, testimony is embedded in the practical experience of the violence on the ground. 
Regrettably, testimony works against the physicality of the violence and the victims‟ wish to 
display „the shame‟ of the apartheid state-sponsored violence. For this reason, testimony, in 
relation to the Cassinga memory, is profane. It corrupts material evidence of the violence. In the 
succeeding pages, I will attempt to explore how various methods of testimony or testimony as 
                                                 
42
 James Howe, “Argument is argument: an essay on conceptual metaphor and verbal dispute,” Metaphor and 
symbol, Vol. 23/1 (2007), p. 1. 
43
 This is according to logical positivism, accessed from http://www.thefreedictionary.com/metaphysical. 
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metaphor may facilitate or impede survivors‟ attempts to tell the world about their difficult 
experiences in Cassinga and its impact on their lives ever since.  
 
Language (written or verbal) as metaphor  
 
The experience of violence is self-evident. That is, physical violence is in the knowing of the 
individual victims of the Cassinga massacre, not in language or discourse about violence (and I 
shall return to language in Chapter 5). In this regard, Thomas M. Hawley observes that 
“language is not a transparent tool to be used in representing a pre-given reality but is instead 
opaque (dense). Hence, the process of ascribing words to things is … viewed as productions of 
meaning rather than reflections of reality…”44 Here, I argue that if language discloses nothing 
tangible other than ascribing “words to things,” then it is obvious that language (words) 
translates into conceptual metaphors which conceal, thus making physical violence abstract and 
ambiguous. In the interviews, survivors invoked this scenario by lamenting the way that the use 
of oral and visual techniques as methods of attempting to elicit violence for the experience of 
others pushed them into insurmountable difficulties. In fact, any attempt to describe the 
complexities of survivors‟ actual experience of brutal violence and suffering during the Cassinga 
attack and afterwards produces dissonance and ruptures. This is because the complexity of the 
actual violence and suffering since the Cassinga massacre is beyond what language can articulate 
and authenticate.  
 
Counting on the difficulties he confronted in attempting to present his experience of the Nazi 
concentration camps, Ellie Wiesel tells us that language or words “„destroy what they aim to 
describe, they alter what they try to emphasize. By altering the truth, words end up taking its 
place, resulting in the displacement of facts and truths altogether.‟”45 Certainly, the moment the 
process of documenting (through the visual, oral or printed forms) commences, tangible violence 
                                                 
44
 Thomas M. Hawley, The remains of war: bodies, politics, and the search for American soldiers unaccounted for 
in Southeast Asia (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2005), p. 7. 
45
 Elie Wiesel, cited in James Young, Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust: narrative and the consequences of 
interpretation(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 22. 
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which such techniques intend making public begin to “fall apart” and disintegrate. “Analogies 
fall woefully short; definitions seem impossible [and] explanations are simply inconceivable.”46 
 
In Writing History, Writing Trauma, Dominick LaCapra adds the following: in writing about 
violence, “loss goes with writing … absence and loss become palpable through discoursing …. 
„It is here that events … are omitted from the language of the writing but are made present in the 
absence of writing.‟”47 LaCapra‟s scenario, when applied to this study, infers that language does 
not only roast evidence, but it completely burns into ashes the original face of a thing that is the 
subject of the storyline. Remarkably so, the disintegration and dissolution of residues of memory, 
somewhat contained in survivors‟ oral narratives, increases the more testimony is transformed 
from the original voice of the victim into the text. As such, there is a considerable loss of 
residues of evidence of the Cassinga massacre in the transcribed and translated interviews than in 
the original recorded voice of survivors. That is to say, the act of writing down things or making 
text from voice produces even more absences when describing the Cassinga massacre than those 
first layers of practical things that survivors‟ oral accounts obliterate earlier.  
 
Des Pres argues suggestively that this shortcoming, the absence of the actual traumatic world in 
the text, is imbedded in “displacement,” because the goal of any text is, according Terence Des 
Pres, to “usurp the real world with a world that is imagined”48 or make-believe. Putting it 
differently, tangible violence falls outside the disciplinary effects of testimony (printed or oral). 
For this reason, the more testimony attempts to recreate or reconstruct the real traumatic world, 
the more damage is done and the more violence disintegrates and falls flat in the text. This was 
particularly my experience when I processed the interviews with survivors of the Cassinga 
massacre into transcripts. In fact, the disintegration and dissolution of residues of survivors‟ 
memories somewhat contained in survivors oral narratives, increased the more oral testimonies 
were reconfigured and transformed from the voice of the victims into printed testimonies. 
 
                                                 
46
 Peter N. Goggin and Maureen Daly Goggin, “Presence in absence: discourses and teaching (in, on, about) 
Trauma.” Cited in Shane Borrowman (ed.), Trauma and the teaching of writing (Albany: State University of New 
York, 2006), p. 36. 
47
 Ibid, pp. 34 - 35.  
48
 Terence Des Pres, cited in Kali Tal, The world of hurt: reading the literature of trauma (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 137. 
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Photographs as metaphoric testimonies 
 
Some key theorists of photography like Roland Barthes, Walter Benjamin, Susan Sontag, 
Siegfried Kracauer and John Tagg have explored the relationship between photography and 
reality from analyzing photographs as “certificates of presence” or truth, to doubting the 
truthfulness or usefulness of photographs as sources of historical evidence.
49
 In this connection, 
my study argues that the „discipline‟ of attempting to detain scenes of violence and, belatedly, to 
present them to an intended audience through the medium or art of photography does significant 
damage to the authenticity of the violence that survivors wish to present in its original form and 
space. Photographs jam, flatten, blur, obscure and are visibly oblivious to the multiple realities 
that individual survivors experienced. By contrast, some studies theorize photographs as 
embedded in the discourse of “authenticating” events or, to follow Caroline Brothers, disclosing 
the “exact physiognomy”50 or actual pictures of the events shown in photographs. How exactly 
photographic images validate and relate violence to the actual life of the things they aspire to 
represent, however, appears very problematic.   
 
Part of my study is to engage particular photographic images of the Cassinga massacre as a way 
of attempting to explore and challenge the metaphoric assumption that images do convey the 
actual life of the object. I base my theory on survivors‟ responses to the various images of the 
Cassinga massacre that I presented to them during the interviews for perusal, comments and 
interpretations. Individual survivors were disappointed by the subtleness of the Cassinga images, 
because the outer surface of photographs, to follow Caroline Brothers‟ argument, in a different 
context, “provides minimal information about what they (photographs) literally depict.”51 
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 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on photography (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981); John Tagg, The 
burden of representation: essays on photographies and histories (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1993); Roland Barthes, “Shock-photos.” In The Eiffel Tower and other mythologies (Berkely, Los Angeles and 
London: University of California Press, 1977); Susan Sontag, “In Plato‟s Cave.” In On photography (New York: 
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Utterson, and K. J. Sheperdson (eds.). Film theory: critical concepts in media and cultural studies, (London and 
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 Caroline Brothers, War and photography: a cultural history (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 5. 
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 Ibid, p. 2. 
18 
 
Rather than using images (photographs and video) “to produce knowledge,”52 Martin Lister and 
Liz Wells “focus on the analysis of images and the contexts in which they become meaningful … 
by formulating what they call a Visual Cultural Studies … (which) … allow the analyst to attend 
to the many moments within the cycle of production, circulation and consumption of the image 
through which meanings accumulate, slip and shift.”53 Lister‟s and Wells‟ analysis relates to my 
own investigation of the „production,‟ „circulation,‟ travel and consumption of photographs of 
the Cassinga attack. One of the central arguments in this regard relates to the photojournalistic 
shot of the Cassinga open mass grave which, in the immediate aftermath of the massacre, the 
media constructed into the „iconic photograph‟ showing the Cassinga massacre.54 
 
As „iconic,‟ this figurative image became the most widely published, circulated and exhibited in 
newspapers and other publications with the intent, ironically, to give the feel and taste of the 
merciless killings of unarmed Namibian refugees. In this respect, my study challenges the 
tendency among the public audience (framed by the media and political statements or discourses) 
to perceive visual images of the Cassinga attack as indisputable documents of historical 
evidence. The central working theory, in this regard, would be that photographs – like words and 
language – are metaphors, as they circumvent and contradict the dynamics of the physical or 
tangible violence they claim to represent. Hence, photographic images of the Cassinga attack are 
never evidence of history. Instead they create an enabling space for public dialogues, and they 
also encourage social research investigations into the missing historical evidence or efforts to 
interrogate the contradictory dynamics between the actual violence and testimonies which such 
images produce.  
 
Lastly, this study will also use oral methodologies to explore and theorize the contemporary 
issues that affect the victims of the Cassinga massacre in the long aftermath of that traumatic 
episode. In fact, the way Cassinga is remembered and narrated through the medium of visual and 
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oral representations does not address the victims‟ uninterrupted emotional and physical 
sufferings which have been ignored and exacerbated over the years. In spite of considerable 
limitations of visual and oral testimonies, in attempting to represent the experience of the brutal 
Cassinga massacre, such techniques still receive preponderant precedence.  In the public 
narration of the Cassinga massacre, the victims‟ ongoing suffering is gravely attenuated by the 
rhetoric of institutional visuality: a situation which the victims and their families consider less 
acknowledging of their ongoing sufferings. 
 
Existing Literature 
 
Cassinga is described as the worst single day of loss of Namibian exiles lives in the anti-colonial 
struggle against South African rule since the launch of the Namibian armed liberation struggle in 
1966.
55
 Yet, this event has not received much academic attention over the years. In particular, no 
existing written work on Cassinga, to the knowledge of this study, has explored the suffering that 
the victims of this episode have endured over the years. Equally so, no existing books, academic 
theses and articles with a particular focus on the Cassinga massacre have attempted to explore 
and examine how testimony, photographic images and other means of representing Cassinga 
unveil or obscure the way survivors witnessed ruthless violence in Cassinga.  
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And, most importantly, no available literature on Cassinga has explored the Cassinga massacre 
in the context of its long and uninterrupted traumatic aftermath in the lives of survivors and 
affected families of missing victims. Instead, some existing literature on Cassinga had been 
written with the intent to unveil “the truth about the Cassinga event” through “careful” or good 
research work. In explaining the aim of her book, the Cassinga Event, Annemarie Heywood 
writes that:  
When a group of us originally embarked on a book about the massacre at 
Cassinga, our aim was to search out, among the fragments of personal 
memories and the too-coherent existing narratives, the truth about the 
event. We assumed that a catastrophic event … must possess an objective 
reality which careful research could uncover and record. We envisaged 
that the trauma of Cassinga, which we as a nation publicly commemorate 
each year, could be ... documented.
56
 
 
In spite of asserting that the Cassinga “plain truth has been more difficult to uncover than we 
foresaw,”57 Heywood has attributed this challenge to the absence of “survivors‟ voice” in her 
work. She also claims that the SADF refusal to release images that they filmed and photographed 
during the „entire operation‟ as another reason for the failure of her work to “uncover … truth … 
trauma … and sufferings …”58 experienced in Cassinga.  
 
Heywood‟s claim that oral and visual representations stand a chance to reproduce that very 
violence for the other to experience is problematic, but it does open a space for new kinds of 
thinking and exploration. That is, to challenge the visual and the oral representations of the 
Cassinga massacre in view of their limitations in trying to represent the Cassinga brutal massacre 
and the suffering of the victims that has exacerbated over the years. My study will explore such 
techniques and methods (visual and oral) as ultimately unyielding when it comes to Cassinga 
victims‟ and historians‟ efforts to reclaim the Cassinga violence. This study will also challenge 
the claims that careful social research (to paraphrase Heywood) could uncover and record an 
“objective history” or “truth” of the Cassinga massacre.59 The reasoning here is that the 
sufferings and needs, in particular, of the victims of the Cassinga massacre are so diverse, 
different from one victim to the other, and materially not obtainable or accessible by the other.  
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Kassinga a story untold, by Mvula ya Nangolo & Tor Sellstrom with a foreword by Sam 
Nuuyoma, presents 17 „voices‟ from seventeen survivors,60 sixteen of them women. At the time 
of the attack, they were all below the age of eighteen. The voices of the interviewees are 
translated from Oshiwambo into English, transcribed, and the text then edited. I would argue that 
these transformations raise some serious concerns. The way the original voice is transformed and 
reconfigured brings into question how much chance the text has to capture, contain and 
communicate violence as represented in the original voice of the victims. In fact, the text 
eliminates the voice, its rich content and crucial details of the particles of violence articulated by 
the victim‟s actual voice, in relation to the crucially informative residues of violence that the 
victims‟ body may recognize and acknowledge in the presence of the interviewer.  
 
Paradoxically, the authors of Kassinga a story untold tell us that this work makes available the 
voices of survivors to the reader. This is problematic, because the content of the voice of 
survivors reaches the audience in such a way that the original voice is completely compromised 
by text which taints and obscures it.  
 
I am not suggesting that there is concrete evidence of the violence in survivors‟ different voices 
of narrating the Cassinga experience. But, notwithstanding the fact that violence transcends the 
reach of survivors‟ voices (which attempts to bring violence back to life), my work argues that 
the Kassinga a story untold is further problematic. This is in the way it claims to use survivors‟ 
voice to elicit experiences of that brutal and traumatic event. When such voices are transcribed 
into a text, considerable damage is done to the original content of the voice. For example, the 
text obscures all emotional sentiments which would have been evident when the victims narrated 
their stories in the interviews. I do not claim that my work is an exception here, but it differs 
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from the existing literatures. This is in the way it challenges and interrogates the relationship 
between the actual Cassinga experiences and the different storylines of its telling or refashioning. 
In so doing, I expect my work to unlock the barriers that disconnect and separate the conceptual 
representation of Cassinga from the tangible experience of violence on the ground.  
 
Eagle Strike: The Story of the controversial airborne assault on Cassinga 1978, written by Jan 
Breytenbach, the field commander of the SADF paratroopers who attacked and killed Namibian 
exiles at Cassinga, is in many respects a contradictory publication. The book contains, alongside 
its sizeable text, a number of photographs shot in Cassinga during the attack. Nonetheless, the 
photographs reveal no dead bodies of women and children during the SADF indiscriminate 
shooting of civilians as survivors claimed in their testimonies. The absence of civilians‟ dead 
bodies corroborates the author‟s argument that the SADF paratroopers did not kill civilians in 
Cassinga. Hence, the photographs he exhibits in his publication are “disclosures of truth” about 
the SADF attack of Cassinga. Yet, how the „truth‟ of the Cassinga attack (SADF version) or 
massacre (survivors‟ version) can “appear … outside ellipsis and hyperbole,”61 or how “truth” is 
made visible and tangible through photographs and texts, is problematic. My study will argue 
that the SADF photographs of the Cassinga massacre were constructed with the purpose to 
obscure the Cassinga traumatic scenes which would associate the SADF with the brutal killings 
of innocent Namibians, particularly women and children. For this reason, the SADF visual 
testimonies of the Cassinga massacre are particularly in conflict with survivors‟ experience and 
testimonies of what happened in Cassinga  
 
An article on Cassinga by the Namibian-born South African military historian, Prof. Leo 
Barnard, raises issues pertinent to my exploration of exacerbating survivors‟ ongoing sufferings 
as raised in Section Two (Chapters 6 and 7) of this thesis.
62
 Barnard uses problematic 
terminology such as “the Cassinga battle,” and alludes to the population in the camp as 
“elements of SWAPO.” Maybe these representations do not disclose an aura of extreme dislike 
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and intolerance for others‟ political views but they are, most importantly, one of the factors 
which regenerate survivors‟ ongoing suffering. Because reconfiguring the Cassinga massacre 
into a „battle‟ suspends survivors‟ chance of recovery as victims, most of them, who were 
actually children and non-combatants when Cassinga was attacked, consider such statements as 
pestering and re-wounding their unhealed emotional wounds. Survivors also consider such 
statements as disclosing a disrespect for the violated human dignity and integrity of the innocent 
victims of the Cassinga event. 
 
Two scholarly studies about the history of the Namibian exiled communities during the South 
African occupation of Namibia have been completed recently. These are Christian A. Williams‟ 
doctoral thesis, “Exile history: An ethnography of the SWAPO camps and the Namibian 
Nation.”63 The other study was carried out by Martha Akawa in a doctoral thesis that examines 
“Sexual politics of the Namibian liberation struggle.”64 
 
Interestingly, Williams‟ chapter about the Cassinga camp and the attack that annihilated it, as 
well as his subsequent article on “Remember Cassinga?”65 raise a number of problematic issues. 
One of such problems emerges from the photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave which as 
Williams notes:  
became the most enduring symbol of Cassinga. Taken from the grave's 
edge, the mass grave photos are close enough to the corpses for individual 
bodies, and in some cases the clothing, wounds and flies covering them, to 
be discernible. The photos demand a visceral reaction. In the weeks 
following the attack and for years to follow, SWAPO and solidarity 
organisations published texts alongside the photos that directed this reaction 
by imputing meaning to the bodies in the grave. Texts drew attention to the 
'civilian' qualities of the bodies, the suffering of Namibians under 
colonialism, and the violence committed against oppressed people in other 
settings. In so doing, they associated the mass grave at Cassinga with the 
history of the refugee camp.
66
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As Williams put it, the photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave is an enduring symbol of 
Cassinga‟s violence. But this assumption is only meaningful when one takes into account the 
context of this photograph as the most widely published and disseminated of all the Cassinga 
attack photographs. Likewise, it is problematic to suggest, as Williams did, that the publication 
of “texts alongside the photo” of the Cassinga open mass grave is a way of “imputing meaning to 
the bodies in the grave.” My study contests this argument. The central argument is that the 
photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave does not, in any way possible, draw “attention to 
the 'civilian' qualities of the bodies in the mass grave (the same as the use of text along the 
photograph of the open mass grave), the suffering of Namibians under colonialism, and the 
violence committed against oppressed people in other settings” as Williams argues. Instead, the 
use of visual and other techniques of documenting the Cassinga massacre should be understood 
as ways through which violence and its dynamics are deconstructed. Photographs collapse and 
taint acts of violence with a near absence of factual evidence. The „near absence of factual 
evidence,‟ which the photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave exhibits, obscures the 
traumatic experience and suffering of those who survived the massacre as they narrate it. 
 
In attempts to make available a different understanding about how photographs of the Cassinga 
attack are connected to or contradict the actual life experience of the Cassinga massacre, this 
work will problematize the photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave as completely at 
variance with the epistemological truth of Cassinga, because violence in this photograph, if any, 
is challenged by the mainstream testimonies of survivors of this episode. This is not to say that 
survivors‟ testimonies (which manifests through verbal or other forms) represent the Cassinga 
experience objectively. But it suggests that the violence which survivors experienced in 
Cassinga, according to their testimonies, is not represented in the photograph of the Cassinga 
open mass grave, nor can the use of text alongside this photograph elicit the untold violence of 
Cassinga, let alone describe each survivor‟s way of seeing and surviving the Cassinga massacre.  
 
To the extent of what this study can establish about survivors, the majority of the victims of the 
Cassinga massacre were women. Moreover, the largest number of people physically maimed at 
Cassinga and who live today in dire need of medical and other assistance consists of women. In a 
brief description of the Cassinga massacre and contestations that followed it, Akawa‟s doctoral 
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thesis makes the significant point that Cassinga symbolizes “one of the incidents in which 
women were hailed as victims and heroines at the same time: … women shared in death, 
defiance and victory.” As things turned out in post-war Namibia, “promises and pronouncements 
about equality have not been kept: twenty years after the end of the war, women‟s bodies remain 
battlefields.”67 
 
Whilst Akawa‟s argument encompasses the suffering and the “bravery” of all Namibian women 
who participated in and contributed to the liberation struggle, particularly in exile, she has not 
addressed particular problems concerning survivors of the Cassinga massacre. My study attempts 
to explore the category of women survivors of the Cassinga massacre in independent Namibia, 
with particular reference to the long-term after-effects and ongoing repudiation of the victims‟ 
human integrity.  
 
The woman‟s body as a “battlefield” is a crucial metaphor. In my study, I problematize the 
women‟s physically damaged bodies, resulting from the Cassinga attack, to emphasize women‟s 
endurance of the physical and emotional suffering since the attack. In particular, my study 
introduces the concept of internal violence. That is, the pervasive state of the endless suffering of 
the Cassinga victims, most of whom are women, and which is not external or explicit to others. 
Therefore, although many survivors‟ bodies show terrible or visually unbelievable protrusions or 
damage, such sites (which I refer to in Chapter 4 as closed gates through which violence made 
physical penetration into the victim‟s body) should not be perceived as showing us survivors‟ 
actual endurance of suffering. Instead, the physically harrowing scars of the damaged body 
should be understood as concealing the actual sentient agony of the individual body that is not 
only damaged, but is also beyond repair. 
 
Structure of the Study 
 
As the reader looks ahead to the rest of this work, it is crucial to explain the style of this thesis. 
This work flows in an „accumulative‟ or „incremental‟ sequence. This mode of expression or 
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formation emphasizes the amassing or increasing multiple layers of traumatic ordeals which the 
victims of the Cassinga massacre are enduring since that episode. In other words, the style of this 
thesis is intended to orient the reader along the path of the disturbing emotional issues of the 
Cassinga massacre which are getting nastier and thornier for the victims every day. 
Consequently, the flow of this thesis begins with the survivors‟ shorter lived traumatic 
experience of violence in Cassinga and ends with their never-ending and inescapable emotional 
and psychological damage which, instead of healing, have been accumulating much pain and 
suffering over the years.  
 
In grappling with the conflict between diverse testimonies and memories of the Cassinga attack, 
as well as the immense suffering and its complexities embedded in the pervasiveness of the 
violence which still pierces survivors‟ lives since the Cassinga event, this work is appropriately 
divided into two distinct sections. The first section, Chapters 2 to 5, interrogates and critiques 
how the visual and oral presentations of the Cassinga massacre do, or do not, authenticate 
survivors‟ actual experience of violence on the ground. The last section of this study, Chapters 6 
and 7, is concerned with the exploration of survivors‟ ongoing emotional disturbance and rage 
due to the victims‟ „disrupted expectations‟ in the name of „reconciliation without justice.‟  
 
Chapter 2 critiques the way the photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave is incorrectly 
interpreted
68
 as an „iconic‟ visual image supposedly exposing the SADF‟s brutal massacre of 
defenceless women and children in Cassinga. One argument in this chapter is that the misery of 
the Cassinga massacre is not elicitable or “transferable to others” through photographic practices. 
Put differently, the actual experience of the Cassinga massacre on the ground, which many 
survivors described as constituting multiple scenes of panic and horror, was far more brutal and 
complex than what this image has constructed and framed or fixed.  
 
Critically therefore, this visual image produces the absence of the physical violence as tangibly 
experienced by those who survived the humanitarian disaster on the ground. In view of this 
scenario, the central focus of this chapter is to problematize the ambiguity of the photograph of 
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the Cassinga open mass grave in relation to its “iconicity.” The chapter argues that this image 
constructs a monolithic and rudimentary picture in relation to the heterogeneity and complex 
materiality of the situation on the ground. This argument interrogates, to follow Sarah Pink‟s 
point, “the problematic assumption that reality is visible, observable and recordable in video or 
photographs.”69 To this end, the “iconic photograph” of the Cassinga massacre is not a 
“dominant source of knowledge and (re)presentation” of the exactness of the brutal experience of 
the Cassinga massacre. Instead, this image transmits an implicit and subtle face of the Cassinga 
violence.  
 
Chapter 3 examines images photographed by SADF paratroopers during the fall of the Cassinga 
camp. In particular, this chapter focuses on the picture of Brigadier Mike Du Plessis and Colonel 
Jan Breytenbach, the two top field commanders for the Cassinga attack who were photographed 
in Cassinga during the operation. The chapter argues that, in creating this photograph, the eye of 
the SADF camera appeared tilted in such a way that the background and foreground of the 
photograph have been eliminated. This is, perhaps, to forestall the disturbing realities of what 
actually happened to the victims of the Cassinga massacre. In view of this representation, the 
chapter argues that this image silences violence and constructs another reality for public 
consumption.
70
 The deliberate obscuring of the violence that this image was apparently created 
for, as opposed to the supposed explosiveness of brutal violence that the “iconic photograph” of 
the Cassinga open mass grave intended showing the world, creates a dichotomy between the 
story of this photograph and that of the victims of the massacre.  
 
In this relation above, the chapter argues that since this photograph was staged in such a way that 
the perpetrators appear divorced from the brutal violence that they are accused of having 
committed against civilians, then the sort of „truth‟ that the immaculate photograph (as I will 
refer to the main photograph in this chapter) attempts to disseminate is metaphoric or symbolic. 
That is, the meaning that this photograph is anticipated to propagate is a superficial thing: 
concealing the violent environment it purports to represent and in which it exists. Hence, the 
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genre of truth that this picture shows exists only within the limits of the SADF official discourse 
of the Cassinga attack.  
 
Chapter 4 deals with issues of individual survivors‟ bodily damage as metaphors: Here, two 
cases of survivors with disabled or amputated body parts as a result of the Cassinga attack are the 
central focus. The chapter argues that the terrible memories embedded in such sites of violence 
(scars on the victims‟ bodies) are far beyond the reach, explanations and understandings of the 
inexperienced viewers. I will refer to such sites or scars of the victims‟ damaged bodies as closed 
gates, because such scars symbolize violent spaces through which violence made forced entrance 
into the victims‟ bodies. The victims, bearers of such sites of violence, describe such damaged 
spaces as frontiers: because they obscure the inexperienced viewer from witnessing violence 
beyond the surface of the damaged body. In this relation, two concepts, implicit and explicit 
memories become crucial to explore as I attempt to trace the picture of the experienced violence 
and its endurance beyond the surface of the amputated or damaged body.  
 
Implicit memory is problematized as an acidic substance that does not virtually exist as tangible 
evidence on the surface of the scars of the wounded victims‟ bodies. Instead, it resides below the 
surface of the scars, therefore, obscured from others‟ experience and understanding. The chapter 
further argues that although implicit memory is so violent inside the body of the beholder, it is 
not elicitable for the other people to see and offer assistance to the sufferer. Equally so, the 
victims whose bodies are maimed and showing disturbing sites of violence do not have a proper 
language to express their suffering and unending pain other than telling us stories or metaphors 
about the atrocious Cassinga massacre and its excruciating aftermath. Hence, other than 
perceiving them as metaphors, it is problematic to embrace the victims‟ damaged bodies as 
authenticating the dynamic of the actual experience and endurance of the Cassinga violence.  
 
Chapter 5 discusses, among other issues, how testimony relates to memory. By memory, I refer 
to the way the experience of the violence is framed and concealed inside the victim‟s body and 
emotions and which cannot be passed on to the other as tangible evidence. In this relation, I shall 
argue that testimony is no substitute for memory. Instead, testimony should be embraced as a 
metaphor or shadowy figure of memory. This is based on the fact that every testimonial narrative 
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of the Cassinga attack breaks ties with the facticity or materiality of that event. Testimony 
authenticates the Cassinga massacre insufficiently. One reason to explain this anomaly is the fact 
that testimony articulates language. It conveys to us stories about the Cassinga massacre, rather 
than articulating the violence that it aspires to unearth and unravel to the inexperienced other.  
 
In view of this conflict, I will attempt to explore how testimony or metaphors, as a technique that 
aspires to show Cassinga the way it was practically experienced on the ground, eclipse the 
physical violence. Yet, testimony or metaphors, as I have indicated earlier, still receive 
preponderant precedence, in the public narration of the Cassinga massacre, over the victims‟ 
ongoing sufferings. This is contrary to survivors intentions to disclose the violence before the 
inexperienced world. As a result, considerable contradictions arise between the vibrant dynamics 
of the actual traumatic world and the conceptual representation of the Cassinga massacre through 
testimonies. 
 
Chapter 6 argues that as a result of the gruesomeness and the “political outrage” of the Cassinga 
massacre, the majority of South African paratroopers who took part in the attack have remained 
mute about what happened in Cassinga in 1978. This is particularly so of a few prominent 
figures, especially the top military echelons in the planning and commanding role of the 
Cassinga massacre, who have remained obdurate that Cassinga was a legitimate military target. 
The central argument in this chapter is that the perpetrators‟ silence or denial of the mass killings 
of civilians in Cassinga illustrates the divisions among them. To put it slightly differently, not all 
paratroopers agree with the SADF official version of the Cassinga attack. This is primarily 
noticeable in the differences between the former senior commanders of the Cassinga attack and 
some of their former junior officers, some of whom have publicly challenged the SADF version 
by refuting its claims that Cassinga was not a refugee camp. Three distinctive categories of the 
Cassinga paratroopers will be explored according to the following classifications: Disclaimers, 
Polemicists and Introverts as I call them.  
 
As Cassinga enters into the distant future with layers of unresolved issues piling on top of each 
other, the victims‟ suffering exacerbates. In this relation, Chapter 7 argues that the victims‟ 
unending suffering and anger are exacerbated due to the unacceptable ways of dealing with the 
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aftermath of the Cassinga massacre, especially following Namibia independence. These issues 
include, among others, the victims‟ disrupted expectations, the „biased‟ Namibian policy of 
reconciliation (which is given greater constitutional power than the suffering of the victims of 
colonialism and apartheid in Namibia), the lack of recognition for the victims‟ loss of human 
dignity, loss of loved ones, the right to know what happened to missing loved ones, the 
perpetrators‟ denial and disrespect for the sufferings of the victims, and the absence of social 
justice to deal with issues of integrity of the victims and the dead since Namibia‟s independence. 
 
On a concluding note, it is important to state what this thesis does not do. One major feature of 
this study is the deliberate exclusion of the survivors‟ voice and body language as I have 
observed during different conversations with interviewees. This study also does not rely on the 
complete and direct transcriptions of how interviewees narrated what happened at Cassinga and 
the succeeding aftermath. Only a small number of the survivors I have interviewed have been 
quoted in this work as the nature of the work, scope and space could not allow me to do what 
individual survivors expected this work to produce. And indeed, as I began writing this work, a 
considerable amount of interviewees‟ transcripts used in this thesis were heavily reduced into 
excerpts, which in turn were edited and somewhat reshaped to suit the emerging theoretical 
argument and constraints of the academic framework required here.  
 
Given these considerations, I would characterize this work as a “metadiscourse.” That is, it is a 
scholarly approach that does not attempt to reproduce survivors‟ narratives of witnessing the 
massacre and the traumatic aftermath. But it also does not reject the way Cassinga is understood 
in the domain of survivors‟ remembering and understanding the SADF mass killing and maiming 
of Namibian exiles at Cassinga. This combines with and is exacerbated by the victims‟ 
endurance of suffering in silence, the incapacity of testimony to tangibly disclose the victims‟ 
damaged lives and, regrettably, the failure of post-colonial Namibia to deal with perpetrators of 
brutal violence and past gross human rights violations. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
VIOLENCE AND THE “ICONIC PHOTOGRAPH” 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The “iconic photograph” of one of the Cassinga open mass graves, 1978. According to Tor Sellstrom, who 
was in the UN team (UNHCR and WHO) that came to Cassinga a week after the massacre, this photograph was 
captured between May 5 and 6 by Gaetano Pagano, an Italian cameraman. At the time of the Cassinga massacre, 
Pagano was shooting a documentary film on Angola for a Swedish Television (SVT).  
 
There is more than meets the eye in the photograph you see above. Primarily, the image you see 
challenges material evidence or historical actuality of the untold experience of Cassinga. Yet, the 
visual picture of the Cassinga open mass grave remains the “most important means through 
which the experience” of the brutal violence at Cassinga is narrated and shared in the public 
space. This is the entry point of this chapter which, among other things, explores the trajectory of 
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reconfiguring and framing loss of lives, bloodshed and the suffering of the victims of this 
traumatic episode through this photographic representation. In particular, this chapter examines 
how Cassinga is (re)constructed through the medium of this image in relation to different 
witnesses - survivors, perpetrators and photographers who visited and saw one of the two open 
mass graves at Cassinga - of the Cassinga massacre. 
 
The anniversary of the Cassinga massacre is commemorated in Namibia each year, on May 4, 
ever since the attack happened. A number of times when such national events take place, the 
photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave is printed and distributed to „show‟ the audience the 
suffering and agony of the brutal massacre of innocent Namibians at Cassinga. Interestingly, 
speakers at such national gatherings tell people that the photograph of the Cassinga open mass 
grave preserves memories of the brutal Cassinga massacre against forgetfulness.
71
 Nonetheless, 
analytically, this “iconic photograph” transmits a packaged, framed and conceptual genre of 
reality. For instance, the way this photograph is selective in showing only a particular scene of 
violence allows survivors of the Cassinga massacre to identify its obliviousness to multiple other 
terrible and, indeed, tangible realities of the Cassinga experience.  
 
How this photograph can actually represent the untold and ongoing traumatic suffering of the 
victims of the Cassinga massacre, in particular the dead and the muted in the mass grave, is 
problematic. One immediate reason is that the „iconic‟ photograph is a symbolic image. As such, 
the subject of the violence that this photograph was projected to expose is compromised by the 
dynamic of the impenetrable silhouette (or shadow) that this photograph elicits. The appearance 
of the “shadowy figure” that is insulating and homogenizing the dead bodies in the mass graves, 
making it difficult for the viewers to recognize and identify individual bodies of their loved ones, 
is crucial. This translates into survivors‟ claims that most of the dead bodies were violently 
mutilated by the attackers. Moreover, the dead bodies were spoiled as they were left unattended 
to for more than a day (see Paavo Max‟s account in this chapter) before the mass burials.  
 
In fact, the people affected by the Cassinga massacre see the “iconic photograph” as producing 
multiple shadows of darkness in the lives of the bereaved families. The „shadow of darkness‟ 
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relates to the way this image suggests the brutal massacre of the innocent Namibians. Yet, 
affected families find no explanation; nothing in this photograph that can console and help them 
find solace in the loss of their loved ones. In essence, this image suggests that the „truer‟ or 
tangible disastrous human carnage and individual identities of the Cassinga victims is something 
that nobody will ever recover and explain through the visual images of Cassinga. 
 
If this image is a silhouette or shadow of the actual traumatic experience of those innocent 
Namibians buried in the mass grave, then this photograph should not be perceived as disclosing 
any „truth‟ that reveals the tangible loathsomeness of that despicable episode. Instead, it should 
be treated as a piece of the historical record, not evidence of the Cassinga events. This suggests 
that as a „historical record‟ or testimony of the mass killings of innocent Namibians, this 
photograph does not produce the exactitude of that event. This means that historical records of 
the Cassinga massacre (unlike the actual experience of the event) are “constructed in human 
consciousness” or intelligence under distinct limitations. To paraphrase Allen Johnson in a 
different context, whether the aim of historical records (such as the case of the iconic 
photograph) is to tell how it really was or how it really came to be, such records can never reach 
mathematical certainty or a high degree of probability or explain the dynamics of the violence as 
experienced in actual life.
72
 
 
In the above context, the iconic photograph, as a document of the Cassinga massacre‟s historical 
record, is less complex and less truthful than the actual dynamic of the violence. The grim 
picture that this image shows is disembodied / removed from the mesh of multiple complex 
realities of violence and human suffering (physical and emotional) as a result of the Cassinga 
massacre. This image rather presents a single reality, albeit abstract, by way of constructing an 
impenetrable wall. The wall or the frontier between the viewer and the dead bodies conceals 
multiple undisclosed and unimaginable suffering experienced by the dead. The impassable 
frontier of separation or the exclusions that this image constructs generates collusion between 
violence, death and impunity. These three subjects - violence, death and impunity - all of which 
represent conceptual meaning in this study act together by way of cementing the obscurity 
                                                 
72
 Allen Johnson, The historian and historical evidence(New York: Charles Scribner‟s sons, 1926), p. 141. 
34 
 
between the dead bodies and those of us who intend to communicate with the dead people about 
their untold bitter experiences. 
 
So, since this image breaks ties with the tangible atrociousness of the massacre, it raises a 
number of exploratory questions and interrogations about how this picture authenticates the 
version of truth regarding the indiscriminate mass killing, maiming, disappearance and suffering 
of innocent Namibian refugees. In this relation, Scott McQuire argues that, although in a 
different context, “the ambiguity of the meaning of images not only questions the modern notion 
of truth,” but it also destabilizes the basic premises of modernity and the reality that the camera, 
“as an agent of change that overturns the realist paradigm,” frames and constructs.73 Here, the 
notion of “destabilization” also relates to the way this photograph frames violence in such a way 
that it presents the viewer with multiple categories of concealed and unnamed traumatic 
experiences. The exclusion of despicable violence and its dynamics stimulates witnesses of the 
Casssinga attack to narrate individual experiences of some of the terrible things that the “iconic” 
photograph conceals. Let me attempt to explore this scenario under the following subheading. 
 
Tracing other realities beyond the „iconic‟ frame: the eyewitnesses‟ account 
 
Around noon, May 4, 1978 John Kawaalala
74
 left Lubango with two companies of PLAN 
combatants or Omakoma  Most of the combatants were new intakes at the Tobias Hainyeko 
Training Centre
75
 near Lubango, a distance of 278km North West of Cassinga. Their attempt to 
reach Cassinga on the day of the massacre was unsuccessful. Their convoy was bombed by the 
South African Air Force (SAAF) and forced to retreat back to Lubango. On the night of May 4, 
they regrouped and successfully arrived in Cassinga on the morning of May 5 under the 
command of Uushona alias Komanda yeeKomanda. As soon as they arrived, they started 
collecting the dead bodies for mass burial. Paavo Max who provided me with this account said 
that Dimo Hamaambo
76
 delegated the task of counting the dead bodies to him as they were 
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interred in the mass graves. The following brief excerpt provides a glimpse of Max‟s experience 
of the making of the Cassinga mass graves and the counting of the dead bodies. “We started with 
the smaller trench. One hundred and forty four [144] bodies were buried in that hole. The badly 
mutilated and spoiled bodies,” Paavo said, 
were collected first and taken to the nearest burial site. This site was at the 
centre of the camp, near the clinic … It was easily accessible than the 
bigger trench that was at the far end of the camp ... where many civilians 
were killed. The smaller trench was very deep, but very narrow. This is 
why we buried the badly damaged bodies and other bisected human pieces 
inside that narrower trench. This could also be the reason why the 
photograph of that mass grave appears not to exist. The second trench was 
much larger as it was meant for storage purposes
77
 … we were planning to 
build a storage depot at that site.
78
 That one, the main mass grave lays in 
the west of the camp closer to the maize field - a few meters away- on the 
left side of the pathway from the centre of the camp to the river side … in 
the western direction of the camp. I counted five hundred and eighty three 
(583) bodies buried in the main mass grave. The total number of the 
bodies buried in the two mass graves is seven hundred and twenty seven 
(727). This is the number I counted and submitted to the late Tate 
Uushona.
79
 
 
The following excerpt taken from the interview with Ndarius “Mbolondondo” Shikongo who 
also participated in the mass burials of the Cassinga victims corroborates Max‟s account:   
The bodies in this mass grave (in the photograph above) are buried in 
layers. But, I must admit that most of the bodies were not handled with the 
respect they deserved. Many of them were in very bad shape, especially 
those buried in the smaller mass grave and underneath the bigger mass 
grave: they were badly mutilated. The top layer that appears in this 
photograph contains the less mutilated bodies … what is at the bottom of 
this photograph is horrible … you cannot see it but – believe what I tell 
you! … Pieces and parts of human flesh … our soldiers from Lubango, 
who piled up the bodies and buried them, were instructed to lay the bodies 
accordingly, in accordance with our customs and rituals. For example, the 
heads of the dead facing the West … we detached shoes from their feet 
and removed the belts, as it is a custom that one cannot bury a dead body, 
oshimhu, wearing a belt or shoes. Regrettably, the task of collecting the 
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bodies was enormous and quite challenging. The stench was unbearable 
and we had no special equipment and tools other than using bare hands 
and wooden sticks to carry the bodies … The enemy abandoned some 
stretchers in the camp, but they were not enough. We cut wooden sticks to 
carry the bodies across the length and breadth of the camp … and you 
know there were close to eight hundred dead bodies, not counting parts 
and pieces of human flesh. We tried the best we could, but it became too 
difficult to properly manage and control the distressful situation. It became 
almost impossible to bury the dead, procedurally and accordingly. It was a 
miserable moment … We were confronted with uneasinesss to do things 
accordingly. The unprecedented number of mutilated bodies … the 
unpleasant stench of human blood and flesh made us drowsy, nauseous 
and very much uncomfortable. However, we managed to speed up that 
difficult and challenging task. We hurried to cover the mass graves to 
reduce the stench of the decomposing bodies. We had the urge to finish, at 
once, and move away from the horrible smell, away from the qualms of 
the unpleasant pictures of human misery and total destruction to the camp 
and property. Unfortunately, after we have closed the mass graves, we 
received instructions to display the bodies for journalists to view and 
document the massacre. People stepped on the bodies, removed sand and 
prepared the bodies for the journalists viewing and photographing. The 
mass graves were left open … we covered the top of the open tombs with 
branches of Eucalyptus trees until the arrival of journalists from Luanda. It 
was a horrible experience, very difficult and emotional moment to 
remember: people dead with their grieving eyes and mouths widely open 
and fixed on you, which is customarily incorrect!
80
 
 
The bizarre and challenging task of re-opening the Cassinga mass graves was not about 
conducting forensic assessments or establishing the DNA examinations to determine individual 
identities of unidentified bodies buried in the Cassinga mass graves which remain shrouded in 
the mystery of unknown persons. The largest mass grave at Cassinga was reopened for a 
different purpose. That is, the camera was expected to witness the unacceptable level of brutal 
murder of defenceless women and children, and, in return, report the level of unacceptable 
violence to the concerned public. Ironically, it turned out that instead of capturing the reality of 
the violence that the bodies in the mass graves experienced, for the public knowledge and 
understanding of it, the camera packaged the dead bodies into objects which conceal violence.  
 
What is interesting, and particularly gruesome, is that the camera can actually literally not 
penetrate the top layer of the dead bodies to reveal the terrible evidence below and therefore it 
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disallows the public viewing and understanding of violence through the visual. So, while the 
photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave may bring to our sight some prearranged images of 
blurred dead bodies, whose identities are difficult to recognize even with the assistance of 
survivors‟ interviews, this photograph cannot unpack traumatic memories and the suffering of 
the dead: the victims‟ struggle with their terminally wounded bodies and their appalling 
experience of brutal death under the care of no one.  
 
In considering this scenario, the politics of the camera as “an eye of history,” one that is 
associated with “realism” as Brady is quoted to have said, and therefore invested with the 
absolute power to reveal “unpleasant, hard facts,”81 is challenged. This is the position of Susan 
Sontag who contends that “many of the canonical images of early war photography turn out to 
have been staged, or to have their subjects tampered with.”82 This trend in photography resonates 
with the way photography constructed, framed and packaged the photograph of the Cassinga 
open mass grave for the consumption of public audience. As a consequence, there are conflicting 
statements between individual survivors‟ (those few who attended the burials) experience of the 
scene of the mass grave prior to the re-opening, and what the camera saw and showed to the 
public after the mass grave was unsealed. Let us consider more closely this part of the interview 
with Paavo Max:  
My sister, Anna Max, was killed in the attack … I was fortunate to 
discover her dead body and assessed how she was killed. She had two 
bullet wounds in the back of her head through her forehead. My analysis is 
that she was shot point-blank from behind while hiding from the enemy in 
the defensive trenches. I, myself buried her in this mass grave … her body 
was laid on the top layer of the mass grave, but it is difficult to recognize 
and identify it in the photograph. But, for sure her body is there.
83
 
 
If the Cassinga largest mass grave was re-opened (first, the earth was shoveled out to expose the 
bodies, then people stepped on the bodies to remove non-human particles) to reveal the dead 
bodies for the camera‟s two-dimensional eye, then it suggests that what we see in the photograph 
was reconstructed, recreated and remade in a number of ways. Such possible repackaging would 
have compromised the original arrangement of the bodies in the mass grave. In other words, it is 
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possible that the top layer of the bodies in the larger mass grave at Cassinga was rearranged or 
restaged in a particular way for the camera gaze. To give one example, Paavo Max told me that 
the mutilated body of his sister, Anna Max, was originally visible among the bodies forming the 
top layer of the mass grave, but invisible in the “iconic” photograph.     
 
Therefore, the fact that this photograph packages, mysteriously, the recognizable dead bodies 
into unknown persons generates a particular trajectory of conflicting truths. In fact, the genre of 
truth documented in this photograph drifts away from the individual survivors‟ realities. This 
pertains to the witnesses‟ personal encounter with the physical recognition and emotional 
presence of the dead people during the burial process, not only mutilated but decomposing and 
issuing a terrible smell, with maggots and flies, all of which cannot be verified in the photograph 
of the Cassinga open mass grave. 
 
Authorship, circulation and intention of the „iconic photograph‟ 
 
Gary Baines provides hints about early publication and circulation of this photograph:  
The “iconic photograph” of the Cassinga open mass grave, in black 
and white was widely syndicated and published by newspapers 
such as Basler Zeitung under the caption „Ein Dokument des 
Grauens,‟ which translates into English as, „a document of horror.‟ 
In June [1978] SWAPO issued its eponymous bulletin with the 
same image appearing on the cover with the byline („Massacre at 
Kassinga: climax of Pretoria‟s all-out campaign against the 
Namibian resistance‟).The picture was included in the Kassinga 
File, a collection of images compiled by Pagano and Swedish 
filmmaker Sven Asberg.
84
 The file circulated through a network of 
agencies and organizations affiliated to the international anti-
apartheid movements. These organizations distributed and 
displayed the images of the mass grave at public exhibitions and in 
publications. The shot became emblematic of the Cassinga 
massacre. It was also reproduced on a number of posters 
commemorating Kassinga [or Cassinga) Day produced by 
solidarity organizations such as the International University 
Exchange Fund (IUEF) and SWAPO‟s own Department of 
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Information and Publicity poster entitled „Massacre at Kassinga‟ 
which must have been produced fairly soon after the event.
85
 
 
The exact date when this image was shot is ambiguous. Tor Sellstrom
86
 who was in the UN team 
(UNHCR and WHO) that came to Cassinga a week after the massacre told me the following:  
The photo [of the Cassinga open mass grave] was captured between May 5 
and 6 by Gaetano Pagano an Italian. He was at the time shooting a 
documentary film on Angola for a Swedish Television (SVT). We / the 
UN team (UNHCR and WHO) and two journalists from the GDR only 
arrived in Cassinga a week or so after the attack. By then all the mass 
graves were already covered.
87
 
 
Per Sanden who arrived in Cassinga before Tor Sellstrom told me that he is not the author of the 
Cassinga open mass grave photograph:   
I cannot, of course, answer for all the other photographers who visited 
Cassinga after the massacre. In my own case, I did not develop my 
photographs (most of which were shot in Cassinga a few days before the 
attack) until I arrived in Stockholm (Sweden), about a month later. When 
it comes to the film rolls they were all processed in London, a couple of 
days later, since I sent them there for processing and dissemination, owing 
to the fact that South Africa claimed they had attacked a military 
installation and not a refugee settlement. BBC in London processed the 16 
mm films and used them together with my other material taken in 
Cassinga before the attack. This was fast considering the availability of 
laboratories, flights to Europe, etcetera, when there were no portable 
professional video equipment that time and no linking of 16 mm film 
material directly to various stations around the world, which is the case 
today.
88
 
 
The authorship of the photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave is not an issue for this study, 
nor are the individual intentions behind the foreign photographers‟ visit to Cassinga. Political, 
ideological, humanitarian and commercial interests could be some of the factors that drew 
foreign photographers‟ generally to visit Cassinga. In considering the specific scope of this 
study, it is unfortunate that these factors cannot be explored in depth. However, based on the 
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interviews with some of the photographers who visited Cassinga after the massacre, it stands out 
emphatically that individual photographers came to Cassinga with a purpose, based on the 
perception that the camera can capture violence (see Per Sanden‟s account below). There was a 
belief that it could generate sympathy and stir public response to stall or condemn political 
violence in Namibia and in neighbouring countries which hosted exiled Namibians. Susan 
Sontag writes, in a different context, “the Vietnam war was mobilized by images (and) the 
feelings that something had to be done about the war in Bosnia was built from the attentions of 
journalists … who brought images of Sarajevo under siege” into the public domain.89 
 
In the context of the Cassinga scenario, the perception that photographs of war and violence can 
stimulate the public “repudiation of war” appears erroneous. In view of the public impact that the 
dissemination of the photograph of the Cassinga massacre was expected to create, I argue that 
the circulation of this image was (and it remains so until today) less effective in unpacking the 
Cassinga violence to the intended audience. Of course, “the camera can see more than is 
supposed.”90 But, what the camera sees is self-contained and self-actualized. Because, although 
the camera can see violence and experience it in real life, nothing reaches the audience in the 
same way violence was experienced on the ground by different agents of witnessing and telling 
it. In fact, visual images dilute violence. As Liisa Malkki writes, in a different context, 
“photographs and other visual representations … speed up the evaporation of history and 
narrativity.”91 This implies that “to photograph is to frame and to frame is to exclude,”92 conceal 
and damage evidence. This is exactly what the photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave 
does. This scenario is further explored, below, in the interview with one of the photographers 
who visited Cassinga after the massacre.  
 
Per Sanden‟s camera and exclusions 
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Per Sanden,
93
 a Swede by birth who currently lives in Windhoek, Namibia, was possibly the first 
photographer to arrive in Cassinga after the massacre. Prior to the Cassinga attack, Per Sanden 
had spent time in Cassinga documenting the everyday life of refugees in the camp. He was there 
until May 3, 1978. Cassinga was attacked a few hours after he had left. He was prompted to go 
back to Cassinga to document the massacre. Unfortunately due to logistics and security concerns, 
he only arrived in Cassinga on May 6 with SWAPO combatants. Per Sanden was perhaps the 
first international photographer to witness the Cassinga open mass grave. The following extract, 
taken from my interview with him, about his experience of the live picture of the dead bodies in 
the open mass grave and how he, as both a witness and photographer at the same time, responded 
to the deplorable scene of violence is crucial for the discussions to follow:  
I arrived back in Cassinga on 6 May 1978 together with units of PLAN 
from Jamba, a mine town southeast of Cassinga, where we arrived in the 
evening of the 3rd of May, 1978 from Cassinga. Traveling back to 
Cassinga in a heavily armed convoy of Volvo jeeps, Land Rovers and 
trucks with plenty of PLAN soldiers we all speculated about what was 
going to meet us there. … We drove up and offloaded at the big parade 
ground in Cassinga where I had delivered a short speech, during my first 
visit to Cassinga, in front of hundreds of women and children who 
gathered at the parade.
94
 I had seen dead people before, during the years 
from 1973, when I first crossed into Namibia with PLAN combatants, and 
onwards. Nevertheless, this was more devastating than anything else I had 
experienced before. The smell was evident; it lay across the place as a fog. 
I knew I came back with a purpose. I went into action without hesitating. 
The Aaton camera was prepared like I always used to do, cleaned the lens, 
checked the battery level and extra cassettes, placed it in its special belt 
around the waist, extra batteries in the jacket pocket, off I went [to the 
mass graves]. PLAN soldiers had removed the huge branches that had 
covered the pitches, which were all full with bodies. There it stopped for 
me. I got the camera up to the right eye, I watched through the ocular the 
horrific sight of war fought with terror. People I had met just three days 
earlier! I could not do the normal shots, close ups, wider pictures with 
perhaps a panoration (sic), as any other camera operator could have done, 
I suppose. I did not even zoom in to set focus and then zoom out. I felt like 
                                                 
93
 Per Sanden had worked as a photographer, predominately alongside SWAPO combatants at the war fronts and 
inside Namibia since the mid-70s and later worked with a SWAPO “contingent” that provided protection for 
Namibian refugees in Angola from attacks by UNITA and South African troops who at the time operated from bases 
inside Angola and occupied Namibia. Prior to the Cassinga attack, Per Sanden spent weeks in Cassinga to document 
the everyday lives of civilians in the camp. He arrived back in Cassinga on May 6 to photograph scenes of the 
Cassinga massacre. Source: the author‟s email and face to face interviews with Per Sanden, 2008 and 2009. 
94
 Parade or Okapale, in the Oshiwambo language, is where daily roll calls were made prior to resuming daily 
activities in and around the Cassinga camp. The Okapale was the main target of the first wave of the surprise air 
bombardments that hit directly on crowds of people assembled at the morning parade.   
42 
 
I intruded a space with its own rules. Here hundreds of people were 
laying, they could receive recognition, perhaps of their mothers and their 
fathers and their children, who could feel offended by my zooming down 
into their misery. I took a few wide shots of the two pitches (sic), well 
describing the magnitude of this crime. [Well], it turned out that my wide 
shots were not so common among all the other camera operators flown 
there from Luanda. We moved away from the pitches (sic) that became the 
graves of Cassinga.
95
 
 
The experience of the Cassinga open mass grave, as Per Sanden suggests, depends upon personal 
experience. This involves the physical and emotional engagement with the inconceivable reality 
of human suffering and agony which is impossible to transmit to others through visual or oral 
techniques. Practically therefore, what happened in Cassinga, in terms of human loss and 
suffering, is beyond the reach of any photographic narration. That is, no photograph can explain 
anything regarding the human suffering and misery which the dead bodies in the Cassinga open 
mass grave endured.  
 
In the face of the dilemma between the impossibility of photographing violence and his 
professional work, as a photographer, Per Sanden was quick to discover that his Aaton Camera 
was ineffective in capturing, recording and documenting brutal violence. In fact, specifically, Per 
Sanden‟s statement above (as evidenced by his refusal to “zoom in” the lens of his camera, and 
“out” to set the focus on the dead bodies) infers that his Aaton camera is a useless weapon. The 
notion of a useless weapon is a powerful metaphor. It translates into Per Sanden‟s understanding 
of the photographs of the Cassinga brutal open mass grave as part of the taxonomy of weapons 
of violence, human misery and despair. Because, a photograph like that of the Cassinga 
traumatic open mass grave, showing unidentifiable dead bodies, would not help the affected 
families find solace and accept the loss of their loved ones. But it wounds and exacerbates the 
suffering and pain of the families whose loved ones disappeared during the Cassinga attack.  
 
In this context above, one argues that Per Sanden‟s apprehensiveness not to shoot accurately or 
„zoom in to set focus‟ and shoot at the bodies (similar to the gun shots at close range) derives 
from the notion that to do so would be akin to the SADF shooting, wounding and killing a 
massive number of innocent people at point–blank range. To him, it feels like another way of 
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exacerbating the misery of the already dead and mutilated bodies. This scenario resonates with 
claims by survivors of the Cassinga massacre that the majority of the victims buried in the mass 
graves were shot at point-blank range by the pitiless SADF paratroopers.  
 
In rethinking the emotional suffering and damage that the zoomed-in, close camera shots would 
inflict on the already damaged bodies and to those who would see the photographs, Per Sanden 
(re)considered the act of aiming and shooting accurately at the bodies in the mass graves. He 
deliberately shot wider with the intent not to pass on the “misery” protruding from the bodies in 
the mass graves (making the terrible injuries evident in the photographs) to the intended public 
audience and the affected family members in particular. To put it differently, Per Sanden 
weighed the damage potentially done by close-up shots against the damage done by obscuring 
identities through distance and therefore rendering the bodies unidentifiable by the families.  
 
In essence, this means that the mutilation and the decomposition of the bodies were so gruesome 
that even a close-up shot would not have helped anyone to successfully identify the bodies. 
“They [the mutilated bodies] could receive no recognition” as Per Sanden put it in the interview 
above. In this context, Per Sanden anticipated that, since most of the bodies were in bad shape, 
mutilated and already decomposing, taking closer aim and shooting at such catastrophic scenes 
of human ruin would cause further damage. This is because affected family members would 
want to recognize their lost family members in this photograph, but when it would turn out to be 
impossible to recognize or identify the missing loved ones in this photograph, it would cause 
further emotional damage to the affected individual families.  
 
This logic raises another important point. It implies that to photograph scenes of brutal violence 
is not a way of revealing the victims‟ identities or showing evidence of what actually happened 
on the ground. Instead, it is a way of disconnecting brutal violence from its natural niche or life, 
and renders it intangible and practically inexplicable. That is, to photograph the Cassinga open 
mass grave is a way of capturing brutal violence belatedly, figuratively and in a packaged and 
staged format, missing the most fundamental picture of how violence unfolded: unstaged, 
visceral and immediate. Hence, rendering the photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave as 
„iconic‟ is fraught with considerable omissions, inexactitude and negation, removed from the 
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originality of the emotionally and physically appalling picture of the open mass graves as 
suggested by the experience of photographers, journalists and a few survivors who stayed in the 
camp to bury the dead.  
 
As a consequence, this “iconic” image does not convey the unadulterated experiences of violence 
to the intended recipient. In fact, it should be noted that the scale of damage and exclusion due to 
the camera‟s close or distant shots - those positions that Per Sanden had trouble with as he tried 
to photograph this scene in such a way that its physical and emotional realities were presented to 
the viewer through photographs - is high and carries negative implications. This is because the 
closer the camera lens moves to focus on a specific area, the more things are excluded. Likewise, 
the further the camera lens moves from the target of shooting, the more violence is given a 
chance to elude and disappear. Because the image detail gets blurred, detail becomes secondary 
to the whole.  
 
Since all the photographs of the Cassinga massacre can be perceived as embedded in the 
elusiveness of the actual experiences of the dead and their untold stories, such images should be 
understood as unpacking shadows of darkness or disclosing the shocking absence of the 
deplorable referent. This argument is unequivocally demonstrated in the photograph of the 
Cassinga open mass grave which is completely oblivious to the physicality of the brutal violence 
that gave it life. In the place of tangible and live experiences of the violence, we see the 
speechless shadows of human remains. The victims‟ voice of trauma and suffering are 
completely muted, their faces badly twisted and completely disfigured to the point of being no 
longer recognizable as human beings, but as shadows of human shock and vileness. The victims‟ 
vitality and attractiveness is eroded by brutal death, the personal agony of dying prematurely, 
away from their parents and families and disconnected from receiving immediate humanitarian 
assistance from their comrades.  
 
These agonies underlie Per Sanden‟s hesitation to “zoom closer” into the shadows of shock and 
vileness in the mass graves, because zooming in (the same as aiming and shooting) on the 
already damaged and significantly lost human traits is destructive. When such images are shown 
to the affected people, they might possibly stir up bad blood, discontentment and restlessness. 
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They could possibly shut the doors on any closure or serenity of the families whose loved ones 
went missing following the Cassinga massacre. This is exactly the case when the “iconic” 
photograph is shown to the people closely touched by the Cassinga massacre.  
 
The other factor underpinning Per Sanden‟s apprehensiveness about shooting at the tainted 
bodies in the mass graves relates to the fact that people do not, to follow Edmund Burke, enjoy 
or “like to look at images of suffering.”96 In addition, as William Hazlitt puts it, “love of 
mischief, love of cruelty is as natural to human beings as sympathy.”97 These statements imply 
that people look at disturbing images of violence with an aspiration to identify and name things 
in them, not to find that they hold nothing and then stay haunted by the ambivalence and the 
complete absence of answers they expect to find in photographs, answers that would help to 
explain unresolved difficult questions. If photographs were able to name and identify the missing 
victims of the Cassinga massacre, affected families could accept the loss of their loved ones and 
possibly find some sort of tangible closure.  
 
The camera as the architect of brutal violence 
 
The camera is the inventor of the Cassinga violence. In fact, the camera is ambidextrous– a 
double-faced agent. As much as it could aim, shoot, destroy and damage the physical identities 
of individual bodies in the open mass grave, the camera was equally the mastermind behind the 
initiation of the nauseating Cassinga violence, the key agent in informing the military think-tank 
behind the Cassinga massacre in its discovery, mapping, and surveying of the position of the 
Cassinga camp, as well as in its precision bombing and dropping of paratroopers on the “enemy 
target.”  
 
To be precise, the Cassinga massacre was a construct of the camera shots from the air which 
preceded the aerial bombardments and the drop of paratroopers into Cassinga. The camera 
introduced the geographical space or location of Cassinga into the maps of the SADF regional 
aggression. Without the use of camera technology to map out Cassinga‟s position in Angola, the 
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planning of the Cassinga attack from the air would have been extremely difficult (even 
unthinkable) and the unprecedented loss of human lives in the long and bitter history of the 
Namibian liberation struggle could have been avoided.  
 
In this context, relying on the camera to record and document the “misery” that it (the camera) 
helped to create was a situation that generated some anxiety and apprehensiveness among 
sympathetic photographers. Closely connected to this line of thought is that Per Sanden 
perceived the association between the camera and its operator as producing a sense of betrayal, 
mistrust and the transgression of love for the other. Moreover, since the dead bodies (most of 
which lay underneath and beyond the reach of the camera‟s eye or lens) in the mass grave were 
reduced to rubble and disfigured, photographic images from that scene could be flatly 
manipulated by the other side or opposition. Such photographs could inadvertently help create a 
fertile ground for the perpetrators to advance defensive claims, in desperate attempts to repair 
their damaged reputation.  
 
Such is the case regarding the existing claims by certain perpetrators involved in the Cassinga 
massacre who argue that this photograph provides no evidence to authenticate SWAPO‟s version 
of the event, namely that those killed in Cassinga or buried in the mass graves are beyond any 
doubt civilians, in particular, women and children. Consider the following scenario: 
In my opinion, however, these photographs prove conclusively that there 
was no massacre of the innocents as alleged by Alexander in his thesis, 
that accusation was a propaganda ploy on the part of SWAPO and its 
sympathizers and that Alexander, if he was an unbiased investigator, 
should have arrived at the same conclusion. The relatively few female 
casualties found in the photograph(s) most certainly included the 
unfortunate ones … used as human shields during the fighting in the 
trenches. Where is the mass grave filled with the bodies of well over a 
thousand „refugees‟, mostly women and children? Alexander carefully 
avoided this thorny question but still made the accusation in his thesis that 
the majority of the people „massacred‟ in Cassinga were civilian refugees. 
Photographs to prove this shameful accusation are strangely „not 
available.
98
 
 
Closely linked to this statement, Jan Breytenbach who commanded the Cassinga massacre on the 
ground also claimed that: 
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SWAPO mutilated the bodies of its own people deliberately … to 
underline the horror of the moment … a deliberate ploy to claim that 
Cassinga was a refugee camp and not a most important military target. 
They wanted to hide the fact that they had suffered a huge military defeat 
by trying to turn it into a „massacre.‟99 
 
Scott McQuire proposes that “the uncertainty of meaning implied by the camera questions the 
idea that there can be an ultimate goal of a single, pure or untouched meaning and this entrains a 
profound epistemological shift in which the meaning of meaning has itself been irreversibly 
transformed.”100 Responding to the perpetrators‟ claims, survivors argue that using this 
photograph as a technique to claim the absence of the bodies of civilians in the photograph of the 
open mass grave at Cassinga suggests that this photograph is an anonymous image. As such, it 
does not provide any meaning, but people insert or attach meanings into it. In essence, the failure 
of this image to provide indisputable evidence regarding the massacre of innocent civilians in 
Cassinga empowers the perpetrators to overwrite the odor of their incorrectness and wrong-doing 
in Cassinga with the aura of correctness and blamelessness. 
 
In this context, Per Sanden might have reasoned that in the same way as the SADF used the 
camera to plot the destruction and annihilation of hundreds of innocent lives in Cassinga, images 
produced by his camera would not necessarily do the opposite. Instead, such images would 
provide ingredients for the perpetrators‟ version of the story. Furthermore, the shadows of death 
that obscure possible recognition and identification of civilian casualties or identification of the 
bodies of women and children in the mass graves also exacerbate the misery of those affected by 
the Cassinga massacre. Indeed, and ironically, the identification of the dead bodies of civilians in 
the mass grave would have been fundamental to challenge the perpetrators‟ denial of the 
Cassinga massacre.  
 
Since the bodies in the mass grave have become constructs of the shadow of the darkness, this 
photograph generates a friction or collision between the viewer‟s gaze and the masking of the 
different realities that different viewers look for in this image. Christopher Pinney, in his study of 
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cultural production through images in India, problematized the “space that photography occupies 
as … a place where faces can easily become masks and where photography is translated as a 
complex theatrical idiom capable of representing persons with endlessly diverse exteriors, 
situated in equally diverse places.”101 It is this “masking,” the eclipsing or absence of the familiar 
human features which unleashes the “nothingness” or variance between the witness and the 
ruined, unrecognizable human features in this photograph that I will now explore below. 
 
Survivors, Iconicity and Nothingness  
 
Apa kape na sha apa!! The shock and disbelief in this exclamation indicates Martha 
Mwatilifange‟s response when I interviewed her about the photograph of the Cassinga open mass 
grave. When translated from the Oshiwambo, this phrase means that there is nothing here (see 
excerpt below). The “nothingness” she proclaimed relates, as she implicitly told me, to the 
considerable exclusion of emotional and physical suffering which (among others) the victims in 
the mass grave endured and took to the grave with them, but to which the testimony of the 
“iconic” photograph is shockingly oblivious.  
 
The fact that the photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave reveals the substantial absence of 
multiple other gruesome images (stories and tangible realities) pertaining to the dead victims‟ 
brutal experience of violence and death, is one of the factors that generate arguments between 
survivors and what is retained in the “iconic” photographic memory. In fact, survivors feel that 
memories and stories of the dead victims are under risk of suffering permanent damage and loss. 
Because, as the terminally injured bodies succumb to violent death, the victims‟ memories and 
testimonies of experiencing lethal violence also dwindle away, decay, decompose and gradually 
disappear in a similar manner to the dead bodies fading away.    
 
In this regard, survivors aspire to conscientize viewers to rationally think about the scale of the 
hidden, unknown or untold physical and emotional dynamics of the Cassinga massacre outside 
the rectangle of the Cassinga ‟iconic‟ photograph. In particular, beyond the simplicity or the 
peripheral vision of the Cassinga open mass grave as Martha Mwatilifange explains:  
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I cannot comment anything about the content of this photograph … suffice 
it saying that besides the reality that this photograph attempts to represent, 
there are multiple unknown graves of the victims of the Cassinga 
massacre. Survivors who escaped from the camp tell different stories of 
comrades who were badly injured, lost blood profusely and left to die 
alone in the bush. The bodies of such victims were never recovered, but 
there are also reports that some of our people‟s remains were discovered 
by Angolans and given pauper burials. But, I want to stress that what you 
see in this photograph is nothing –Apa kape na sha apa!!This image has 
no resonance with the practical dynamics of the brutal violence on the 
ground: the memory pictures of the critically wounded comrades who 
succumbed to pain and loss of blood as others watched on, the screaming 
and anguished voices of despair of the wounded victims trapped in the 
burning thatched dwellings and in the trenches where the bayoneting and 
shooting at close range of civilians unfolded predominantly. People 
suffered deplorable damage: physically, emotionally and psychologically. 
I have a friend of mine, Angelina Angula, a survivor of the Cassinga 
massacre and currently a teacher at the Mweshipandeka Senior Secondary 
School in Ongwediva. I would advise that you visit and interview her. She 
survived the massacre inside the trenches, covered by dead bodies - these 
terrible things remain vivid and troublesome. I personally remain in the 
shock of the horrific picture of mutilated bodies of women and children 
bayoneted to death inside the trenches … as well as roasted bodies of 
women and children burned inside vehicles where they sought protection. 
This I saw when I was rescued and walked, with rescuers, across the camp 
to the survivors‟ assembling point. My memory of such unbearable 
picture, of those innocent Namibians slaughtered cold-bloodedly, is 
infinitely and permanently wounding me with no end in sight to it!
102
 
 
The implicit memory picture that Martha decries resonates with what Siegfried Kracauer calls 
the “monogram.” Rosalind Morris explains “monogram” as a “memory image,” the last recalled 
image of a person whose lived history and relation to others generate a sense of his or her 
“truth.” Anything which does not signify something in terms of that truth - what is often called 
the essence of a person or personality - is generally omitted from these images.
103
 In this relation, 
the “nothingness” or the obvious contradiction between individual survivors and the Cassinga 
iconic photograph points to this image‟s alienation or disconnectedness from survivors‟ 
“monograms,” the dynamics of those things which survivors count as tangibly traumatic, 
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unacceptable and permanently present in the everyday memories of the victims of the Cassinga 
massacre.  
 
Moreover, the “nothingness” of the photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave also signifies or 
carries a concern about the way the camera reinforces the separation of the dead bodies from 
personal traumatic memories of the victims buried in the Cassinga mass graves. Nonetheless, it is 
also important to recognize that although many survivors failed to relate their excruciating 
personal experiences to this image, they were nevertheless encouraged to conquer the 
photograph‟s obtrusive silences. That is, each individual survivor eagerly explored and 
interrogated deplorable things that the photograph missed, obscured or failed to disclose and 
explain to the inexperienced viewer. Survivors for instance, interrogated the ambivalence and the 
exclusiveness of the photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave, considering the way this 
image covers up the identities of the bodies in the mass grave. In essence, this image produces 
dissonance and rupture between the divergent, disturbing practical realities in testimonies of 
individual survivors and the considerable exclusion of brutal violence demonstrated in the 
photograph. 
 
A “mnemonic” and sole device against forgetfulness? 
 
In considering the different testimonies from different witnesses of the Cassinga massacre, the 
iconicity of the photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave is challenged. To represent this 
“document of horror”104 as “iconic” is to ignore the silences and exclusions embedded in what it 
has singled out. Paradoxically, this document has for long been perceived by the outside world as 
authenticating the viciousness of the SADF mass killings of Namibian refugees in Cassinga. This 
image is also often interpreted as “mnemonic” during official commemorations of the Cassinga 
massacre since Namibia independence.  
 
Such a scenario contends with the notion that the photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave 
eludes the tangible horrendousness and complexities of the Cassinga massacre. I find this 
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contradiction problematic, because in view of survivors‟ comments on this photograph, tangible 
violence makes heavy concessions to photography. In considering such important discoveries, it 
is naïve to perceive the iconic photograph as a “mnemonic” of the brutal experiences of 
Cassinga. What if there is no connection or corroboration between photographs of the Cassinga 
attack and the victims‟ personal memories of Cassinga or other brutal violence in the everyday 
experience of political killings and disappearances of innocent people prior to Namibian 
independence? Does this mean that when there are no photographs to act as an aid to such 
experiences, or when the victims‟ personal experiences of the violence are different from the 
experiences of photographs, that such bitter memories are forgotten or cannot be remembered? 
 
Of course, the photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave unleashes uncomfortable emotions 
and anger deriving from the absolute absence of the practical realities that different viewers look 
for in this photograph. But this is not to accept that this image is “mnemonic” to memory. For 
this photograph depicts bodies of the dead people whose memories are personal, buried - deep 
down - with them and beyond the reach of the camera. Hence what the camera has photographed 
is the silhouette that eclipses our understanding of the memories of the dead. The opacity of this 
photograph, which is shrouded by mysterious dark shadows which conceal the economy of 
dreadful memories of the dead people in the mass grave, echoes Susan Sontag who writes, in a 
different context, that people do not “remember through photographs … photographs eclipse 
other forms of understanding.”105 
 
Sontag‟s view is applicable to the issues I have grappled with above and to what is to follow. 
But, let me say again that when one looks at photographs of the things we have not experienced, 
it is difficult to see beyond the surface of such images and locate the undisclosed memories in 
their interior or exterior. Therefore, to look at the Cassinga iconic photograph is to search for the 
silences and the absences of the bigger picture of the unspeakable atrocities that the camera 
missed. In this relation, the labeling of the photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave as iconic 
or mnemonic makes considerable compromises with the practicality of incommunicable 
humanitarian disasters, across the length and breadth of the camp, as experienced and reported 
by individual survivors and other witnesses of the massacre.  
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In this continuum, it merits noting that the symbolic worthiness that the public attaches to the 
iconicity of the photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave does not mirror the veracity of the 
brutal violence and violent death of the victims described as women and children. Indeed, as 
pointed out earlier, to perceive this photograph as iconic is to retreat from the supremely 
unacceptable scenes of the violence as reported by survivors and of what the camera missed 
recording.  
 
The dilemma outlined here undermines the existence of other multiple landscapes of violence 
which the photographers who arrived in Cassinga too late (to witness and photograph) missed 
photographing. Perhaps, multiple images of the Cassinga massacre would have presented the 
public with numerous challenging complexities beyond the existing linear representation of the 
violence so that they could see and debate things from the point of view of realities different 
from the extant visual representation of the Cassinga massacre.  
 
It is helpful at this stage to put into perspective why the Cassinga event is represented by the 
presence of a solitary photograph when the event is actually suffused with multiple experiences 
of brutal atrocities. Why was there no release of other photographs from different angles of 
seeing things in Cassinga, as evident in survivors‟ testimonies? This anomaly is explored below.  
 
According to two informants,
106
 a crew of Angolan photographers and journalists who arrived in 
Cassinga a few hours following the SADF withdrawal was denied access into the camp. They 
also claimed that Dimo Hamaambo had personally refused the Angolan television crew access to 
the camp. His decision landed him in trouble with the FAPLA. He and Greenwell Matongo (the 
chief political commissar of PLAN) were “summarily arrested” by the “irate FAPLA and 
detained at the headquarters of the 5
th
 Military Region in Lubango on the order of Ivadi 
(according to Richard Kabajani), the irate FAPLA commander.”107 The arrest of Hamaambo and 
Matongo almost immediately following the Cassinga massacre is not surprising considering the 
following political squabbles.  
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In the late seventies, political wrangles bedeviled the relationship between FAPLA and SWAPO 
over PLAN‟s forward operational bases in southern Angola. This trouble was anchored in 
FAPLA‟s suspiciousness around SWAPO‟s long-standing collaboration and comradeship with 
UNITA
108
 prior to the independence of Angola. In many instances, according to General Reports 
of the Cassinga camp committee,
109
 FAPLA had made serious accusations that the SWAPO 
civilian camp at Cassinga was harboring UNITA civilians and supplying them with provisions, 
mainly food and medicine. SWAPO soldiers at the forward military bases close to the Namibian 
border, from where they launched operations into Namibia, also experienced regular harassment 
from the Angolan forces. In one such instance, FAPLA was reported to have arrested and 
disarmed PLAN “representatives” [members] at Cuangari, and then taken them to Pereirade Eça.  
This arrest followed the alleged clash between FAPLA and PLAN fighters at Oshitumbe on 9 
June 1976 on allegations that UNITA members were seen ferried in a PLAN lorry. According to 
the Cubans in Angola, FAPLA detained fifty-eight other PLAN fighters en route to the front for 
the same reason.
110
 
 
The General Reports of the Cassinga camp committee blamed the “enemy” for such incidents. 
They note that “enemies were trying hard to bring about friction and subsequently open conflict 
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between the two progressive armed forces.”111 Also, in the Cassinga camp General Reports of 5 
May 1976, Commissar Ndafogwe Nopoundjuu reported the following: “when I met 
Shimbalanga, the head of the information Department in Lubango,
112
 at Cenjanca (sic) … he 
almost burst out in rage; accusing us [SWAPO] of being obstinate in regard to orders given by 
the government … he accused us of collaborating with UNITA. [He said] a senior UNITA 
commander was found at Cassinga and in the past [SWAPO] refused to hand over Nangonja.”113 
In a similar report of the minutes of the Cassinga camp committee meeting held on 26 
November, 1976, the meeting reported that “the FAPLA comrades will not trust us [SWAPO] 
easily. They are now somehow convinced that SWAPO is not sincere about cooperating with 
them. Of late, the FAPLA at Canjanla (sic) recognized a former UNITA member called Hamala. 
He was in a group of sick people who were to receive treatment at Cassinga. According to 
FAPLA, the man worked with a former UNITA commander, Hamupunda. They (FAPLA) 
therefore do not understand why these criminals are in our ranks. The man has been taken 
away.”114 
 
Also in the minutes of the Cassinga camp committee meeting of 26 November 1976, it was 
brought to the attention of the committee that Major Zulu was forced by FAPLA to hand over 
“four girls [allegedly] former UNITA members, two from Namibia and two from within 
Angola.
115
 During that meeting, Major Zulu admitted and expressed fear that FAPLA was 
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preparing to make inroads into SWAPO bases for identification of former UNITA members.”116 
These developments might help to explain why Hamaambo refused to issue permission to the 
alleged crew of Angolan journalists. Such unpleasant incidents may also explain why FAPLA 
dealt with Hamaambo and other commanders in a disrespectful manner, arresting him and his 
juniors for ambiguous reasons. Nonetheless, several other theories arise in the attempt to explain 
and understand why Hamaambo refused to allow the Angolans access to photograph and 
document the fresh scene of the Cassinga massacre. It is telling that Mbolondondo thinks that 
Hamaambo “was paranoid to have taken that decision.”  
 
Hamaambo‟s apprehensiveness is however better understood through the following 
circumstances: The atrocities committed by the SADF in Cassinga were so gruesome and raised 
concerns about the impact such images would create especially among SWAPO supporters at 
home. In the seventies, before combat clashes intensified between the SADF and SWAPO 
guerrillas, SWAPO fighters were, locally, associated with combat myths and supernatural power 
in fighting the colonialist army. This suggests that prior to joining SWAPO in exile, many 
civilians reasoned that once in SWAPO camps, it was no longer possible for the enemy to hunt 
them down and kill them.  
 
In this context, Hamaambo would have thought that the picture of the gruesome Cassinga 
massacre would result in the decline of the number joining SWAPO in exile and at home. The 
second reason could be that Hamaambo would have denied Angolan photographers‟ access to 
Cassinga on the ground of being suspicious and mistrustful of the media and what their 
intentions were, or what they intended doing with the images they would have captured. The 
issue of security was another important factor. SWAPO was an armed revolutionary movement 
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very suspicious and sensitive to possible enemy espionage. In this context, it could have been 
particularly difficult for Hamaambo and Matongo to verify the identity of the Angolan media 
crew as actually representing the MPLA government. It was believed that UNITA or its allies 
could disguise themselves as if they were government agents. FAPLA was also not to be trusted 
in view of the problematic relationships with SWAPO as presented above.  
 
The other problem was communication. The SADF disabled Cassinga‟s link with other places 
such as Luanda and Lubango. This suggests that Hamaambo and Matongo acted on their 
individual initiatives. However, Hamaambo‟s decision not to permit Angolans access into the 
camp also suggests that he was possibly angry in considering that Angolans did not respond 
militarily to help Namibians against the attackers. Had FAPLA responded militarily, many lives 
would have been saved. Moreover, Hamaambo‟s decision also underpins an ethos of strictly 
following combat norms. PLAN had strict combat ethics regarding the protection of identities of 
fallen fighters, especially senior commanders, for example those senior SWAPO commanders 
who were among the bodies of civilians, such as Commander Jonas Haiduwa,
117
 the Deputy 
Commander of PLAN, and Nalikonkole, the chief administrator of the camp.  
 
Finally, Hamaambo‟s alleged refusal to allow the Angolan journalist crew entrance into Cassinga 
should not only be viewed through the lens of the issues illustrated above. Issues pertaining to 
the social and cultural rites of the Namibian exiled community should also be considered. 
Notably, photographing the dead bodies for public exhibiting and viewing may have been 
politically acceptable but was in fact culturally unacceptable. 
 
In the few remaining pages of this chapter, it is important to return to the concept of 
“nothingness” which Martha Mwatilifange coined earlier. This is in order to try and explore and 
perhaps understand some of the discrepancies between the visual and the different eye-witness 
experiences of the untold scenes of violence left undisclosed by the iconic photograph.  
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Analytically, by claiming that the iconic photograph is nothing, Martha is not dismissive of the 
experiences and storyline of this image. Rather, her discontent raises a number of scenarios. The 
first scenario can be translated as follows: that the actuality of the Cassinga massacre as 
experienced and lived by survivors since then is immensely deplorable and tangible and exceeds 
the visual and oral techniques of documenting it. Hence, the notion of the nothingness of this 
photograph does not suggest that this image shuts the window that ventilates general feelings of 
pain and sympathy for the victims of the Cassinga massacre. Instead, this scenario challenges 
individual survivors‟ “mental picture.” It suggests that the “ravage and destruction” which this 
image is oblivious to are “eloquent testimony of the violence which preceded the unfolding of 
the picture.”118 
 
A second scenario is that the friction and disconnectedness between survivors‟ memory and the 
implicit memory of the iconic photograph are being exposed. Although this photograph is 
embedded in the camera‟s experience of a particular scene of violence, it is regrettable that those 
divergent traumatic memories of the photographed scene are framed and deeply concealed 
beyond the reach of our senses.  
 
Thirdly, the nothingness of this visual image suggests that the story of the iconic photograph is 
one thing, whereas the practical reality on the ground was another different reality that no 
photograph can authenticate. This implies that different viewers can approach this photograph 
with preconceived perceptions, with different interpretations, meanings and objectives. In this 
regard, suffice it to say that when different viewers engage with visual images, each viewer sees 
what he or she believes in, or wants the public to believe in, regardless of its inclusions and 
exclusions.  
 
In this context, therefore, the Cassinga photograph has become a much fought-over bone of 
contention between different agencies debating the Cassinga massacre. The following 
contradictory statements illustrate this problem of a dialogue that would take the viewer or reader 
nowhere:  
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The images of corpses, some of whom are women, some young, and some 
wearing civilian clothing are evident to a cursory examination of the 
photograph.
119
 
 
Countering this argument by the academic Gary Baines is Colonel Jan Breytenbach (the field 
commander of the Cassinga massacre) who argues that:  
The so-called mass grave [photograph] shows a great majority of men, all 
[of] them combatants, with only three women barely recognizable among 
the lot and, significantly, without any evidence whatsoever of dead or 
mutilated children.
120
 
 
Analytically, Breytenbach‟s opinion does not deny the fact that his paratroopers killed and 
mutilated bodies of innocent women and children at Cassinga. But his statement resonates with 
the impossibility of the photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave to reveal the physical and 
emotional torture or suffering that the attackers brutally inflicted on civilians. Therefore, in 
considering this discourse, the conflict between the different agencies of seeing and commenting 
on the Cassinga iconic photograph is explained as credibly embedded in the darkness that this 
image elicits. Put differently, the enduring blackout that this image unleashes evaporates 
evidence and nourishes inconclusive dialogues between different witnesses, writers and 
commentators of the Cassinga event. In this connection, it is worth recognizing the “oscillatory 
ambiguity” of photographs.  
 
Photographs in general are “dubious (images which) destroy mnemonic experience.”121 In the 
realm of this imperfection and considerable exclusion of things, the inauthenticity of the 
Cassinga visual image is recognized and challenged, consciously or unconsciously, such as in the 
way it is (hopefully unconsciously) demonstrated by Colonel Breytenbach in the statement 
above. This is one reason why Siegfried Kracauer sees photographs as representing an 
“assembled effigy … of a nature alienated from meaning (which) promotes the confrontation of 
consciousness … with the reality that has slipped away from it.”122 When applied to the subject 
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of this chapter, this statement implicates the photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave in a 
tacit and implicit circumvention of violence and a disregard of survivors‟ experiences of the 
same event. Therefore, in working against the eclipsing of the vastness of the Cassinga violence 
that this image boxes, survivors feel and want the viewer to understand that the victims‟ personal 
experiences of the Cassinga massacre, across the length and breadth of the camp and outside it, 
were more diverse and complex than the flat or linear reality that this image supplies. 
 
A fourth scenario, arising from the statement that the photograph of the Cassinga open mass 
grave is nothing, carries a metaphoric meaning: it expresses the victims‟ anger, frustration and 
disappointment about the state of the Cassinga mass graves. In particular, survivors‟ anger and 
disappointment revolve around issues of physical and emotional divides between human remains 
at Cassinga which survivors, families and comrades have not visited since the Cassinga 
massacre. Survivors are angry and disappointed that “nothing‟ has been done to maintain or pay 
solemn respect and tribute to this historic site and honor the dead in a dignified way regardless of 
Namibia‟s attainment of independence in 1990 (see Chapter 7). 
 
In getting to the end of this chapter, it is important to note that although survivors‟ desperate 
search for things that are unrepresented in this photograph have ended in absolute failure and 
disappointment, their search for the missing realities was nonetheless significant. One reason is 
that, although it was almost impossible, for example, to identify individual bodies in the 
photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave, the blurred content of this photograph displays 
different things to different viewers. For example, the mysteries, silences and secrecy of the 
violent deaths concealed in the anonymity of the dead bodies signify a “silence that speaks.” As I 
will discuss in the next chapter, the way the enormity of violence is constricted, obscured and 
almost reduced to its absence in the photographs that are communicated to survivors in this 
research process, has encouraged survivors to disclose some of the things that these images 
exclude or conceal. For instance, oral accounts by Max and Shikongo at the beginning of the 
chapter pertaining to how the dead bodies were collected, assembled and buried in mass graves 
present irrefutable testimony for the overall argument I am presenting in this thesis.  
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The fact that none of the survivors including those who participated in the collection and the 
burial of the dead bodies such as Max and Shikongo could identify individual bodies in the 
Cassinga iconic photograph suggests the atrocious nature of the massacre that almost annihilated 
all life in the camp and left survivors in a state of insurmountable confusion, chaos and 
uncertainty about their future. Hence, it was extremely difficult for survivors, and those who 
came to their rescue in the aftermath of the massacre, to do things appropriately. This would 
include sorting out the dead bodies in a way that could create an enabling environment for 
possible identification of the individual bodies which would provide some resolution for their 
families, as is demanded today.  
 
I have also tried to tease out that as an imperfect model of the real and tangible world of the 
Cassinga massacre, the iconic photograph has become the focus of contestation between 
survivors‟ oral testimonies and visual testimonies of the Cassinga massacre. This protestation is 
embedded in the way this image is packaged, in such a way that the inexperienced viewer is 
constructed in a particular way and encouraged to see, contemplate and perceive the Cassinga 
massacre through the lens of the packaged reality of things. This is the main concern of the 
Cassinga survivors, and from this their protestations arise. That is, the “nothingness” of the 
iconic photograph excludes the other violence that the camera missed or considered mundane 
and less important to capture, and situates the inexperienced viewer at the periphery of multiple 
realities and the central meaning of the Cassinga massacre as understood by survivors whose 
everyday continues to unfold in excruciating and traumatic memories.  
 
Therefore, since the Cassinga iconic photograph elusively represents the broader picture of the 
event it aspired to represent, it relinquishes and betrays its claim of authenticating and 
historically validating the record of Cassinga. To follow Marshall Blonsky, “signs [photographs, 
in the language of this study] are not related to the things or states of world they appear to 
designate, but they stand in front”123 of the situations they intend to designate. In this continuum, 
since the sign or the photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave is not identical to divergent 
experiences of brutal violence as experienced by the dead and survivors, then any theory that 
perceivesthe photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave as bringing realities to life or as 
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authentic demonstration of the totality of what happened in Cassinga are to be contested. For 
example, theorizing the historical photograph as “universally effective revelatory, reflecting the 
truth of that which it represents,”124 and the camera as a mechanical form of reproduction that 
provides a “source of factual knowledge” and “objective evidence,” can be challenged.  
 
Nonetheless, it should be finally noted in this chapter that the image of the Cassinga open mass 
grave offers a flashpoint. In relation to this, that image can best be described as an indicator or a 
“sign” of the missing realities of the undisclosed actual violence. Hence, the representation and 
dissemination of different categories of photographs of the Cassinga massacre should not be 
perceived as disclosing the exactness of what happened in Cassinga, but should be understood as 
occupying a space that conceals and silences violence.  
 
Of course, photographs of the Cassinga massacre should be recognized as significant historical 
records. However, such records and documentation of history are inertly fixed in a “mono – 
dimensional illustration” of the world they aspire to authenticate. In spite of such weaknesses, 
when perused by survivors, photographs of the Cassinga massacre can promote critical debates 
about significant exclusions and explanations of the missing categories of the Cassinga brutal 
violence as the following chapter will explore. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE “IMMACULATE PHOTOGRAPH” OF THE COMMANDERS OF THE CASSINGA 
MASSACRE 
 
The interaction between survivors and the visual images of the Cassinga massacre is very complex and 
entails a variety of interpretations. As I have pointed out in the previous chapter, the notion that the 
“iconic photograph” of the Cassinga open mass grave is “nothing” does not dispute what the camera 
spotted and aspired to “authenticate.” The survivors‟ concern is that the “iconic photograph” obliterates 
many other multiple scenes and numerous survivors‟ accounts of experiencing the Cassinga mass 
killings alive. In fact, the different responses and comments from survivors about the different 
photographs of the Cassinga massacre varied from survivor to survivor.  
 
In reading and analyzing different viewers‟ comments about photographs of the Okiek people of Kenya, 
Corinne Kratz contends that photographs were “mnemonic that prompted people to talk about events … 
beyond what is shown…”125 The context of Kratz‟s analysis is not based on visual images of war and 
violence, unlike mine, and her view that photographs are “mnemonic that prompted people to talk about 
events …” is something that cannot be left as unproblematised. But her analysis of how people relate to 
photographs, or how photographs relate to people in a social practice of things, is reflective of my 
experience of how photographs of violence relate to the Cassinga victims‟ experiences, as well as how 
the victims relate or locate their experiences of the violence inside or outside the photographs I 
presented to them.  
 
My analysis of the Cassinga survivors‟ response to the photographs presented to them during the 
interviews demonstrated how visual images gave survivors a momentum to explore the hidden realities 
beyond the surface of the visual representation of the Cassinga massacre. In other words, survivors used 
visual images, not as a “mnemonic” device to assist memory or to cause them to remember things. 
Instead, the use of photographs in the interviews proved essentially important in evoking survivors to 
challenge visual images‟ claims to “authenticate” the brutality of the Cassinga massacre.  
 
                                                 
125
 Corinne A. Kratz, The ones that are wanted: communication and the politics of representation in a photographic 
exhibition (California: University of California Press, 2002), p. 148 - 149. 
63 
 
In this relation, this chapter explores the effectiveness of survivors‟ use of visual images as compass 
devices, not necessarily to “look through” photographs but to explore violence beyond the confines or 
peripheries of the frames of the visual images. This chapter will give a particular focus to a photograph 
of the Cassinga commanding officers, or the “immaculate photograph” as I sometimes refer to it in this 
chapter. Ahead of this central discursive issue, it is important to provide some background about where 
and how I obtained the photograph of the two commanding officers of the Cassinga massacre on the 
ground. 
 
The SADF archive and the visual records of Cassinga 
 
This project is in possession of particular photographs, maps and charts of the Cassinga camp, taken 
prior to and during the Cassinga massacre. I obtained these images from the Department of Defence 
Archives in Pretoria. This institution was established as the SA Defence Force (SADF) archive in 1968, 
following the approval by the Minister of Education for a separate military archive. It specializes in 
military history and houses the official records of the Department of Defence, as well as a collection of 
unique publications, unit history files, photographs, maps and charts pertaining to the Department of 
Defence and its predecessors dating from 1912. Accessibility to the archival documents is in accordance 
with the National Archives of South Africa Act (Act No. 43 of 1996) and in the case of classified 
documentation, accessibility is subject to approval of the Chief of Defence Intelligence of the 
Department of Defence.
126
 This indicates that the now South African National Defence Force (SANDF) 
archive is highly bureaucratised as all documents (including photographs) must go through a process of 
declassification before they are made available to researchers. Documents already declassified also have 
to be re-scrutinized before researchers access them.  
 
In my case, most of the archival materials, already declassified, that I have requested from the archives 
have not been released to me by the end of this study. I have no intention to dwell on the politics of the 
colonial-apartheid archive in this study. But as in Premesh Lalu‟s analysis of the colonial archive, it is 
pertinent to understand the colonial archive in the context of an institution that the “discipline of history 
generally approaches ... with a measure of suspicion because of its supposedly inherent „biases.‟…” 
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Indeed, the colonial archive translates into an institution that is embedded in “covering up the traces of 
complicity in violence…”127 
 
The SADF photographs of the Cassinga massacre, at least those which I accessed, are shrouded in 
dubiously clean hands. This pertains to both the SADF and this archive. It is this sheer look of 
unblameworthiness, or the immaculateness of such images, that I will explore later in this chapter. My 
numerous visits to the former SADF archive in Pretoria revealed that even after the collapse of 
institutionalized apartheid and violence, the colonial archive still validates and preserves the apartheid 
culture of constructing frontiers of obscurity around the histories which disclose apartheid – colonial 
“acts of violence” against its vulnerable subjects. In the same way as the colonial archive pacifies the 
specific histories surrounding the killing of Hintsa (to paraphrase Premesh Lalu), my “efforts” to dig up 
specific detailed histories in the former SADF archive about the killings of Namibian refugees at 
Cassinga in ways which depart from the SADF construction and justification of the colonial massacre 
were significantly constrained by the intransigence and pervasiveness of the “discourse of the colonial 
archive.”128 
 
The visual images unveiled to me for research, possibly in selective ways, consisted mainly of aerial 
photographs. Predominantly, these were images recorded by the South African Air Force (SAAF) Joint 
Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (JARIC) before the Cassinga massacre. According to Edward 
Alexander, Canberra photo-reconnaissance aircrafts
129
 carried out several reconnaissance missions over 
Cassinga prior to the attack. Ideally, these images corroborate survivors‟ oral accounts that a few weeks 
leading up to the Cassinga massacre, suspicious planes were noticed orbiting the aerial space around 
Cassinga. Such movements were noticed mainly in the early hours of the morning or at noon.  
 
Thus, there were very few traces of the photographs and no video footage of the SADF coverage of the 
Cassinga operation. This is despite the fact that the SADF mission for the Cassinga massacre was 
equipped with cameras and video equipment. According to Edward McGill Alexander who has 
conducted a substantial number of interviews with the Cassinga paratroopers, “one paratrooper who was 
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a photographer was given a 16mm cine camera and a still camera to take with him when he jumped into 
Cassinga. He received orders to record images of what took place. The man appointed to carry out this 
task, Mike McWilliams, claimed during an interview conducted with him, „to have used the opportunity 
to take along an additional still camera of his own ...‟ McWilliams claims that he handed the official 
cameras and films back to the military authorities at the end of the operation.”130 There are also claims 
that individual paratroopers used personal cameras during the Cassinga massacre.  Brigadier Mike Du 
Plessis is quoted as telling Sgt. Major Fougstedt in an interview that “Morne Coetzer of the SABC 
recorded some video footage, while many of us took photos with ordinary cameras. Many photos came 
out, but we weren‟t as successful as we had hoped to be.”131 Moreover, according to other sources, 
paratroopers recalled having been shown “a 16mm film footage [of the Cassinga attack] at a 
paratroopers‟ reunion some months after the raid and the film was, according to official minutes, shown 
at a debriefing conference … However, the 16mm film footage could not be traced, nor could all the 
photographs.”132 In this regard, there is also a concern about the whereabouts of the documents that the 
paratroopers captured from Cassinga. The SADF official reports concerning the things captured in 
Cassinga state that the paratroopers “brought from Cassinga four trunks full of documents.”133 
 
According to the head of the photographic section at the former SADF archive in Pretoria, Mr. Gerald 
Prinsloo, the archive never entered any record of SADF-produced video footage of the Cassinga 
massacre. He also told me that many of the Cassinga photographs available in the archive were 
deposited by individuals and not by the SADF as an institution. This is particularly so of the colour 
photographs that Mr. Prinsloo told me were donated to the archives in 2009 by one of the former 
Cassinga paratroopers who now lives in Europe (see Appendix D for some of these Cassinga attack 
photographs). Nevertheless, I considered it fortunate to have found a few essential photographs, relevant 
to the theme of my study. These photographs show the SADF paratroopers in Cassinga during its fall. 
Surprisingly, these images do not show the paratroopers‟ involvement in the indiscriminate shooting of 
civilians in the camp. These exclusions are crucial in attempting to explore the SADF construction of 
the Cassinga massacre through visual images. The other concern is that most of the photographs do not 
contain crucial information such as the authors/photographers of the images. In the case of the 
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photograph that I will discuss in this chapter, the only archival information it contained is a caption that 
reads: “Col J. Breytenbach (with radio) and Brig. Du Plessis at Cassinga.” When I started drafting this 
chapter - focusing on this photograph - I sent an email to Mr. Gerald Prinsloo, inquiring about the author 
of the photograph and how the archive accessed it. Prinsloo‟s reply reads:  
It can be assumed that the photo was one of a group of official photos 
regarding Cassinga donated by the Defence Force to the archive. The film 
would have been developed and printed in the archive's own darkroom 
(now defunct). Unfortunately, we have no further specific information on 
the photo or photographer. Except for the following information: Indexed 
into the archive: 1980.
134
 
 
Arguably, the failure to release documents of horror for public seeing in this case dilutes the SADF 
version of events that Cassinga was a sophisticated military base and the Headquarters for the SWAPO 
guerillas in Angola. Moreover, the possibility that the SADF never deposited sensitive materials of the 
Cassinga attack in the SADF archives or removed them during the process of South Africa‟s transition 
to democracy suggests that the perpetrators‟ version of the Cassinga story is politically and defensively 
orchestrated. It is important to explore why the SADF visual images of the Cassinga attack, unlike the 
SWAPO photograph of the open mass grave that blames the SADF for the merciless massacre of 
defenseless civilians, are constructed or staged in such a way that the assailants appear irreproachable in 
terms of killing innocent women and children. This is demonstrated by the photograph below of the two 
top field commanders of the Cassinga massacre, who are now waging a fight about which of them was 
the actual commanding officer of the Cassinga massacre.
135
 
 
The immaculate photograph 
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Figure 2. The commanders of the Cassinga massacre: Col. J. Breytenbach (with bandaged wrist. For clues about the bandage, 
see, Jan Breytenbach, The Eagle Strike, p. 384 - 387) and Brig. Mike Du Plessis at Cassinga.  Source: the SADF archive, 
Pretoria. Date obtained: 2007, photographer: unknown. 
 
During the preparations for the attacks on Cassinga (also known as Moscow by SWAPO and code 
named Alpha by the SADF) and Vietnam (code named Bravo),
136
 the SADF was given clear 
                                                 
136
 Vietnam\ Osheetekela was a SWAPO military camp, less than 30km from the Namibian north western border 
with Angola. The Vietnam base was attacked on the same date as Cassinga, alias Moscow. Unlike the Cassinga 
attack, Vietnam was mainly a land invasion. Although Vietnam was actually a SWAPO military base, many 
civilians escaping from Namibia to Angola could spend days in Vietnam waiting for transport to Cassinga and other 
arrangements. When the camp was attacked hundreds of civilians were found in the camp. It is estimated that over 
three hundred civilians died in the attack. Two hundred and sixty were captured and taken back to Namibia. The 
prisoners were detained at Mariental, 260 kilometers South of Windhoek and remained incommunicado for about 
eight years before most of them were released at the end of 1986. See Appendix E of this Thesis: Rev. Samwel 
Mateus Shiininge‟s account of the Vietnam attack.  
68 
 
instructions to make sure that photographic “coverage” of the operations, “especially Alpha camp,” took 
place. A SADF planning document for the Cassinga massacre reports that “credible coverage and 
immediate release is essential to counter claims of SADF mass killings of civilians, especially women 
and children.”137 In general terms, it is without a shred of doubt that the SADF was well prepared and 
equipped to photograph and video tape the Cassinga operation in a manner that portrays it as a military 
camp. In essence, according to this document, the SADF photographers were expected to use the camera 
as a tool to deconstruct, reconfigure and obscure things on the ground for political gains. Hence, the 
SADF camera is seen here as a tool of political manipulation. This is the context for the SADF 
guidelines for the Cassinga attack which (in spite of the fact that the population in Cassinga was civilian 
and unarmed) were clearly spelled out as follows: photo coverage must show military features for 
example weapons, ammunition, communications, headquarter buildings; any dead must have weapons 
alongside them; any photograph of civilians must reflect humane treatment, for instance being provided 
with food; and documents captured must feature prominently to add credibility to subsequent 
disclosures.
138
 
 
Regarding the above, the photograph showing the two senior commanders of the Cassinga massacre, 
Brigadier Du Plessis and Col. Jan Breytenbach,
139
 is not the photographic genre that the SADF desired 
                                                 
137
 Chief of the SADF, “PSYAC Planning Directive No. 3 \ 78, Operation Reindeer (top secret): Phase Three (Media 
coverage).” Source: SANDF Archives, Pretoria. 
138
 Chief of the SADF, “PSYAC Planning Directive No. 3 \ 78, Operation Reindeer (top secret): Phase Three (Media 
coverage).” Source: SANDF Archives, Pretoria.  
139
 A scuffle is simmering among the Cassinga paratroopers about who actually commanded the Cassinga attack. At 
the centre of this disputation are Colonel Jan Breytenbach and Brigadier Mike du Plessis. At the time of the 
Cassinga massacre, Mike Du Plessis had just been named first commander of the brand new 44 Parachute Brigade, 
comprising 1, 2 and 3 Parachute Battalions (see Breytenbach, Eagle Strike, p. 545). The account provided by 
Willem Steenkamp informs us that Brigadier Mike du Plessis was one of the two senior officers (the second one was 
Brigadier Hannes Botha, Director of Operations of the South African Army) who went to Cassinga without official 
permission. Du Plessis and Hannes Botha allegedly forced their way into the aircraft that flew Breytenbach to 
Cassinga. Because of their presence in Cassinga, it is not clear, today, who really was in overall command of the 
Cassinga massacre. Steenkamp reports that according to Du Plessis, “Breytenbach was in command only of the two 
assault companies (Alpha and Bravo), while him, Du Plessis, exercised overall tactical on the ground …. However 
… there can be no doubt that Breytenbach was the commander of the whole battalion and that he appointed his 
second - in - command to control the assault companies … Du Plessis himself admitted that the chief of the Army 
had expected him to exercise his command from an airborne command post. It is not clear why he did not do so.” (In 
Willem Steenkamp, Borderstrike, p. 137). Mike McWilliams who was officiated to photograph and video record the 
Cassinga operation tells us that Jan Breytenbach, “the most respected, decorated and loved military leader in the 
South African (apartheid) airborne environment,” was officiated to lead and command the Cassinga operation. A 
brief insight into Breytenbach‟s historical background of his career as a professional soldier: loyalty and the respect 
he earned, within the SADF inner circle, during many years of unreserved service and commitment to the course of 
the SADF becomes crucial in understanding his role as the SADF kingpin in executing violence. (See Appendix J of 
this thesis for Colonel Jan Breytenbach‟s role in the region and beyond). Nevertheless, the presence of Brigadier Du 
69 
 
and had instructed its camera operators to capture during the unfolding of the Cassinga operation and 
make public afterwards. Why was this image then taken? Perhaps the answer lies partly in observing 
that this photograph was deliberately framed, its background and foreground considerably purged and 
selected to exclude the appalling scenes of violence against weaponless people (which do not comply 
with the SADF public discourse of the attack). Therefore, this photograph suggests that the perpetrators 
had nothing to show as supportive evidence for its version of attacking Cassinga. As I have presented 
above, it is not possible to find Cassinga represented as a comprehensive military camp in any of the 
SADF photographs that were made available to me during my frequent visit to the former SADF archive 
in Pretoria or accessed through other sources. In the same vein, photographs showing scenes of 
bloodshed and mass killings of civilians in Cassinga could not be traced in the former SADF archives.  
 
Nonetheless, in practice, those who perpetuate violence against unarmed civilians are notorious for 
hiding from the public view any visual images that portray senseless torture and brutal killing of 
innocent people. Perhaps I should refer to a general scenario of the recent war in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
In these two countries, photographic images and video footage showing unacceptable violence against 
civilians by the American-led forces are not accessible to the public, except when such images are 
disclosed to the public through independent sources. This is the case of the leaked photographs 
                                                                                                                                                             
Plessis, Colonel Jan Breytenbach‟s immediate senior (in rank) in Cassinga, created much annoyance for 
Breytenbach who accused Du Plessis of doing things in Cassinga disrespectfully and unprofessionally. In his words, 
“the water spider,” as Du Plessis was nicknamed: following his accidental landing into the Cubango River during 
the Cassinga parachute drop where he almost got drowned, “was just a passenger” with no role assigned to him to 
play in Cassinga. He was unauthorized to go to Cassinga - “both Du Plessis and Hannes Botha jumped into Cassinga 
against Genl. Gleeson‟s will” - Gleeson was the Chief of the Army Staff Operations. (In Breytenbach, Eagle Strike, 
p. 547). According to Brigadier General McGill Alexander, Major General Ian Gleeson, the overall commander of 
the operation, was “emphatic that Du Plessis and Hannes Botha should never have been there [in Cassinga].” This 
was because, according to Gleeson, the two “wanted to go on a partridge shoot.” In this respect, Breytenbach argued 
that Du Plessis‟ presence in Cassinga made “the operation a … bloody nuisance.” (In Edward Alexander, “The 
Cassinga Raid,” pp. 100 - 102). Breytenbach did not explain how Brigadier du Plessis made the “Cassinga operation 
a bloody nuisance” except to emphasize that du Plessis‟ conduct in Cassinga was highly “unprofessional.” This 
statement could suggest that du Plessis‟ individual conduct in Cassinga was extremely brutal as alleged by Lazarus 
Cornelius later in this Chapter. Edward Alexander contends with Mike McWilliams and other sources that “the 
officer appointed to command it (Cassinga) was the most experienced and successful combat soldier in the SADF, 
Colonel Jan Breytenbach. Nevertheless, there was a long - standing sentiment of animosity between him and his 
immediate superior, Brigadier M. J. Du Plessis, the brigade commander. This led to differences of opinions and a 
clash of wills.” (In Edward Alexander, “The Cassinga Raid,” p. 113). Breytenbach, himself, tells us that, in 
Cassinga, Du Plessis demonstrated a “total lack of discipline … (who) interfere(d) in my command …” (In Jan 
Breytenbach, Eagle Strike, pp. 546 - 7). Breytenbach continued to testify that “I was given the command over 
several hundred paratroopers for the Cassinga battle by General Viljoen [Lieutenant General Constand Viljoen, chief 
of the SA Army]. Monty Brett, Lew Gerber, Johan Blaauw and Piet Nel with their troops came under my command. 
I prepared them for battle and I led them in the Cassinga Operation, which made me, and me only, responsible for 
the acts of every single one of the officers and men under my command at that time. After the battle I stepped back 
and they reverted to their previous commanders.” (In Jan Breytenbach, Eagle Strike, p. 553). 
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depicting the US soldiers‟ torturing of Iraqis, civilian or “insurgents,” at the Abu Ghraib prison which 
stunned and shocked the world in 2004. This argument follows Eliot Weinberger‟s observation, in the 
Cultural Magazine OCTOBER 123, of the Iraq violence when he wrote that:   
The Cheney–Bush 11 era has not produced a single poem, song, novel, or art 
that has caught the popular imagination as a condemnation or an epitome of 
the times. The only enduring image is a product of journalism: the hooded 
figure in Abu Ghraib photographs.
140
 
 
As I have pointed out earlier, the Peter W. Botha government (1978-1989) which succeeded the John 
Vorster government (1966-1978) was determined to obscure and deny the public access to viewing 
photographs which could incriminate the SADF in acts of systematic brutal violence against refugees. In 
fact, and this is ironic, the SADF hated being branded a “deadly force against” civilians. Consider the 
following:  
Irremediable damage had already been done … to the paratroopers … how do 
we rectify … the perception that we acted like a bunch of blood thirsty 
murderers and rapists?
141
 
 
In this relation therefore, the absence of the photographs showing acts of unmerited violence against 
civilians, as overwhelmingly conveyed in every interview with survivors, explains the SADF deliberate 
attempts to silence and distance themselves from the wrongs and possible crimes against humanity.
142
 
This refers to the SADF paratroopers‟ indiscriminate killing and maiming of innocent civilians during 
the Cassinga attack. In this instance, the immaculate photograph, the central focus of this chapter, 
creates numerous workable spaces for individual survivors to interrogate and challenge the SADF 
telling of the Cassinga event. That is, when the Cassinga photographic images are deliberately staged to 
obscure and silence the practicality of the violence on the ground, survivors find it unacceptable. The 
nonviolent staging of the paratroopers‟ photographs incite disbelief and provoke individual survivors to 
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give voice to the unacceptable violent practices that the SADF visual images hide from the public view. 
There is a disconnectedness between the photograph of the two commanding officers of the Cassinga 
massacre, and the actual practice of their killings of civilians in the camp, as I shall elaborate in the 
scenarios below.  
 
A preconceived visual   
The immaculate photograph was, most probably, shot shortly before the paratroopers‟ departure from 
Cassinga. As I have pointed out earlier, the SADF “media representatives (who)… accompanied the 
forces”143 to Cassinga were instructed to avoid, by all means, taking snapshots that in the post-Cassinga 
operation might implicate the paratroopers in the indiscriminate mass killing and maiming of civilians in 
Cassinga, especially women and children.144 Arguably, this image is one of the SADF‟s frontlines to 
counter the popular narratives that implicate the paratroopers in the indiscriminate mass killing of 
civilians. In this relation, the way the immaculate photograph is constructed, or its look, veils the dirty 
actions that the paratroopers committed against innocent civilians in Cassinga. According to interviews 
with survivors of the Cassinga massacre, this photograph defies the excruciating experiences of sheer 
human carnage and suffering as witnessed by survivors and partially seen by independent sources who 
visited Cassinga in the immediate aftermath of the massacre. In a more general approach to 
photographs, John Tagg compares the contradictory relationship between photography and historical 
events to the qualities of a “chameleon.” The “chameleon-like” relationship is applicable to my analysis 
of why the unfolding of the Cassinga massacre means one thing to survivors and other observers 
(including individual perpetrators of the massacre) of the Cassinga massacre, and a different thing in the 
way Cassinga is represented in the various photographic images that the perpetrators captured and 
released for the public viewing. 
In this context, the exclusion of the foreground and background in the photograph above becomes 
crucial. The unclaimed space of the catastrophic civilian casualties that this photograph deliberately 
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obscures is intended to achieve some political leverage. Its purpose is to exert a confusion, create myths 
and wrest the perpetrators from accountability for the Cassinga massacre. Indeed, it is an attempt to 
eliminate anything that may put the paratroopers in the picture of “criminal and delinquent behaviours” 
against innocent civilians. That is, this image intends shunting or pushing away the shocking space, the 
multiple unpleasant features or landscapes of bloodshed and human carnage. Perhaps the issue of the 
SADF attempt to disconnect themselves or to escape from violence is also one of the items that 
Breytenbach is obsessed with in the telephonic conversation, as illustrated in the immaculate photograph 
above. He is most probably preoccupied with the issue of paratroopers‟ “behind schedule” evacuation 
from Cassinga. Paradoxically, the SADF perceived the paratroopers‟ immediate departure from 
Cassinga as a way of disconnecting, though only physically, from the catastrophic environment of the 
unprecedented human carnage in the entire history of SADF aggression, colonialism and apartheid rule 
over Namibians.  
 
The fact that the immaculate photograph obscures the excruciating landscape of human catastrophe 
places this photograph in opposition to other photographs which intend to disclose appalling scenes of 
the unnecessary loss of lives and other sufferings incurred by the victims of the Cassinga massacre. For 
example, the way the immaculate photograph is staged clearly distinguishes itself from the “iconic 
photograph” of the Cassinga open mass grave (see Chapter 2). The “iconic photograph,” in contrast, 
carries a message of a humanitarian crisis and appealing for the public to render a sympathetic response 
to the suffering of Namibian refugees. Therefore, it is obvious that whilst the photograph of the 
Cassinga open mass grave evokes pathos about the innocent killing of civilians, the central focus of the 
SADF photographer(s) is to tilt or shift away from the difficult and hard realities evident in the 
neighbourhood of the camera operators.  
 
Moreover, the way Jan Breytenbach and his accomplice, Du Plessis, are constructed in the 
immaculate photograph also replicates the customary SADF practice of not acknowledging and 
taking responsibility for the acts of violence (which no study can verify) it perpetuated against 
untold numbers of Namibian civilians between 1966 when political violence started, and 1989 
when it ended in the unexplained circumstances in which more than 140 PLAN combatants were 
killed during the process of Namibia's disarmament and demobilization of the former warring 
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parties carried out under the auspices of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group 
(UNTAG).
145
 
 
The fact that the two soldiers are photographed without their destructive weapons or laid down 
beside them is another significant factor in examining the meaning of this photograph. This 
“handmaiden,” the lack of weaponry of the two soldiers, is like a game that equates to denialism.  
Put differently, it demonstrates an invention of a “mythological past(s)” using the “powers of 
darkness.”146 That is, the absence of weapons in their hands is intended to pacify violence. It is a 
way of certifying the SADF commanders‟ outright denials that their paratroopers did not, 
ironically, carry weapons: bayonets and other sharp objects used to commit sheer acts of 
violence against unarmed civilians. Therefore, the frontier created between the two perpetrators 
of the Cassinga mass killings and the weapons (guns and bayonets) they used to kill civilians in 
mass numbers is a way of circumventing accusations of SADF ruthlessness. The blameless look 
of this photograph is therefore intended to win the hearts and minds of the public at large.  
Thus, the elusiveness of violence made explicit in this photograph defines apartheid as an institution that 
not only sent soldiers to kill civilians pitilessly, but also taught its security forces to circumvent the 
appearance of violence committed by the SADF in the war zones on an everyday basis. In this relation 
therefore, the immaculate photograph‟s representation of the two soldiers as faultless, though in the 
midst of a landscape covered in a plague of blood, conveys a decorative picture, typical of the SADF 
attempts to please the eye and deceive the mind. The concept of a decorative picture of violence echoes 
Caroline Brothers‟ citation of Walter Benjamin‟s speech, 1934, to the Institute for the Study of Fascism 
in Paris, when he remarked that “the camera is now incapable of photographing … a rubbish-heap 
without transfiguring it. … In front of (human misery), photography can only say: „how beautiful‟ … It 
has succeeded in turning abject poverty … into an object of enjoyment.”147 
In the same way, I argue that the SADF manipulated the camera as a tool of assaulting, altering and 
destroying the landscape of violence in which the SADF had both hands. So, the SADF camera is the 
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associate of an acute blindness which instates darkness in the place of violence thereby transfiguring and 
altering the meaning of things, or the actual world and the real things in them. The concept of 
“transfiguring” violence does not relate to SADF blindness per se, but introduces the contradiction 
between the knowability and the unknowability of the SADF. By this I mean the SADF‟s deliberate 
construction of darkness around situations when it is well aware that such circumstances existed. Hence, 
the concept of transfiguration is used here to decipher the SADF deliberate attempt to cover the violence 
or its machinery (perpetrators) with the aura of “beauty” or purity.   
Metaphorically, the aura of “beauty” denotes the actual “white propaganda,” a “public relations 
technique” employed by the SADF to keep the public in the dark about the humanitarian atrocities 
carried out by the agents of the apartheid state and colonial rule in Namibia. Nevertheless, the SADF use 
of photographs in the context of advancing “white propaganda” intended for public consumption 
appears ineffective. This goes with Caroline Brothers‟ view that “propaganda can only work 
successfully by resonating with those beliefs already held by the individuals it is meant to persuade.”148 
As I have outlined earlier, if Du Plessis and Breytenbach‟s photograph was indeed constructed as a tool 
of state “white propaganda,” then the spotless appearance of this photograph presents a “tangential 
relation” to violence. That is, it contradicts or denies survivors‟ reports of the paratroopers‟ rampage and 
indiscriminate killing of civilians in Cassinga. Therefore, if this photograph is staged in a manner that 
the perpetrators appear exonerated from the brutal violence that they were observed committing in 
Cassinga, then the sort of “truth” that this photograph is attempting to disseminate is “circumscribed”, 
oblivious to the reality of the violent environment in which it exists, and unacceptable to individual 
survivors of the Cassinga massacre and many other Namibians at large. Hence, the face of Cassinga that 
this picture shows exists only within the limits of the SADF official discourse of the Cassinga attack and 
not the wider international or popular Namibian view of what happened in Cassinga.   
Lazarus and Du Plessis  
 
What would the immaculate photograph tell if we interrogate its exclusions in relation to survivors‟ 
experience of the Cassinga massacre? In a more general approach, Corinne Kratz observed that 
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“photographs do not „speak for themselves‟ or provide a transparent „universal language.‟”149 But 
photographs embrace open-ended narratives. This means that the look, content and purpose of a 
photograph provokes and determines the meaning that an experienced viewer attaches to it. In 
particular, inasmuch as photographs attempt to decontextualize the Cassinga violence from its actual 
experience and historicity, photographs also, concurrently, invoke survivors‟ opposition to the 
photographs‟ reconfiguration of the paratroopers‟ ruthless practice of violence against unarmed civilians 
on the ground. In this relation, the immaculate photograph produced varied survivors‟ responses in view 
of the content they communicate.  
 
To enter into these dialogues, my interest in writing a chapter about this photograph was aroused by my 
interview with Lazarus Cornelius. Cornelius came across this photograph (the immaculate picture 
above) in the album of the Cassinga photographs that I presented to him at the end of interviewing him 
at his homestead, Etunda, in 2008. Cornelius claimed to have recognized one of the men in the 
photograph, Brig. Mike Du Plessis (according to the SADF archives caption). He claimed that he was 
alert when he observed Du Plesssis indiscriminately shooting to death, at point-blank range, the 
critically wounded victims with a pistol.  
 
The argument here is that, inasmuch as many of us, the inexperienced, cannot see beyond photographs, 
especially images which we are not familiar with, some survivors of the Cassinga massacre do see 
beyond the confines of photographs. Survivors can see and tell stories about hidden realities which do 
not protrude from the surface of photographs when inexperienced viewers engage them. Individual 
survivors recorded and filed paratroopers‟ (as individuals or as a collective) deliberate killings of 
defenseless civilians in the camp. Like the disclosers of Wikileaks, survivors reveal undisclosed secrets 
that the SADF photographs of the Cassinga massacre hide. This is explored in the following dialogues.   
 
“I personally saw him killing wounded civilians!” 
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Figure 3. Lazarus Cornelius, a survivor of the Cassinga massacre. He is showing the interviewer the “Boer” whom he claims 
to have witnessed killing, deliberately, civilians who were critically wounded in the attack. Photo by the author, 2008. 
 
“Truth” is supposedly self-evident. Albeit, the telling of “truth” here is visibly eclipsed by the shadow 
that obscures others from seeing it as practical evidence, the essence of its meaning lies in the fact that it 
is procreated by actual circumstances. However, it is also important to recognize that “truth” becomes 
immaterial when it does not relate to a practical experience of a thing. In the context of the Namibia 
political conflict, in the run-up to independence, certain things are regarded as “true” and others as 
“untrue” regardless of what historical facts they represent. Take a simple scenario: that the SADF 
carried out a systematic execution of Namibian refugees in Cassinga is undisputable “truth” for many 
Namibians, just as it is “untrue” for the SADF that it massacred innocent women and children in 
Cassinga. This is not to deny the fact that in the context of narrating (visually or orally) the Cassinga 
massacre, “truth” translates into the complete absence of the referent. As such, what is considered “true” 
by some, is immaterial, “untrue” and contested by others, as a substitute for the obscured and missing 
actual world.  
 
I am introducing the problematic scenario of “truth” as a way of trying to explore its limits and strengths 
in the context of the many conflicting “truths” told by different agencies of experiencing and reporting 
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the Cassinga attack to the inexperienced other.  I am referring to what individual survivors observed and 
witnessed in relation to the experiences and stories of the SADF photographs of the Cassinga attack. 
The following dialogues between Lazarus Cornelius and the photograph he holds explore this conflict. 
 
In leading to the dialogues between Lazarus and the perpetrators detained in the image, Caroline 
Brothers writes in a different context that “by looking [at photographs], the [experienced] viewer is 
implicated in a highly structured pattern of vision and representation. Meaning inheres not in the 
photograph itself, but in the relationship between the photograph and the matrix of … specific beliefs 
and assumptions to which it refers. The photograph is the site at which these „invisible‟ beliefs … 
manifest, the gaze of the photographer directing the gaze of the viewer, and it is in this constant 
dialogue between image and society that lays the photograph‟s greatest interest for the historian.”150 In 
examining the visual representation of the immaculate photograph, the inexperienced viewer‟s gaze is 
packaged in such a way that it encounters impenetrable hindrances. Such blockades withhold the 
viewer‟s chance of seeing the unacceptable things which surround the circumvented border of the 
photograph. The frontier that this photograph has created between the viewer and the inaccessible space 
also prohibits the viewers‟ chance of seeing the “truth” of the deplorable scenes of damage to human 
lives and property, presumably, on all sides around where the two commanding officers‟ stood.  
 
Interestingly, the violence that this photograph renders us oblivious to is “precisely what is of interest” 
in this chapter. In this regard, the fact that the immaculate photograph is structured in such a way that it 
prohibits the inexperienced viewer from seeing violence beyond the confines of the photograph‟s 
parameters, encourages survivors to give testimonies which rise beyond the confines of the 
photograph‟s staged “truth.”  As John Tagg put it in a different context, staging a certain genre of 
constructed “truth” for the public consumption is “infinitely vulnerable to qualification … by a third 
variable.”151 In the context of this topic, the constructed “truth” represents the immaculate photograph 
whereas, the “third variable” is suitably the witness of the Cassinga massacre. In this context, Lazarus in 
his capacity as a witness and survivor of the Cassinga massacre, his ability to investigate, explore and 
interpret the immaculate photograph according to his experience of the killings of civilians on the 
ground qualifies him for the “third variable.” This is demonstrated in the following passage:  
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This is the wicked Boer, „Embulu‟,I have spoken about earlier in the interview. He was so 
ruthless … I do not know how many wounded people he killed that day, but he killed people 
pitilessly!! … I have no doubt about him ... I did not see any other Boer like him … Let me 
tell you why I say that it is him: Number one, he was the only Boer I saw carrying this brown 
shoulder bag. It resembled the Soviet made shoulder bags used by PLAN commissars and 
when I saw him carrying this brown bag, I immediately thought about Commissar Greenwell 
Matongo who often carried a similar bag with him - it should had been his - maybe he died 
and his shoulder bag captured by the enemy - I thought that way, and that is how I became 
interested in this Boer. Number two, he looked burly physically and I was particularly 
startled by his appearance. There was a moment when he came too close to me … he should 
have seen me … maybe he thought I was dead … When they shot and wounded me - from 
the back - I laid down - flat - flat - flat like dead. I laid flat on my stomach with my clothes 
soaked in blood. Luckily, I did not experience any loss of memory throughout the attack. I 
was sentient of every movement, noise, everything around me. I listened carefully and 
observed everything that unfolded before my eyes … I carefully observed this matured Boer 
as he walked alone. He was alone, unaccompanied by anybody! He was only armed with a 
pistol, but he was very ruthless. I saw him indiscriminately shooting to death people who 
were critically injured and fighting to stay alive: Tock! Tock! Tock! Tock! … I can still hear 
the sound of his pistol in my ears. It was the most shocking experience of the Cassinga 
massacre and that experience continues to bring much pain and sufferings whenever I 
remember this thing.
152
 
 
Christopher Pinney tells us that photography “has no identity … its history has no unity... It is a 
flickering across a field of institutional spaces. It is this field we must study, not photography as 
such.”153 Somewhere in this chapter, above, I have pointed out that the SADF camera operators acted 
under political restrictions. They were instructed not to photograph things that disclose deplorable 
pictures of human carnage in Cassinga. Hence, most of the SADF pictures of the Cassinga massacre, 
that are available to me, exclude scenes of bloodshed and civilian deaths. Nonetheless, since 
photographs are open to different viewers‟ interpretations, such as in the case demonstrated by 
Cornelius above, I argue that photographs defy the political and other orders that constructed them. In 
this way, photographs act indifferently to the rules of the apartheid state which regulated what 
photographs must show and what they must conceal. By breaking the state‟s attempt to control, destroy 
and silence acts of violence against civilians, the SADF photographs of the Cassinga attack become 
embedded with the notion of betrayal of those who packaged and staged particular realities before the 
eye of the camera. In this context, the SADF photographs of the Cassinga massacre can be understood 
as perfidious agents. This takes cognizance of the fact that individual survivors with experience and 
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knowledge pertaining to the people and things appearing in photographs can act as interlocutors. The 
way Cornelius is able to gather and unpack sensitive things that the immaculate photograph conceals is 
the obvious demonstration of this scenario.  
 
Certainly and also interestingly, survivors can use photographs as weapons against the perpetrators. That 
is, the same photographs that the perpetrators shot and staged with the purpose to conceal and keep 
secret the unacceptable pictures of violence, can also be used by survivors to implicate the perpetrators‟ 
unleashing of the indiscriminate and violent killing of civilians as demonstrated by Cornelius above. 
And so, when survivors can transcend photographs‟ frontiers and disclose things beyond photographs‟ 
parameters, it can help historians and the public at large to, also, acquire new knowledge and new ways 
of thinking and understanding the previously hidden secrets. Hence, since photographs are social objects 
without a formula to unlock meaning uniformly, what is “important is the way in which the links 
between the oral and the visual can counter and mesh with other forms in the contemporary, shifting the 
balance and allowing … multiple forms of history transmission to operate.”154 
 
The way Cornelius explored and disclosed the unspeakable things that the photograph of du Plessis and 
Breytenbach is oblivious to, suggests that the act of staging photographs with the intent to disseminate a 
certain discourse is not efficient. This is in response to the fact that photographs are “read differently” in 
response to individual experiences and incurred sufferings since the Cassinga massacre. In this relation, 
no single photograph can communicate a single or unambiguous reality. Photographs are interpreted 
according to individual survivors‟ experiences, sufferings, anger and unaddressed Cassinga issues in the 
long aftermath of the massacre. These and other distressful factors combine in constructing meanings 
and effects beyond the limited and ambiguous content that photographs bring to our sense of seeing. The 
fact that the meaning or interpretation of a photograph is not embedded in the content of a picture, but 
beyond the frame of it, is demonstrated in the following excerpt:  
Whenever that picture [of the alleged Du Plessis executing civilians] 
appears … it takes me back to Cassinga and I am grieved repeatedly. I tell 
you, memories of that pitiless soldier, moving alone and finishing the lives 
of the critically injured is emotionally and physically hurtful. Whenever I 
revisit it, I collapse emotionally and remain in my bedroom in fear and 
insecurity. People were killed indiscriminately, women and children, yet 
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the perpetrator goes unpunished. How can I forgive a person like this one? 
… Not at all, forgiveness is a façade, especially when there is continuing 
denials of the massacre of innocent civilians … such unending and 
deliberate irritability to the wounds, causing our wounds to bleed 
repeatedly and profusely. Yah, I have forgiven them, at least, in words. 
However, the grief is deep inside me and I feel that I have not forgiven 
them, especially that Boer! Is he living a normal life when his hands are 
red with the blood of so many innocent people? Does he know that he has 
put many lives in trouble and robbed many families of their loved ones? 
What he did is very painful and a difficult experience to live with. Yes! It 
is reconciliation, but I fail to grab the context of this reconciliation. Where 
is justice? Where is it?
155
 
 
As I have indicated earlier in the case of Cassinga, photographs are subjected to a variety of different 
witnesses‟ experiences, examinations, interpretations and meanings. I am presenting a point that a single 
photograph may infer different meanings and interpretations from different agencies and forums that 
give it multiple voices and meanings beyond the restricted way that photographs contain and restrain 
things. Thus, for the perpetrator, the photograph in this context may interpret a sense of “bravery for the 
mission well accomplished.” For survivors, as demonstrated in the excerpt above, the immaculate 
photograph is the associate of pervasive trauma: grief, anger and anxiety. In this relation, therefore, it 
appears problematic to accept that the perpetrators‟ photographs of the Cassinga operation can hide 
multiple acts of violence. They cannot hide the anger and bitterness of the victims of that episode: just 
as it is not possible for the SADF photographs of the Cassinga massacre to honestly disclose the 
appalling violence of that episode.  
Visuality and sensory exploration of the Cassinga violence 
Visuality was not used in isolation from other senses when survivors searched for scenes of violence in 
the different photographs of the Cassinga massacre. Other senses (hearing, seeing, feeling and smell) 
were collectively used as survivors tried to read photographs with the intent to discover the things they 
have experienced in Cassinga, detecting and unveiling areas of conflicts between the packaged story of 
the visual images and the various stories of individual survivors. Indeed, as Elaine Scarry teaches us, 
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“those attributes confirmed by both vision and touch tend to be felt to have a greater reality than those 
attributes experienced by only one of the two, or by one of the other senses without these two.”156  
Cornelius relied mostly on two senses: sight, the sense of seeing and touch, the sense of feeling as he 
attempted to trace and discover things inside and outside the boundary - the inclusions and exclusions in 
the picture of the things he experienced in Cassinga - of the “immaculate photograph.” He 
predominantly used his fingers or flat palm to name and map out positions in the camp, during the 
massacre, where he observed multiple scenes of brutality he attributed to Brigadier Du Plessis and 
others. In most cases, Cornelius pointed to structures or things experienced in Cassinga beyond the 
boundary of the photograph with which he engaged. Consider the following examples: “I observed him 
killing the wounded people from this side … the pit toilet which I avoided and which they later blew up, 
killing many people inside it was that side … the river where many people drowned is located that side. 
The list of the things and experiences through which Cornelius tried to navigate the interviewer, but 
outside the borders of the photograph, is endless. This representation explains that this photograph 
conveys considerable exclusions of the things known to and experienced by survivors on that fateful and 
memorable day. 
I construed that as the witness‟ finger runs over the photograph, it is a sign of ascertaining and 
discerning relationships between the photograph and memory. The more Cornelius recognized 
despicable things that the photograph ignores or excludes, the more he held firmly to the photograph. At 
this point, his voice often choked - it fell flat, as verbal dialogue became overwhelmed by the anger and 
rage in response to the fury of what he called the photograph‟s “untelling of truth.” The “photograph‟s 
untelling of truth,” that Cornelius bemoaned, points to the conflict between the actual experience of the 
violence on the ground and the visual misrepresentation and framing of the untainted picture of that 
violence which unfolded before survivors and witnesses.  
In this context therefore, when Lazarus engaged Du Plessis‟ photograph for a considerable time, uttering 
words to the photograph (not to the interviewer), it can be interpreted as a way of interrogating the 
photograph‟s exclusions, and the packaging and framing of the violence. Because to “frame”, as an 
embedded feature of photographs, is to enforce boundaries, to obscure seeing violence beyond the 
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staged realities of the camera. It is a way of impairing other human senses and of denying the 
inexperienced people a chance to also experience and comprehend deplorable pictures of the Cassinga 
massacre. Moreover, observing a moment of silence (as I experienced during Cornelius‟ conversation 
with the immaculate photograph) by bringing the whole body of the speaker to a state of abrupt 
motionlessness, also conveys other important meanings. It can be understood as a way of paying solemn 
respect to each memorable scene of the violence and to the dead comrades.  
In this perspective above, the victim‟s sensory interaction with the visual representation of the Cassinga 
massacre is capable of tracing and discovering unprecedented exclusions of the numerous things which 
may appear mundane and ordinary to the assailants but traumatic for the victims of the Cassinga 
massacre and their families. In fact, the things that the perpetrators consider normal and necessary are 
the things that considerably concern survivors and exacerbate their sufferings and bitterness.  
The search for acknowledgment 
As demonstrated in Cornelius‟ excerpt above, the victims of the Cassinga massacre are time after time 
reminded that the scourge of the Cassinga violence, which has brought endless suffering and sorrow, 
requires an intervention of justice which has been long overdue. In this relation, the victims of this 
episode, dead and alive, can only forgive the perpetrators, if their untold suffering and degree of sorrow 
were to be recognized politically and economically, as I will later explain, and if justice were to take its 
course. A moment after Cornelius‟ dialogue with the immaculate photograph, he asked me if he could 
keep the immaculate photograph with him. He told me that he needs to show “the killers,” aadhipagi, to 
the affected families of the people who went missing in Cassinga in his constituency.
157
 Cornelius 
aspires to use this photograph to interpret its content in relation to the outstanding absence of the 
victims‟ sufferings, pain and sorrow associated with this image. The following excerpt summarizes what 
we might call this “genre”:  
A person like this one (du Plessis) should come here to face justice. He 
should come here to answer to questions about his role in Cassinga. His 
actions were inhuman … instead of offering assistance to the wounded 
and helpless, he went amok slaughtering them. This is unacceptable. Can‟t 
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they bring him and others here and face justice … it would be fair enough 
to bring them here and face us while we are still alive. The public is eager 
to listen and hear what happened to their loved ones. I should keep this 
photograph to show it to my constituency when we commemorate the 
Cassinga massacre next year [2009].
158
  
In the absence of survivors‟ justice, the victims find it unacceptable to forgive the perpetrators who 
remain unapologetic for the deplorable wrongs they committed. Indeed, issues of the victims‟ justice are 
the prerequisite for genuine forgiveness and “national reconciliation” and should be seriously kept in 
place if Namibia were to claim that it is certainly independent and sovereign. Survivors and affected 
families also raise issues of reparations for the affected victims. Arguably, official acknowledgment or 
reparations for the victims of the Cassinga massacre may not equal the price of the sufferings and the 
loss of the innocent lives, nor can they restore the violated human dignity of the victims. But, such 
approaches can also be argued as the only ways of providing the victims with a sense of recognition for 
the injustices done to them, as seems to be the case with the Hereros of Namibia against the German 
government ongoing today.
159
 
In this context, Cornelius‟ intent to parade the accused perpetrator‟s photograph before the local 
population suggests the victims‟ aspiration for the long overdue justice. The victims demand a public 
apology and compensation that we might interpret as perceiving these ideals as fundamental forms of 
“reparation or recognition”160 for colonial-apartheid violence against innocent Namibians, and as 
“preconditions” for reconciliation. It should also be noted that, it is not only the victims of the Cassinga 
and Vietnam massacres who demand a public apology, but many other Namibians suffered collateral 
injuries and other human rights abuses in the years of South Africa‟s ruthless colonialism and apartheid 
rule in Namibia.  
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For me, the scenario laid out by Cornelius introduces a metaphor of parading the enemy (photograph) 
before survivors and families of the dead in his community. This metaphor discloses the victims‟ quest 
for some form of dialogue with the perpetrators. The affected communities want the perpetrators to 
acknowledge the responsibility for the Cassinga massacre and other violence in the exchange for 
genuine forgiveness and reconciliation. Hence, Cornelius‟ drive to keep the perpetrator‟s photograph 
with him until such time as it can be shown to the victimized population enlightens us about the victims‟ 
desire for justice. The perpetrators of the Cassinga massacre are strongly called upon to answer to the 
murder charges against them. “Where are they? Where are these men now? Can‟t they bring them here 
and face us?”161 These questions also indicate that the perpetrators of the Cassinga massacre have gone 
underground since their departure from Cassinga: where they left the dead and the critically wounded 
civilians abandoned, as they unsympathetically returned to their bases in northern Namibia from where 
most of the victims hailed.  
 
In reaching the end of this chapter, it is worth emphasizing that in confronting the SADF visual images 
of the Cassinga massacre, the inexperienced viewers‟ gaze is confined to the pigeonholed realities 
within the restricted boundary of photographs. For this reason, the inexperienced viewer cannot see 
deplorable situations of human suffering and carnage beyond the frontiers of such images. On the 
contrary, survivors of the Cassinga massacre view visual images of the Cassinga massacre differently. 
This scenario carries two meanings. The first reason is that survivors approach the Cassinga visual 
images as sources of untold pains and suffering. This is because, when survivors come into contact with 
such images they are instigated to explore multiple scenes of violence beyond the staged realities or 
exclusions of the visual, thereby getting irritated and wounded again. The second meaning infers that 
survivors find greater pain and discomfort in the SADF visual images of the Cassinga massacre than the 
inexperienced viewers: they find such images undermining the authenticity, multiplicity and 
deplorability of the Cassinga experience by staging, framing, packaging and obscuring the many 
realities experienced on the ground by the assailants and by survivors as individuals and as a collective.  
 
Nonetheless, in the same manner as survivors, the SADF as well as individual paratroopers, do not find 
pleasure and merit in distributing and disseminating horrific photographs of civilian casualties in 
Cassinga. As such, images of civilian casualties appear not to have formed part of the “group” of 
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photographs donated to the SADF archives in Pretoria (as indicated at the beginning of the chapter). In 
particular, the emerging publications written by Colonel Jan Breytenbach and articles by Mike 
McWilliams (the official SADF photographer of the Cassinga massacre) appear to deliberately exclude 
photographs showing civilian casualties. Nevertheless, whilst such exclusion explains that the SADF 
photographs cannot disclose or authenticate the SADF discourse of what actually happened in Cassinga 
on the ground, they also convey another important reason explaining why the perpetrator holds back 
sensitive photographs of the Cassinga massacre: the perpetrator finds no pleasure in such photographs, 
because they valorize the deep scars which continue to interrogate and haunt them for the innocent lives 
they destroyed in Cassinga.  
 
In this respect, it is important to note that both survivors and paratroopers emerged from 
Cassinga traumatized. Therefore, if postcolonial Namibia is interested in helping both victims to 
recover from shock, trauma, anger and grief, things must be done sensibly and in a human way. 
Not in the way that “the benefits [given] to the perpetrator … outweigh the benefits [given] to 
the victim.”162 Thus, applauding the perpetrators with a number of privileges at the expense of 
the weak and the historically vulnerable populations is about maintaining and feeding the old 
apartheid culture regarding race, class and hierarchies of inferiority. Hence, this melancholic 
anomaly is not only discriminatory but it is, in essence, a repetition of violence: it exacerbates 
the sufferings that torture the civilian victims and families of the missing people in Cassinga who 
appear to bear the greatest burden of the Cassinga massacre for life, in an absolute silence that 
conforms to the prevailing political order. As long as this ailment remains without a cure, there 
can be no recovery and healing for all the victims (survivors, bereaved families and perpetrators).  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
MEMORY OF THE WOUNDED BODY, ORAL TESTIMONY AND THE OTHER 
 
 
In the preceding chapters, I have explored how visual testimonies are not fully consonant with 
the practicality of the Cassinga violence as witnessed on the ground by survivors of the 
massacre. In the same way, oral testimony fails to elicit the painful memories of the victims‟ 
wounded bodies. This is while violence has clearly left very scarred marks, openly evident, on 
some survivors‟ bodies. This chapter argues that the terrible memories incised into the victim‟s 
body as evident through the physical body scars are far beyond the reach and understandings of 
the other, as no testimony is capable of transferring such memories.
163
 The “other” here denotes 
the inexperienced viewers. When I interviewed the victims whose bodies are physically maimed 
since the Cassinga massacre, they told me that the sites of violence, evident on their disfigured 
bodies, may appear healed from the outside, but in reality such sites are gates (to which I return 
later) into profusely bleeding memories. The metaphor of “profusely bleeding” inner memories 
is analogous to the internally bleeding wounds of the victims since the Cassinga massacre.  
 
The central argument in this chapter is that the pain or memory of the damaged body is not 
communicable via the protruding scars on the victims‟ maimed bodies. Quite the alternative, the 
pain sits beneath, deep inside the veins of the victims. In considering this disturbing revelation, 
this chapter attempts to explore the inauthentication of survivors‟ bodily injuries through 
survivors‟ oral testimonies. Notably, every single scar of violence protruding from survivors‟ 
bodies is not a lifeless effigy. Such scars or figures of violence, according to survivors, are 
sensitive areas and full of life because they are connected to the chronic injuries that are properly 
framed and beyond the reach of others and, most disappointingly, beyond the reach of the 
victims‟ own testimony.  
 
Physical scars and invisible memories  
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Important lessons were learned when I interviewed survivors with amputated body parts and 
other horrible injuries sustained in Cassinga. According to Rauha Shitangi, “the pain of the 
wounded body is invisible as it is contained inside the victim‟s body or below the surface of the 
scars of damage on the victim‟s body.” The scars, in terms of deciphering the dynamic presence 
of chronic wounds beneath the physical damage of the body, denote a fundamental metaphor. 
The essence of chronic injuries or wounds, therefore, infers that the wound appears, falsely, to be 
healed in the eyes of the external gaze upon such tragic figures. But, internally the wound is open 
and profusely bleeding. Here, two important structures of the wound emerge. These are the 
physical and internal structures. The physical structure is visible and may appear healed or 
recovered from the pain. The internal wound is out of sight of the other as it is inside the victim‟s 
body. It is not the physical structure of the wound or scars, but the severity of the inside or open 
wound that survivors bemoan and describe as unleashing unhealing bitter memories of the 
Cassinga massacre and its aftermath. In this connection, Rauha Shitangi told me the following:  
The picture of remembering Cassinga is like sustaining an injury on a 
sensitive area of the body ... Look at this terrible scar … this deep cut at 
this sensitive area of my leg, omuthipa [which translates as the achilles 
tendon] … it appears healed – hasho – right? Of course not, because if I 
touch this area, even with a very soft touch, I can feel the pain deep inside 
… the pain is inside … it is chronic inside, permanent and untreatable.164 
 
 
Cassinga is as sensitive as the Achilles tendon injury which when hurt may not mend and heal 
completely again. Its pain is alive inside, not external, and so painful that it hurts when tampered 
with. In this relation, the scars, effigies of violence on survivors‟ bodies, translate into the 
shadows of lasting pain and suffering below the surface of these sights or scars. If memory of the 
wounded victims, to return to Rauha‟s affirmation, is akin to the severing or damage of sensitive 
parts of the body, then wounded memory translates into the body that continues to experience 
unhealing pain and suffering.  
 
The use of the metaphor, omuthipa, a crucial and sensitive part of the body (which Shitangi used 
in attempts to explain to me the characters of the wounded body), portrays the sensitivity and the 
resistibility of the wounded body to mend and heal properly. Evasively, the “body in pain” 
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appears healed when looking at it externally and seeing the external scars, but it is throbbing 
inside. And, without communicating their pains and sufferings, survivors might live amidst us 
and we might unknowingly take it for granted that all is well with them. The point is that 
survivors are constantly waging a protracted struggle with the implicit emotional memories. This 
is because the excruciating moments, traumatic experiences and ongoing violence are deeply 
seated and therefore beyond the other‟s experience and sensitivity and indeed beyond the 
survivors‟ efforts to elicit anything so that others could experience and understand their ongoing 
suffering.  
 
In recalling emotional memories of the bodies of her comrades roasted to death near the 
Cassinga garage, Martha Mwatilifange said the following:  
That scene near the Cassinga garage sickens me. That place, where some 
of us reassembled after the massacre ... It is such a horrendous scene, so 
traumatic that it is beyond my words … such a shocking horror that no 
one can describe. … people roasted to death … the smell of roasted 
human flesh was unbearable ... Whenever I remember and recount that 
horror … the already open wounds start to bleed profusely … It was 
horrible, watching seeing dozens of people roasted and beyond 
recognition is hurting … it is something I do not want to remember and 
talk about it … it opens the wounds.165 
 
The concept of the “open wound” is a metaphor for the survivors‟ endless implicit traumatic 
memories of the Cassinga massacre. The “open wound” as interpretative metaphor for the 
unhealing or chronic memory lays emphasis on the endless suffering of the victims. As Shitangi 
unambiguously put it across, survivors lament the fact that remembering Cassinga is akin to 
stabbing the open wound. Notably, the remembrance of the Cassinga massacre and its deplorable 
aftermath is a frequent experience. This means that survivors are repeatedly wounded by the 
many returns of Cassinga‟s appalling moments. In fact, the entire body of the victim is wounded, 
inflamed and sensitive to touch, because any rough touch on the scars awakens the demons. This 
implies the victim‟s return to the horrific experience of the Cassinga violence.  
 
To take a closer look at this situation, it should be said that when the body has sustained an 
injury, a “diffuse area of tenderness” develops around the site of the injury. Therefore, since the 
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Cassinga traumatic memories represent multiple wounded areas of the victims‟ body, it implies 
that every segment of such memories is “hypersensitive” to external “stimuli.” These are so 
sensitive that the pains aroused by the external stimuli of the terrible things experienced in 
Cassinga, as Martha points out above (or indeed when interviewers question survivors about the 
Cassinga massacre), it sends shock waves of indescribable pain and suffering all over the 
victim‟s body.  
 
The damaged bodies and implicit memory 
 
As illustrated in the photograph below, it is important to note that the Cassinga victims with their 
bodies severely maimed do not just live with the physical trauma and suffering due to the loss of 
their vital and irreplaceable limbs and so on. They also live with emotionally charged memories. 
These memories are completely obscured from the knowledge and awareness of the other.  
 
Meme Hendrina Kiiyala, in the photograph below, was a seventeen year-old school girl when 
Cassinga was attacked. She sustained serious body injuries and received treatment for her 
amputated arm and other wounds in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). She 
talked, emotionally, about how the inexperienced people, in the broader context of the world 
community, lack the understanding and recognition of the ongoing excruciating pain and 
suffering beneath the picture of the physically damaged body. According to her, the internal pain 
is more traumatic than the pain protruding from the physical scars that the viewer sees. But the 
skin covering the internal pain has, as Charlotte Delbo would put it, “hardened, it allows nothing 
to filter out of what it retains”166 and the victim has “no control” to elicit the damage and trauma 
retained inside her. The following brief excerpt from my interview with Meme Kiiyala gives the 
reader a glimpse of her endless suffering: 
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Figure 4. Hendrina Kiiyala photographed inside her homestead at Oshiku shaShipya, north central Namibia, 11 June 
2009. She opted for her photograph to look this way. Photograph by the author. 
 
I was seventeen when this terrible violence damaged my life. I was a 
child, separated from my parents by the war and violence inside Namibia. 
I went into exile hoping to escape violence and receive education for a 
better future. The unfortunate happened a few months after arriving in 
Cassinga … Many people died on that day and survivors were left in very 
difficult situations, emotionally and physically. In the immediate aftermath 
of the massacre, I had this thought it was better to have died than 
surviving the killings. The pain was so unbearable. We did not receive any 
treatment on the day of the attack. The second day also passed without any 
treatment … From Cassinga, those of us who were seriously wounded 
were transported to the Cuban military clinic at Techamutete, about 25km 
from Cassinga. The group consisted of Namibians, Cubans and Angolans 
who needed emergency treatments. Unfortunately, we only received 
painkiller tablets there. On May 6, a helicopter flew sixteen of us, all 
Namibians to a hospital in Huambo. Others went to Luanda and so on. We 
had horrible experiences in Huambo. Each one of us, except one little girl, 
had a limb amputated … my arm was surgically removed there, in 
Huambo. This happened because I did not receive treatment on time. We 
spent three days without treatment after the massacre. Sometime in June 
1978, we arrived in Luanda en-route to East Germany (GDR) for further 
treatment and to receive artificial limbs. My initial stay in the GDR was 
discomforting and traumatic. Remember that, it was all whites who did all 
these bad things to us in Cassinga. Emerging from that terrible experience 
of racial killings, I could trust no white person, in the immediate aftermath 
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of that experience. In German, therefore, it took very long to accept that 
they [Germans] would do no harm to me. How different were they from 
the Boers who brutalized us for no wrongs? I harbored that anxiety for 
very long. … We received treatment at a clinic called Berlin- Buch. There 
was a nurse called Ellen (sic) who was so friendly to me and treated me 
like her own child, but I only realized her mother – like approach after 
some time: the thing was, I lost appetite for most of the period I spent in 
the hospital. She was concerned about my poor appetite. She frequently 
told me that she would send me back to Cassinga if I did not eat and finish 
my food. That was her way of trying to influence me to eat. I did not take 
it lightly. I took her threat very seriously. The more she mentioned 
Cassinga, the more I felt a tumble in my stomach and the more I lost 
appetite for food … Of course, she was aware of the physical injuries on 
my body, but she was unaware about the emotional damage such 
deplorable experience created in me, the heavy load of traumatic 
memories inside me, mistrust, fear and feelings of insecurity that the 
terrible Cassinga experience planted inside me. If I had a way of 
explaining and unpacking the pain, trauma and shock inside me, she 
would not have made such remarks.
167
 
 
In following Lawrence Langer‟s presentation of Holocaust testimonies, “the body can be 
maimed in many ways, not only through mutilation,”168 thereby making it an “active agent” of 
pain.
169
 As an “active agent” of pain, the mutilation that the body incurred and enduring pain are 
active forms of what Elaine Scarry refers to as “bodily memory.”170 In the context of the 
Cassinga massacre, the notion of the “bodily memory” implies the active endurance of violence 
inside the body of the victims, “both alive” and those “buried”171 in the Cassinga mass graves or 
whose bodies have never been accounted for since the killings.  
 
By looking on the surface of Meme Hendrina‟s amputated arm and, indeed, her mutilated body 
as a whole (the emphasis here is on the internal damage rather than the external damage), it is 
certainly plausible to imagine that the injuries and the pain she sustained and suffered were 
terrible as she described it in the interview. But, like photographs, scars of violence, which seal 
violence beneath them, are not anything that survivors can rely on when hoping for their living 
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painful experiences to reach, in the pragmatic nature of the never-healing wounds, the broadest 
possible public audience. 
 
Therefore, although many survivors‟ bodies display terrible or visually stupefying, shocking 
bodily damage as a consequence of the SADF‟s brutal violence, this damage should not be 
necessarily be interpreted or perceived as illuminating the pain and suffering of the inner “bodily 
memories” of the violence that mutilated the body. Of course, there is a relationship between the 
physical damages of the body and the violent penetration of the pain into the victim‟s body. But, 
the physically harrowing scars of the damaged body should, instead, be interpreted and 
understood as concealing the actual sentient agony which is hidden and self-evident of the 
injured body that is not only damaged but also beyond repair. 
 
In The Body in Pain, Elaine Scarry writes that “physical pain has no voice, but when it last finds 
a voice, it begins to tell a story, and the story that it tells is about”172 the physical scars‟ inability 
to elicit the innermost pain and suffering of its victim. In this relation, Kiiyala‟s stump of her 
amputated arm elucidates the argument I am constructing. It is unambiguous that the physical 
site of damage on her body is transparent in the photograph, but the pain, disability and 
sufferings which emanate from it are implicitly and exclusively personal experiences. This is 
particularly so when the intent to communicate the victims‟ “pervasive and enduring” distress 
becomes difficult through the visual or “verbal expressibility.” 
 
It is lucid that Kiiyala‟s picture of the amputated arm reveals a “heartrending site.” However 
external, it emits shocking and hurtful emotions and may situate sensitive viewers in the position 
of a secondary witness of the violence. Nonetheless, the external pathos that this photograph 
flashes into view restrains the experience of violence to a particular area of the victim‟s body. 
This implies that such external scars on the victim‟s body are not as damaging as the innermost 
violence that invasively sits beneath the surface of the protruding scars or amputated body parts.  
 
Nonetheless, the protruding sites of violence on the victim‟s body should be recognized as 
entrance points. These spots indicate the area(s) where violence perforated the victim‟s body. 
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Below these gateways lie multiple conduits, channels leading to the interior dynamics of multiple 
wounds, pain and suffering of the victims. In this connection, the visual representation of 
Kiiyala‟s disabled body introduces the viewer to the surface of the broader but implicit picture of 
the emotional damage and the multiplicity of the pervasive and enduring pain beneath the 
protruding physical injuries. Therefore, “beyond the experience of the actual physical violence 
[or scars of violence] lies a form of discursive, rhetorical violence that continues to do harm in 
the minds of people …”173 The fact that emotional pain is exclusively personal is problematic for 
others‟ recognition. In this connection, Elaine Scarry tells us the following:  
When one hears
174
 about another person‟s physical pain, the events 
happening with the interior of that person‟s body may seem to have the 
remote character of some deep subterranean fact, belonging to an invisible 
geography that, however portentous, has no reality because it has not yet 
manifested itself on the visible surface of the earth [or body].
175
 
 
Elaine‟s statement is significant when we reframe it in the context of the scars of violence on 
other people‟s bodies. Relating this scenario to the photograph of Kiiyala‟s amputated arm, I 
would argue that a viewer who is solely connected to this brand of violence through the medium 
of this photograph is actually a naïve spectator. This is actually in relation to, according to Elaine 
Scarry, the “unsharability” or the “inexpressibility of physical pain”176 of the other person which 
the photograph has “eclipsed from view.”177In comparison, my physical immediacy to survivors‟ 
damaged bodies, during the interviews, and listening to their traumatic stories about how they 
incurred and nursed their deplorable injuries, were more real and emotionally charging, more 
than what this photograph shows. This is not to claim that by spending time with survivors 
during the interviews or personal communication with them, it was possible to understand their 
implicit memories and suffering. However the tangible presence of the victims‟ physical injuries 
and the sufferings embedded in the stories they told me were cutting through my emotions.  
 
The burden of implicit memory and its formation 
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My earlier reference to the victims‟ scars as closed gates through which violence has made a 
forced entry into the body is fundamental. If wounded memory is located beneath the surface, 
where the initial violence had initially made a forced entrance into the body and sealed the gate, 
then it means that memory is deeply an internal mechanism or organ - hidden from the public 
eye and recognition. The notion of the closed gate implies that violence is detained, framed and 
boils inside the body. As such, the chance to find an exit to the outside of the body is very 
narrow. As an alternative, the relentless struggle to find an exit from the wounded body 
crystallizes into tension. This internal violence causes inside „explosions‟ leading to massive 
internal injuries and bleeding. Regrettably, the invasiveness and restlessness of the internally 
locked up trouble or internal violence may develop without the notice and awareness of the 
outside world that could possibly provide some alleviation.  
 
As a consequence of enduring the pervasive suffering in isolation, the victim may become 
vocally wounded or repressed into “passive victimhood.” This implies that there is “collusion” 
between the body in pain, language and “silence.”178 The “collusion between violence and 
silence,”179 may partly explain why the victims of the horrendous Cassinga massacre are 
enduring so much pain and suffering in silence for so long. This does not mean that the victims 
do not want to communicate their tremendous miseries. Nor is this failure entirely inherent in the 
fact that physical violence “resists verbal objectification,” or because there is an absence of 
“language for pain.”180 But its meaning is closer to suggesting that the victims are repressed, and 
condemned to “contain” and deal with their numerous enduring suffering implicitly, and in 
silence (as will be explored further in this chapter).  
 
In this relation above, it important to explore implicit traumatic memory in the context of its 
extremely harsh and unstoppable victimization of the body.  Implicit memory depicts the searing 
pain and suffering which transcend the actual moment and space where, initially, the body came 
under the spotlight of the SADF systematic violence. In this relation, survivors‟ boiling 
memories, pervasive in the internal workings of the Cassinga victims‟ individual bodies, should 
not be perceived as akin to the victims‟ actual experiences of the violence on the ground. Rather, 
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the emotional endurance of the Cassinga painful memories is much more violent than the actual 
physical attack. This takes into cognizance the fact that unlike the brief moment of experiencing 
the physical unfolding of the violence on the ground, implicit memory is continuously violent in 
such a way that it endlessly causes tremendous damage, injuries and restlessness in the victims‟ 
lives.  
 
According to survivors, the formation and crystallization of implicit memory inside the victims‟ 
bodies features two crucial moments or stages which are nevertheless jointly connected. The first 
category is the primary stage. This moment is directly associated with the actual occurrence of 
the massacre on the ground. Survivors recognize this category as the period when violence 
entered the body: it involves the actual individual recording and memorization of the painful 
things experienced (physically and emotionally) as violence unfolded. The second category is the 
secondary stage. This phase sets in the moment the primary phase is completed. It is the replay 
of the assault pictures or scenes of violence recorded during the primary stage of witnessing the 
massacre on the ground. In other words, this moment transcends the actual space of violence. It 
is specifically associated with the individual victim‟s endless struggle against the recurring 
traumatic flashbacks and nightmares. As such, this moment represents the gruesomeness of 
carrying the burden of the relentless returns of the unhappy moments of the Cassinga massacre, 
combined with the excruciatingly chronic aftermath.  
 
In this relation, Helena Shixuandu Iipinge (photograph below) whose face was shockingly 
damaged in Cassinga, described the violence as an off and on experience:  
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Figure 5. Helena Shixuadu - Iipinge. Photograph by the author at Oshakati, 2009. 
 
Sometimes I am disconnected from it, but whenever I see my face like this 
in the mirror, is like pressing the button that switches on the screen of the 
Cassinga violence … In the mirror, my face is invisible … Instead, I see 
the bitterness and anger instead … I am very angry with those who caused 
this terrible damage, those who stole the beauty of my face … why did 
they do it? Why did they cause all these endless pains? Why are they not 
accountable for all these endless pains and sufferings? How can I forgive 
them?
181
 
  
The “on and off” violence that Shixuadu described in the interview indicates what Cathy Caruth, 
in the context of the Holocaust trauma, identified as “second wounding” or “double 
wounding.”182 In the case of the victims of the Cassinga massacre, the “double wounding” calls 
to mind the understanding that the Cassinga violence finds no resolution within the victims‟ 
mental schema. This is particularly so when society ignores the victims‟ ongoing suffering and 
trauma. Certainly, Shixuadu experiences many returns of very sad moments of the massacre 
which have left a permanent and unpleasant brand on her face. Looking at her face in the mirror 
is a way of reflecting on the terrible experience in Cassinga, and connecting it to her bodily and 
emotional sufferings since that awful day of catastrophe, human suffering and wretchedness. In 
other words, her damaged face is the agency that generates an “anguished memory” embedded in 
the irreplaceable beauty stolen from a young girl without compensation: it refers to the victims‟ 
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anger, sadness and frustration when the perpetrators escape taking responsibility for the Cassinga 
massacre. This is all under the watchful eye of the justice system which ought to speak for and 
protect the victims of apartheid-colonial violence against innocent civilians, particularly women 
and young girls. Shixuadu‟s expression of shock and anger is therefore also a way of 
interrogating the unfairness of the justice system since Namibia became a democracy in 1990.  
 
In this connection, the continuity of the unhealing traumatic memories stem from a number of 
reasons. For example, both Namibia and South Africa did not honour the expectations, prior to 
democratization, of the victims of colonial and apartheid atrocities. Paradoxically, democracy 
turned out to benefit the perpetrators at the expense of the victims of political violence under 
apartheid and colonial rule in Namibia. The victims are also under the state obligation to forgive 
the perpetrators whom the state shields from prosecution (see Chapter 7). Indeed, in the eyes of 
the formerly oppressed, democracy (in the political context) has simply added miseries to the 
victims‟ experience of the pathos of colonialism. Certainly, the victims of the Cassinga massacre 
and other related violence in Namibia are unhappy about the execution of such political games, 
especially the issue of “reconciliation without justice” (which I have explored in Chapter 7) for 
the victims of apartheid-colonialism in Namibia. 
 
It is apparent that survivors demand justice and nothing else. Survivors feel strongly that the 
perpetrators of the Cassinga massacre have to apologize, take responsibility and compensate the 
victims for the damages incurred. In the absence of social justice, the bleak cycle of traumatic 
violence continues to recharge repeatedly and adds more layers of pain and suffering felt by the 
victims of the Cassinga massacre, the survivors and affected families. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that survivors voice a concern that their sufferings, grievances and nightmares have 
reached a level that is no longer easy to contain, at least emotionally. I am not saying that the 
initiation of the justice towards the victims can repair and remedy emotional suffering. What I 
am saying is that it is possible to interrupt and reduce the level or layers of the injurious but 
“tainted (implicit or obscured) memories,” if things were to follow the demands and aspirations 
of the victims.  
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The misery of Lonia Vatileni alias “Ndjeimo” expressed in the following excerpt illustrates the 
arguments I am presenting:  
My health has been considerably compromised … My amputated feet are 
never healing … they itch terribly, especially when it is cloudy and wet … 
Those who did these terrible things to us are not accountable to our 
unending sufferings. The Boers are untouchable, if they were 
approachable and able to listen, we would want to ask them to repair and 
fix the damage they created. The government preaches national 
reconciliation. What reconciliation? Who benefit from it? With my 
physical disabilities, endless emotional pain and suffering, the coercion to 
forgive the Boers is another nightmare. Forgiving them for what? Have we 
done them any wrongs? And, how can I forgive them when they have not 
acknowledged responsibilities for our innocence, permanent disability and 
endless suffering? They have made my life miserable, yet I must forgive 
them? Must I condone violence and unhealed wounds? … I am a cleaner 
and my wage is not enough to help me deal with my disability-related 
problems, such as getting proper medical assistance. I am also a single 
mother, with five children and I do not have a proper house. Two of my 
children have completed schooling but they are unemployed. Their father 
was a SWAPO combatant. He was killed in the war. I need support to 
assist these children, to finish their studies and maybe help me 
tomorrow.
183
 
 
Never forget! Never forgive! The burden of forgiveness as preached in post-colonial Namibia is 
in conflict with survivors‟ “anguished memories.” More than a thousand people died or 
disappeared and every survivor suffered untold consequences, physically and emotionally. In 
view of this distressing situation, it becomes certain that survivors‟ actual experience of the 
Cassinga massacre on the ground and their ongoing sufferings are intertwined. Certainly, 
Ndjeimo‟s statement suggests that the traumatic effect of the actual physical moment of the 
violence, as such, combines with the traumatic aftermath of the massacre and subscribes to life-
long sufferings and fathomless agony. The prolonged survivors‟ suffering and disappointment 
also echo the dominant presence of inequalities in society: race, class, gender and economic 
differences that characterize a society emerging from apartheid, colonialism and racial rule.  
 
The way survivors chronicle their anguished stories (a reflection of their inner anguished 
memories) suggests one other crucial issue. That is, survivors‟ reflective traumatic memories aim 
to stir and direct public attention, not to the actual moment of the Cassinga massacre as it is 
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politically remembered. But the victims do intend taking the public down the memory line of the 
contemporary problematic issues of humanitarian concerns affecting them since the Cassinga 
massacre. These are the issues which survivors are particularly concerned with and want 
addressed if they were to meaningfully accept and forgive their former enemies. Certainly, 
survivors‟ despair, hopelessness and disappointment are the direct products of the current 
political negligence of survivors‟ emotional and psychological miseries. In this way, the ongoing 
difficult moments combine with the implicit memories of the victims in such a way that it adds 
extra layers of pain and suffering to the people already burdened and depressed. 
When I paid Meme Sabina Uupindi a visit at her homestead in Ombafi, Ombalantu, it transpired 
explicitly that the severity of the survivors‟ suffering (emotionally and physically) is indeed a 
combination of the actual experience of the massacre exacerbated by individual survivors‟ socio-
economic challenges that they face on a daily basis. Sabina is a single mother who lives with a 
number of dependent children under her care. I am trying to construct an argument that unlike 
survivors with access to decent employment, survivors living below the poverty line, in generally 
poor socio - economic environments, appear more severely affected by the recurring traumatic 
memories of the Cassinga massacre and the aftermath. Implicit memory as such, is 
comprehensively the sum total of multiple affective conditions which continuously propel 
continuous traumatic nightmares and suffering of survivors who are below the poverty line. 
It is also important to recognize that the degree of suffering and the enduring severe traumatic 
memories also relate to a number of other factors. Individual survivors told me that the higher 
the intensity of the physical and emotional violence the victim experienced and recorded, or the 
severity of the injuries and disability the victim sustained during the massacre, the more 
excruciating the physical and emotional suffering. This is the view of Sabina Uupindi who told 
me the following: 
Each survivor accumulated individual experiences of the massacre and of 
surviving the horror. Some people were lucky to have escaped from the 
camp before the foot - soldiers moved in. In my case, I was unfortunate to 
have fallen in the hands of the enemy. My friend, Loide Amwaama and I 
were found hiding … both of us were by then wounded … Our captors did 
not do any physical harm to us, but they took us to traumatic scenes 
around the camp, where people were horribly killed in mass numbers. One 
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shocking experience is when they took us to a dead person body wearing a 
military uniform … his body was badly mutilated and his intestines were 
on the floor … we were terribly shaken … but they were pitiless … they 
ordered us to sit at the sides of the mutilated body … placing the corpse 
between us. Loide sat on the right and I sat on the left side of the corpse. 
They told us that we must not look away from the corpse … I had never 
been that close to a dead person, and worst of all, the body was badly 
violated … it was horrible - horrible. From that scene, they took us to 
other horrible, horrible scenes where we found many other people dead, 
most of them lying in pools of blood. We were under the escort of four 
Boers for most of the time … at the end of it they took us to the clinic 
where we found another group of our comrades rounded up.
184
 
 
Uupindi‟s preoccupation with the sites of the physical and emotional memories means that 
violence is rationally dynamic and transferable. It moves or it transcends, as I have indicated 
earlier, the shared physical space and specific moments into the private and internal space of the 
victim. The degree of survivors‟ obsessiveness with violence in the distant present of the 
Cassinga massacre suggests the degree of the psychological damage that survivors have suffered 
for a very long time. This detrimental effect becomes a concern, especially in considering that 
the victims exposed to such traumatic experiences were children. And for most of them, it was 
their first experience of seeing dead people, pools of human blood and other horrible pictures of 
human catastrophe. This scenario also takes into cognizance the fact that in some customs, such 
as those of Aawambo, children were not allowed to view dead bodies. And, should that happen, 
the victim was to be cleansed, a practice which survivors of the Cassinga massacre side-stepped 
in the immediate aftermath of the massacre, a way of purifying the victim to manage the shock, 
distress and nightmares.  
 
Guilt Memory 
 
Guilt Memory is a common, painful experience of every survivor of the Cassinga massacre. The 
following scenario attempts to explain this excruciating scenario: 
Counting on the intensive attacks from the air which lasted for about an 
hour, I can say that there was no time to attend to the wounded and all 
those who needed help such as women and children. It was all about 
saving own life. At first, people were running together in small groups. 
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But afterwards, people realized that it was risky running in clusters. 
Women especially sought the company of their male folk. They hoped to 
receive protection from them, but men were dodging and avoiding them. 
There was also a sense of avoiding people wearing white or red, target 
clothes, which the enemy could easily detect. The disoriented and 
confused children including a number of babies who were in search of 
their mothers and crying for help were neglected ...  It is regrettable and 
traumatic.
185
 
 
In a similar scenario to Amukoto‟s account, other survivors also raised issues of guilt and regret. 
They told me that the period of the attack was actually a moment of watching comrades succumb 
to their injuries unaided. Darius Mbolondondo Shikongo, one of the few rescuers of civilians in 
Cassinga, told me how he continues to suffer from emotional distress attributable to his failure to 
rescue the victims who were critically wounded and unable to walk: 
In fact, I whisked many children across the river before the Boers came 
inside the camp. But, it was difficult to help other people who were 
critically wounded and could not walk. I did not pay attention to them 
during the rescuing exercise, as it required more than one person to carry 
each of them to places of safety. Pictures of those distressful moments are 
pervasive. They keep on returning, seriously wounding me and making 
closure and healing impossible.
186
 
 
In a similar scenario, Rauha Shitangi told me about her emotional blameworthiness as the 
following excerpt attempts to disclose:  
I cannot remember the name of that young girl, but she was one of the 
students from the St. Mary‟s Odibo High School.187 I found her deep in 
the bush, critically wounded. The place where I found her was relatively 
safer and I decided to stay there with her. Regrettably, she died, as I 
watched on. She was a courageous young girl. In spite of the awful pain 
she experienced, she was very brave to tell me her full name and her 
address in Namibia … Regrettably, I have not been able to remember her 
name and her parents‟ address when things returned to normal. She died 
shortly after passing that information to me. I had deep cuts on my leg and 
buttock and stayed at that spot, rescuers, the Cubans found me there. We 
left her dead body there … what happened to it I do not know … but, it is 
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so painful and troublesome … I feel guilty that I failed to convey her death 
to her family as she entrusted me to do before she died.
188
 
 
“Guilt memories” refers to anxiety embedded in the survivors‟ reflection of individual failures to 
provide needed assistance to those who desperately required particular help at critical moments 
of grave injuries and death of dear comrades, friends and family members. The frequency of the 
distressing guilt memories is also anchored in the dishonoured tasks entrusted to survivors by the 
dead.  
 
The inadvertent dishonouring of assignments which the dead assigned to survivors, such as the 
missed opportunities to report the death of comrades to respective families as in the case of 
Shitangi (who feels blameworthy for the deceased families‟ uncertainties about the fate of their 
missing daughter), discharge frequent multiple tensions which barricade survivors‟ chances of 
finding comfort and healing. So, the failure to safeguard others‟ lives or convey the deceased‟s 
notes to their families combine with other distressful moments in the aftermath of the Cassinga 
massacre, as discussed in Chapter 7.  
 
The inability to remember and recall, as in the case of Shitangi, what others inferred or 
communicated to them in the course of fighting for life and dying a painful death does not mean 
that survivors‟ emotional memories regarding the experience of suffering endured by others is 
also lost. But the survivors‟ inability to remember the things and tasks entrusted to them by the 
dead suggests that memory is carried away by the shocking experiences the individual is passing 
through during difficult periods. So when memory is preoccupied with overwhelming brutal 
violence, ethical issues find no entrance into memory. As such, future events and tasks or 
obligations are treated as secondary and may not be properly filed and preserved for future 
reference.  
 
Other factors may also explain this dilemma, such as the concern about one‟s own survival. That 
is, individuals entrusted with future responsibilities to convey messages of death to the deceased 
families (such as in the case of Shitangi), might themselves be “near death experience” and 
uncertain of surviving the violent killings. But, even when survivors cannot remember the names 
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and places of the deceased family members, the shocking memories of watching others succumb 
to death in pain and helplessness still hang in the balance and surround the lives of many 
survivors. Survivors listen to voices and messages from the dead reminding them about what 
they, the dead, entrusted or expected survivors to do when peace should return to Namibia.  
 
A scenario similar to Shitangi‟s dilemma was echoed by the late Rev. Michael Amukoto who 
also narrated that he is continuously haunted by an enduring shadow of guiltiness. This pertains 
to Amukoto‟s inability to explain what happened to his family members whom he lost in 
Cassinga. He tried to explain his ordeal to me as highlighted in the following excerpt:  
I lived with my wife and four children in Cassinga. After the massacre, I 
did not see my wife and my eldest daughter, Nuusiku Lengomwenyo 
Amukoto. I still do not know what happened to them. The uncertainty 
about what happened to my people is very hurtful and keeps on returning 
since the Cassinga massacre … this situation always demands 
explanations which I ought to have, but which I do not have and I do not 
think I will ever find … such as whether my people are really dead. If they 
died in Cassinga where are they buried - in the mass graves? These 
nightmares and those of my other two sons Gabriel and Otto Amukoto, 
who also died in exile during the successive years of the Namibian 
liberation struggle and whose remains are unaccounted for, also bring 
much suffering and endless grief every day. The shadow about what 
happened to my people is unacceptable.
189
 
 
In a different perspective, Jay Winter wrote the following: “the dead serve(d) as the conscience 
of the living, to terrify them into making a better world”190 for the dead. Indeed, “only the 
living,” and indeed families of the dead, can “rescue the dead” from political ruins. In this 
relation, the “silhouette” or “shadow” that Amukoto bemoans is a painful metaphor for the 
neglected world of the dead or, as Amukoto repeatedly put it in the interview, “my people, aantu 
yandje.” When there is an inability to see, know, understand and find answers when situations 
are shrouded in absolute darkness and silence, such a metaphor translates into Rev. Amukoto‟s 
single-handed and directionless search for “answers” and explanations about how his wife and 
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daughter possibly died at Cassinga.
191
 And, if they were killed, what exactly happened to their 
bodies? From this deplorable scenario, the aftermath of the Cassinga massacre translates into an 
impenetrable frontier that disconnects the living from the dead. This barrier is so hostile and 
impassable in such a way that it prohibits the bereaved families from practicing acceptable norms 
in line with respective individuals or communities‟ performances of rituals and rites for the dead. 
This is one other adversity that propels survivors‟ sense of guilt and other suffering in the face of 
the violated and unfulfilled individual clan and societal practices.  
 
In the precinct of this insurmountable quagmire, survivors and affected families of people who 
are the unconfirmed dead, or whose burial grounds are not yet confirmed, have been trapped in 
the traumatic moments which never end. In other words, when lethal violence involving the mass 
killings or disappearance of people is shrouded in the absence of identified human remains or 
graves, it perforates more injuries. The bitterness for the unconfirmed losses of the loved ones 
crystallizes into a cycle of relentless traumatic violence that continuously brings around lasting 
painful processes of ruminations or the recurrence of undiluted violence.
192
 
 
Guilt memory and unsung rescuers 
 
Every survivor whom I have interviewed pays tribute to the brave men, such as “Mbolondondo,” 
“Nakatana,” Paavo Max and David Kamakondo (at least to mention individuals whose names 
were provided in my interviews), who saved many lives in Cassinga. Survivors told me that they 
would not have survived if it were not for the bravery and humanitarian efforts provided by 
individual SWAPO combatants who in lieu of escaping through various exits known to them, as 
trained guerilla fighters, chose to volunteer and save the lives of vulnerable civilians. These men 
whisked away a number of civilians from the camp, across the brimming Cubango River, before 
the paratroopers moved into the camp.  
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Regrettably, the role played by rescuers in Cassinga appears forgotten. Darius “Mbolondodo” 
Shikongo, whom most survivors accredit for rescuing and saving many lives in Cassinga told me 
the following:  
I still believe that I am yet to receive recognition like other heroes‟ who 
have received special recognition since independence ... only if my role 
during the Cassinga massacre is anything to be remembered … but who is 
a hero, a politician? I think it is genuine that we all get official recognition 
and rewards while we are still alive.
193
 
 
Namibia‟s lack of recognition of persons, other than prominent politicians, for their bravery and 
selflessness in saving others‟ lives in conflict situations, or other contributions made during the 
liberation struggle, might well trigger emotional pain, hopelessness and frustration of those 
people. In this context, the absence of attributing official recognition to individuals known and 
accredited by oral sources for their selfless roles of saving civilian lives can result in tensions and 
disappointments. Important to note is that such frustrations and disappointments concern the 
survivors who were saved by rescuers like “Mbolondondo,” more than it concerns the rescuers 
themselves. In this way, by registering the unhappiness regarding the unrecognized role one has 
played in rescuing the lives of others is not, necessarily, about expectations for some sort of 
material reward, though this is also crucial, but it is primarily a societal norm. In other words, as 
human beings, we owe recognition to such phenomenal and exceptional men and women of 
integrity. Nothing dilutes their unique contribution, their bravery, selflessness and exemplary 
deeds under extreme and difficult circumstances during the trying times of Namibia‟s protracted 
walk to freedom. 
 
Dying memories  
 
The fact that memories of the Cassinga experience are not elicitable and communicable to the 
inexperienced world is of much concern to the victims of the Cassinga massacre. Survivors are 
of the opinion that, as an alternative to the inextricable memories, oral testimony can be useful in 
constructing and framing a history that describes the deplorable picture of the Cassinga 
massacre. However, survivors are anxious that there is apathy, especially the considerable lack of 
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political commitment to encourage the collection, preservation and documentation of the stories 
of war and violence that characterized Namibia‟s long and bitter walk to liberation. This is 
particularly in view of the natural fact that the number of those who participated in the Namibian 
liberation struggle is getting fewer and fewer as the Cassinga generation travels into the distant 
future:  
Let me say that the generation that fought against the South African 
colonial rule is dwindling. Take, for example, our group of 1976. Five 
hundred of us, including fifty women, left Zambia to Kongwa in Tanzania 
for military training. But, look at things today. How many of us are still 
alive? Of course, many of our colleagues died in the war. But, those of us 
who survived the conflict have tried nothing to document and preserve our 
important histories.
194
 
 
Martha Ndamona Mwatilifange-Uusiku, a history teacher at the Oshakati Senior Secondary 
School told me the following:  
Survivors as the eyewitnesses of the Cassinga massacre are the primary 
materials and sources of what Cassinga means. If we die with our 
testimonies, the generations to come will never know and understand. 
They will never be able to retrieve our stories from the graves … our 
generation will be blamed for sitting idle and watching these precious 
histories die with us. We are still alive today for a purpose. We are the 
living testimonies of the Cassinga massacre and what happened 
thereafter.
195
 
 
The late Rev. Michael Amukoto added:  
 
It hurts, it is really painful and discomforting. Our people are not 
committed to preserving the histories of what Namibians paid for 
independence. It is so disappointing to watch our valuable heritage 
disappearing. It is a betrayal to our loved ones whose blood we say 
“waters our freedom.” Our people tend to forget too soon. Imagine, our 
children are not even taught these things (such as the Cassinga stories) in 
schools. Namibia has traveled a long and protracted journey to get where 
we are today.
196
 
 
According to Hendrina Kiiyala: 
 
Those of us who went into exile lost many people, not only in Cassinga. 
We left many people at every place we settled, Lubango, Vietnam, 
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Kwanza-sul, Vienna, Ndalatando, Omatala, in the bush where our soldiers 
fell fighting the enemy and many other places. We buried so many people 
and lost many others, whose graves are unknown … these are some of the 
histories that we must preserve, teach, explore and research as a nation.
197
 
 
In the continuum of living with memories so traumatic, but which the victims cannot elicit, 
remembering such difficult memories without showing and explaining them properly causes 
other wounds to open. This failure also throws survivors into a dilemma. On one hand, they face 
the inner urge to tell the outside world about their horrific experiences and what they want 
addressed. On the other hand, there is anxiety and concern about the disappointments and anger 
which can emanate from the inability to empirically disclose violence to others. Hence, survivors 
are also worried that the inexperienced people are complacent and appear not to take survivors‟ 
stories seriously. This is the view expressed in the following extract:  
The Cassinga massacre appears like a joke to non-survivors, but to us [the 
survivors] it is endless suffering. Many times, I have tried to tell what 
happened and continues to happen to me since then, but none appears to 
believe me, share with me the painful moments … no one is interested in 
offering alternative which could help me deal with my difficult situations. 
Many could not pay attention because what I tell them appears unreal, but 
Cassinga left me permanently wounded and continues to incur wounds in 
the present. This situation becomes worse, especially, when a comrade 
dies … it reminds me of those other comrades I lost in Cassinga.198 
 
Martha Mwatilifange told me a similar scenario:  
 
Whenever I receive a news of death of a Cassinga survivor, it scratches on 
the wounded part of my memory. And you know, many of them just died 
like that, without their stories being told, recorded and preserved.
199
 
 
Regardless of the Cassinga survivors‟ aspirations to disclose realities of the massacre to the 
inexperienced world, it always remains a matter of concern and disconcertedness. No matter how 
survivors try to tell the world about their wounded memories, there are always insurmountable 
difficulties. This unwelcome situation prevails, because the tangibly wounded memory remains 
implicit and hidden from the intended public audience. As a result, it is difficult to recognize as 
real when survivors communicate their suffering to the inexperienced audience in forms of 
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testimony other than disclosing those practical things inside them. When the public shows no 
interest to listen to survivors‟ traumatic experiences and emotional sufferings it generates 
negative consequences that prolong the pain and suffering of the Cassinga victims.  
 
In bringing this chapter to the end, two concepts, of implicit and explicit memories have been 
employed in attempting to trace “wounded memory” beyond the confines of the visible frontiers. 
These frontiers translate into the physical scars on the victims‟ injured and amputated bodies. I 
have argued that such appalling figures represent gates or passages through which violent 
incidents made forceful and unwanted entrance into the victims‟ bodies. In this relation, I have 
problematized implicit traumatic memory as an acidic substance that does not virtually exist as 
tangible evidence on the surface of the scars on the wounded victims‟ bodies, but it resides 
below the surface of the scars, therefore obscured from others‟ experience and understanding. I 
have argued that while implicit memory is empirically tangible and violent inside the body of the 
beholder, it is not elicitable for the other people to see and offer assistance to the sufferer. In 
addition, the victims whose bodies are maimed and offer disturbing evidence of violence do not 
have a language to express their suffering and unending pain other than telling us stories about 
the atrocious Cassinga massacre and its excruciating aftermath. Regrettably, such testimonial 
accounts are entangled in the inefficiency of language that conveys the absence of the tangible 
violence. In this context, it is problematic if survivors‟ testimonies were to be embraced as 
authenticating the dynamic of the actual violence as implanted in the survivors‟ bodies.  
 
As discussed earlier, interviewees with amputated body parts and other terrible scars, most of 
which are hidden, were enthusiastic to disclose such damage during the interviews.  Survivors 
perceive amputated limbs and other shocking scars on their bodies as crucial visual techniques 
that disclose personal suffering. Of course, as I have pointed out earlier, the actual pain and 
suffering that the individual victim experienced are interior mechanisms: very deep and 
concealed, below the surface of the damaged area of the body and beyond the other‟s reach and 
understanding. However, the exterior of the wounded area of the body is still crucial. Such 
damaged sites unleash traumatic pictures which convey personal stories of the victims, arguably 
more than the camera photos or the victim‟s oral testimonies can disclose. In this context 
therefore, the victims‟ disclosure of the physical damage on their bodies such as in the case of 
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Lonia Ndjeimo Vataleni (who showed me the shocking stubs of her amputated feet), Hendrina 
Kiiyala, Helena Iipinge (discussed here in Chapter 4) and many others, symbolizes survivors‟ 
struggle to find appropriate techniques to communicate their sufferings to the public.  
 
It can also be deciphered that, since the victims find no appropriate language to describe their 
experiences and ongoing sufferings, disclosing such scars for the public seeing may allow the 
viewer to interpret such damage beyond the confines and limitations of the victims‟ own 
language of explaining things. In the final analysis, the concept of body scars not only refers to 
the physical disabilities that the body incurred. They also portray the survivors‟ emotional and 
psychological suffering: the agony of living with irreconcilable loss of limbs, permanent 
disabilities, deteriorating health and the recurring bitter memories deep inside survivors, or 
beneath the scars and only understood by the victims‟ themselves. Nonetheless, the sufferings 
and trauma of the Cassinga massacre are personal burdens that cannot be shouldered or shared, 
but need others‟ understanding and positive responses. This point reinforces the argument I keep 
returning to, that language (verbal or written), protruding physical damage on the victims‟ 
bodies, photographs and other means of conveying testimony to us are subtle and inaccurate 
techniques of attempting to disclose the exactness of survivors‟ inner trauma and suffering. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
TESTIMONY AND ORGANIC VIOLENCE 
 
 
In the preceding chapter, I have presented arguments that memory signifies the organic print, the 
actual and tangible picture of the Cassinga massacre and the excruciating aftermath that 
continuously wounds the victims. Memory is problematized as constituting multifold layers of 
enduring pain and suffering, yet it is implicitly invasive. Consequently, when the victims wish to 
communicate their untold suffering to the inexperienced world, testimonial accounts (oral, visual 
or textual) convey the absence of the tangible violence. In other words, the wall protecting 
memory is difficult to crack and unpack violence through testimony as the medium. This is the 
context in which the victims of the Cassinga massacre describe the scars of the Cassinga 
violence or their mutilated bodies as frontiers which obscure and then alienate the inexperienced 
viewer from witnessing violence beyond the surface scars where violence incurred damage as it 
made its forced entrance into the victim‟s body.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss, among other issues, how testimony relates to memory. 
By memory, I refer to the tangible experience as recorded and intrinsically box-filed in 
individual survivors‟ different compartments of storing the things experienced in one‟s life since 
the Cassinga massacre. In this relation, I will argue that testimony is a figment of memory, 
because survivors‟ testimony of the Cassinga massacre breaks ties with the facticity of that 
episode. Testimony authenticates the Cassinga massacre insufficiently. One reason to explain 
this anomaly is the fact that testimony is regulated by language, other than being a direct product 
of the violence that it aspires to unearth and communicate to us.  
 
My task in this chapter, therefore, is not to specifically raise issues about the absence of the 
empirical violent world or our dismal failures to verify the massacre‟s facticity in survivors‟ 
testimonial accounts. In lieu of this, I will attempt to discuss this problem in a different context. I 
will explore how testimony, as an aspiring technique of showing Cassinga in the way it was 
practically experienced on the ground, eclipses the physical violence, contrary to survivors‟ 
intentions to disclose the violence before the inexperienced world. Importantly, I intend picking 
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up the problematic relationship between language and testimony. In this chapter, testimony is 
explored in relation to survivors‟ use of verbal techniques as the medium of attempting to elicit 
and convey the actual realities of the massacre to the inexperienced person(s). However, since 
language is embedded in speech, and therefore figurative unlike the tangible Cassinga violence, 
considerable contradictions arise between the vibrant dynamics of the actual traumatic world and 
the vibrant conceptual representation of the Cassinga massacre via oral testimony.  
 
In pursuing the complexity between testimony and the authentication of the Cassinga massacre 
as survivors observed it on the ground, I construct this chapter as a twofold approach. The first 
half of the chapter presents a brief account of survivors‟ meta-narrative or the dominant 
discourse of narrating the Cassinga massacre by survivors. This is not to say that survivors‟ 
experiences of what happened around Cassinga are comprehensively collective. The Cassinga 
experience was mostly individual. As such, survivors tell extraordinary and individual stories 
that are diversely unique from one survivor to another survivor‟s telling of the same traumatic 
episode. For instance, the meaning embedded in the loss of comrades and friends, injuries, 
alleged rapes, amputated limbs, nightmares and traumatic flashbacks are all individual 
tribulations and vary from person to person in accordance with the degree of exposure to the 
violence, the type of injuries one sustained, the period of time spent in Cassinga before the 
massacre, as well as the age and gender categories of survivors. The diversity of such stories 
poses problems when attempting to combine them as a collective story. The narration of the 
Cassinga episode also poses a challenge of whose story to include, what items of the story to 
write and where to start with each story. 
 
Since it proves difficult to use survivors‟ testimonies collectively or use interviews “making 
qualitative statements that pertain to all,” I decided to use an extract from Paavo Max200 to 
                                                 
200
 Paavo Max was born on September 11, 1943 at Rupara, Nkurenkuru in Okavango. His parents were missionaries, 
sent from Oniipa in Owamboland to Okavango in 1933. His father was Antonious Max Manuel, the founder of the 
Nkurenkuru, Rupara and Omupini missions in Okavango. In 1964 Paavo was admitted to the Ongwediva Seminary 
[Teachers Training College]. He barely spent six months at the Seminary when he sat for a placement test to become 
a post master. He was among the three successful candidates: Boas Mweedeleli, Mateus Nuulimba and Paavo Max 
who became the first black post masters in Owamboland. The three received eight months training in postal service 
at Ondangwa. After passing the examinations from Bloemfontein, SA, they worked at the post office Head Quarters 
in Ondangwa. In 1968, following the resignation of the inspector of Post offices in the north, Max became the first 
black Post Office Inspector in the North Central Namibia. He joined SWAPO in 1960. In 1965, according to his 
interview, he landed in trouble when it was discovered that he helped facilitate safe passage of censored letters by 
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present a metanarrative of the Cassinga massacre: not in the way it necessarily speaks to each 
survivor‟s experience “scientifically,” but in the way it provides detailed information about 
several issues raised by other survivors of the Cassinga massacre. Max‟s role as one of the few 
combatants who rescued a number of women and children from the camp to places of safety is a 
motivational factor for choosing an extract from his interviews. His operation as a rescuer of 
many victims from different corners of the camp presented him with a broader exposure to the 
magnitude of the violence at different localities of the camp. Max‟s testimony is also 
extraordinary because, according to his testimony, he participated in the collection of the dead 
bodies for burial. He also counted all the dead bodies that were buried in the Cassinga mass 
graves.
201
 
 
In the second half of this chapter, I will attempt to present the analysis of testimony, in the 
context of how it relates to the telling of the actual physical violence as per the survivors‟ actual 
witnessing of it. I will argue that from my experience of engaging survivors in the interviews, 
testimony should be interpreted as a courier that conveys knowledge, not experience, to the 
inexperienced people. The following pages carry the shortened transcript of my interviews with 
Paavo Max, which lasted for six hours, about the survivors‟ meta-narratives of remembering and 
narrating the Cassinga experience. But, firstly, it is also important that we learn from Max about 
the origin of the Cassinga camp.  
 
The birth of the Cassinga camp 
 
In March 1976 while on the hunt for Commander Dimo Hamaambo
202
 we, 
a platoon of SWAPO combatants, came to Cassinga. By then, the Cuban 
soldiers had occupied it, there were no Namibians living there at the time. 
The mission to find Dimo aborted while we were at Cassinga. From there 
                                                                                                                                                             
Herman Toivo ya Toivo to the outside world and in 1968 he was sacked from the position of Postmaster inspector. 
In 1974, he joined SWAPO in exile, leaving behind his wife (meme Nangulohi Selma Max whom he married in 
1969). Between June 1977 and December 1977, he was part of five hundred PLAN cadres sent to the former Soviet 
Union for military training. Upon his return from the former USSR, he settled in Cassinga as one of the camp 
administrators until the massacre in May 1978. Source: author‟s interviews with Paavo Max, Efindi, 2008. 
201
 See Chapter 2, Paavo‟s account of counting the dead bodies as they were buried in the Cassinga mass graves.  
202
 According to oral sources, one of the objectives of Operation Savannah was to capture Dimo Hamaambo. By 
then Hamaambo stayed at Oshitumba where SWAPO and UNITA operated as allies prior to the 1975 split. When 
the SADF launched Operation Savannah into Angola (end of 1975) Hamaambo escaped from Oshitumba. He, 
according to Paavo Max, spent months in hiding in the jungles called the Efitu Lyiiti yaNandjamba, an evil forest, 
until the situation normalized, that is when the Operation Savannah retreated towards the Namibian border.  
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we went back to Huambo without any clues about the army Commander. 
In just over a year, on June 15, 1977, a group of about five hundred of us, 
men and women, left for the former Soviet Union for advanced military 
training. We returned on December 4, 1977. A few of us stayed behind, on 
the real front, the rest of our group members went to the war fronts/ 
SWAPO military regions in southern Angola, closer to the border with 
Namibia.
203
 I was sent to Cassinga for administrative purposes. By that 
time, the civilian population arriving from Namibia had increased 
tremendously. They were in thousands and newcomers were arriving from 
Namibia almost on a weekly basis. Because of Cassinga‟s geographical 
position and location, deeper into southern Angola (260km from the 
Namibian border) we thought it was out of reach of the regular SADF 
incursions into Southern Angola by land. We thought it was a safer place 
to settle civilians arriving from home. The massacre happened about a 
year from the time Cassinga became a SWAPO civilian settlement. 
Therefore, by the time of the massacre, the camp was in the process of 
establishing itself fully as a community of displaced Namibians in exile.  
 
The growing community of the exiled civilian population needed support 
in terms of education, administration, health facilities, shelter, clothing, 
food and most importantly security and protection from the enemy. 
Security - wise, we dug long trenches [omatelendja] in the camp, because 
the enemy attacks from the air were expected. What we did not expect was 
an attack by foot soldiers … though we did have some concerns about 
UNITA, but not to the extent of the ruthless power that the Boers used 
against civilians. Education provision for the young ones and soliciting 
schooling opportunities in independent countries for the students leaving 
Namibia was our first priority. As the centre was in the process of 
developing, classes took place in the open space, under the trees: we 
needed everything, qualified teachers, books, you mention it. We ran 
adobe bricks-making project, to build classes, accommodation and other 
facilities required in the camp. Historically, Cassinga was a sort of a farm 
area, formerly a Portuguese settlement. As such, there were not enough 
facilities in terms of building structures. The settlement only had eight 
buildings, as far as I remember, abandoned by the Portuguese. One of the 
buildings was converted into the camp clinic, another building was used 
for the administrative purposes and the largest one was used for storage 
purposes. However, we erected additional facilities, basic accommodation 
structures such as the traditional thatched roofs to accommodate the 
growing number of people. We divided the camp accordingly. For 
                                                 
203
 According to Paavo Max, by 1978 SWAPO had three Military Operational Areas (regions) located closer to 
Namibia border with Angola. These were: the North Western Region (under the command of Wilbard Tashiya 
“Nakada”); Northern Region - East of Ondjiva (under the command of “Zulu” Nadenga); and the Eastern Region -
Okongo, Eenhana
203
 area (under the command of Matias Ndakolo Mbulunganga). Source: author‟s interviews with 
Paavo Max, Efindi, 2008. 
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example, young children stayed at a separate site, away from the centre of 
the camp. In view of its strategic geographical location between the Tobias 
Hainyeko Training Centre (SWAPO fighters‟ training base) and the 
combat regions, Cassinga was a crucial networking site, particularly in 
terms of transportation. There was a garage and a “petrol station.” All 
SWAPO vehicles traveling from Lubango to other places or from the 
fronts were expected to refuel in Cassinga before proceeding to other 
places. So, PLAN combatants could not avoid traveling through Cassinga, 
they had to pass there and sometimes, especially when transport was not 
available or broken, they could spend days and weeks in Cassinga. For 
example, at the time of the attack a number of combatants from Zambia 
were on transit in Cassinga. They had just arrived there a few days, 
unfortunately they had no weapons.  
 
The attack (Oshiponokela) 
 
My residence in Cassinga was located next to the garage. On the morning 
of May 4, 1978, I woke up as usual, at five o‟clock. I went for the morning 
exercise before returning to my room to dress up and prepare for the daily 
morning parade. Around seven o‟ clock that morning, I was done and 
ready for the parade. I had dressed up in full military uniform, okakonkola, 
and as usual, I always carried my gun and four rounds of ammunition with 
me. I was on my way to the parade / okapale when a sudden thundering 
sound rocks the space above me. When I looked up, I saw four planes. I 
immediately reckoned that it was an attack and when I looked at my 
watch, it was seventeen minutes to eight (07: 43). The four planes formed 
a cross in the air, one in front, another one behind and the other two flew 
opposite each other. They emerged from the direction of Lubango, north 
to south direction. In seconds, they descended on the parade - okapale 
where people assembled for the morning devotion. Suddenly there were 
heavy explosions at the okapale followed by thick crowds of dust, smoke, 
people‟s screams and confusion at the parade.  
 
When the planes dropped the first bombs, people were commanded to take 
cover, lay down flat on the parade. As the first wave of the bombings 
passed, we ordered everyone to retreat to the trenches. I immediately 
retreated to the guns. We had two anti-aircraft guns. One was a double - 
barrel and the other one a single barrel, Zek U 2 and Zek U 1 respectively. 
We also had a lighter British anti-aircraft gun, but that one proved 
ineffective, it jammed after firing a few shots. The one-barrel anti-aircraft 
gun was also put out of action immediately. However, the double - barrel 
anti-aircraft gun was located in a dugout, almost disguised and obscured 
from the direct enemy view and fire. It stayed intact for much longer. We 
however wasted a lot of ammunition, including small arms fire by firing at 
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the planes. We thought the enemy would only attack from the air. We did 
not expect the drop of paratroopers inside the camp.  
 
When the enemy dropped from the air, the crew at the only remaining 
anti-aircraft gun concentrated the fire on the advancing ground forces. 
That gun really caused trouble for them as it delayed the enemy advance 
into the camp for much longer. The temporary holdup of the enemy was 
significant in many ways. For instance, it enabled us to rescue some of our 
people to safety before the enemy moved inside the camp. Unfortunately, 
the anti-aircraft gun ran out of ammunition and the gunners were shot 
dead. Following the silence of the anti-aircraft fire, the enemy broke inside 
the camp and committed gruesome killings of so many innocent people. 
The enemy marched freely along the trenches shooting civilians inside the 
trenches at point-blank range and bayoneting them, taya tsu aantu 
nomagonga gokoondjembo. They vandalized every existing structure; they 
burned everything they came across; the clinic, administrative office, food 
depots, accommodation facilities, cookery and utterly everything that 
survived the aerial bombardments was deliberately set on fire.  
 
The rescuing task 
 
A very few number of combatants volunteered to save women and 
children. It was a risky undertaking. Rescuers exposed themselves to many 
dangers, but it was important to save the lives of women and children. 
This tiny blemish you see on my face is a bullet mark! It was fired from a 
very close distance as I cut my way through the bushes. It was painful but 
I did not succumb to it. I did not feel the pain immediately. The violence 
was so unbearable that one became insensitive to injuries on the body. 
Pain, hunger and thirst were just not there until the violence subsided. 
People were running with critical injuries and I contemplate about it a lot 
until today: I find no explanation as to how it was possible for the victims 
to sustain such deep injuries, lose much blood, yet they sustained a life ... 
Many of the people we rescued or failed to rescue were in total panic and 
confusion. The situation in the camp was horrible; dust and smoke oozed 
everywhere, people could hardly see each other and many people 
crumbled under chemical emission/gas that made many of them insentient 
and insensible instantly. Nevertheless, we tried the best we could. I 
personally rescued four successive groups to the riverside before the 
Boers/Eembulu/Oombulu stormed inside the camp. “Mbolondondo” was 
another rescuer who played a significant role. He evacuated most of the 
children from the other side of the camp (where most of the young 
children were located). He took most of them (the pre-school kids), across 
the river where we also whisked Dimo Hamaambo. 
 
Hamaambo could have died or been captured in Cassinga. He stubbornly 
refused initial attempts to escort him to a safer place outside the camp. We 
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acted in accordance with the ethos of our army that senior commanders 
must be covered and provided with maximum protection in case of 
precarious situations that risked their lives or allowed them to fall into the 
hands of the enemy. We were fighting a war with the mightiest army in 
the region, maybe in the continent. It has always been our principle that 
the safety of our leaders was the first priority. In engaging such a powerful 
enemy, it was imperative that we keep our leaders safe in case of the 
enemy threat. Their safety was crucial - so that they can guide and lead us 
through the revolution as they successfully did. We took Hamaambo 
across the river, to a hidden location, where he stayed with his bodyguard 
“Nakadila” and others. We ordered the noncombatant civilian population 
to retreat to the western direction of the camp. That was the only possible 
route to escape from the camp, provided the escapees avoided the open 
terrain. There was an open space and a path extending from the centre of 
the camp towards the riverside. We instructed people to follow the densely 
vegetated area to the riverside and avoid the open space. Unfortunately, 
people were scared of escaping through the thick bushes. Instead, many of 
them ran across the open terrain, oya matuka mongalangala, to the 
riverside. As a result, many of them died as they tried to run across that 
open terrain. That terrain without bushes became a rich hunting ground for 
the predator and the prey an easy catch.  
 
The most difficult part of the rescue mission was dealing with many 
people who refused to leave the trenches. Many of them, despite shouting 
and urging them to move out of the trenches to safer places, to leave the 
camp under our escort, did not respond to the command. People were 
terrified and shocked. They would have reasoned that it was much safer 
inside the trenches than running across the burning and exploding camp. It 
was a very tense situation, heavy smoke, deafening bomb blasts and 
gunshots all over the camp. Some children went into very dangerous 
hideouts, such as seeking shelter under their beds, inside the pit toilets and 
other dangerous enclosures. Most of the thatched roofs that served as 
dormitories were bombed and set ablaze with people inside them. There 
was another challenge. People were falling asleep while on the run for 
safety. I think, something was inhaled that made people weak and 
unconscious. Many people were falling asleep instantly while on the run, 
but if you slapped that person, he would wake up but in a confused state. 
When the Boers flooded the camp, it became impossible to continue with 
the rescue work. I retreated to the western side of the camp. I stayed in the 
riverbed until the Cubans arrived. 
 
The Cubans (Aakuba) 
 
The Cubans‟ military base at Oshamutete (often spelled Techamutete) was 
the nearest military base to Cassinga, about 20km from Cassinga. At the 
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inception of the „paratroopers‟ drop at the outskirt of the camp, Uhuru,204 
the camp secretary, was dispatched to Techamutete to notify the Cubans 
about the attack and to request military help. Unfortunately, Uhuru did not 
return to Cassinga, he was killed when the SADF Airforce attacked the 
Cuban military convoy on its way to Cassinga. However, the second 
attempt by the Cubans succeeded. They arrived very late though, around 
two in the afternoon. The Boers were still in the camp just before the 
Cubans entered Cassinga. They retreated the moment the Cubans moved 
inside the camp. After assessing the deplorable situation, the Cubans took 
some of the wounded people to their clinic at Oshamutete. We did not 
receive any assistance from Lubango [Angolan help] that day. That late 
afternoon while we were going around the camp, with the Cubans, 
collecting the critically wounded, I found the body of Commander Jonas 
Haiduwa, the deputy Commander of PLAN, pierced with bullets and 
mutilated. I did not know how he re-entered the camp, because we also 
whisked him to a place of safety when the enemy started dropping soldiers 
in Cassinga. Surprisingly, I think, he should have experienced a moral 
dilemma, surviving at the cost of women and children. I also found the 
body of my sister, Anna Max, among other bodies in the trenches. We also 
rescued four girls at the spot where I found my sister‟s body. They were 
like dead: their entire bodies smeared in the blood of their dead comrades: 
they were very confused and shivered feverishly. A few other people were 
still alive among the dead bodies inside the trenches as well as at other 
places around the camp. Survivors were so shocked that they remained 
silent regardless of our efforts, shouting and appealing to anyone alive to 
report to us. When darkness came, we could hear multiple sounds of 
people groaning and some were calling for help. Many of them were 
wounded and terribly cold: it was very cold at night since it was the 
beginning of the winter season. We were fortunate, however, to find 
enough blankets not destroyed by the fire. The ground enemy set all 
standing structures ablaze, deliberately. Before the nightfall, the Cubans 
went back to their base to assess their own losses. They left us in a very 
desperate situation. Some of our comrades (combatants) with whom we 
were supposed to share responsibilities fled the scene. Some of them went 
as far as Jamba about 42km from Cassinga. That night almost everybody, 
except for the seriously wounded and corpses, deserted the camp. People 
were scared of spending the night in the camp. The number of us left in 
the camp was about four. There was a concern that UNITA, the most 
important ally of South Africa in Angola, might sneak into the camp at 
night and execute survivors. Six of us spent the night inside the camp, just 
not to leave the dead and critically wounded alone in the camp. The four 
who made up this number were not soldiers, we just recruited them to help 
stay on guard of the camp overnight. One of these boys works at the State 
House - where I also worked before my retirement. We call each other 
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 Golden Uhuru, Paavo could not remember Uhuru‟s middle name. It also appears that “Uhuru” is not Golden‟s 
surname. 
118 
 
comrades in arms, in the memories and remembrance of that horrible and 
difficult night of May 4 through to the morning of May 5. It was a long 
night of much pain, horror and of the horrible stench of death.  
 
The day after 
 
SWAPO soldiers from Lubango called Omakamufelendja arrived in 
Cassinga on the morning of May 5. We were very much relieved when 
they came. We shared responsibilities in collecting corpses all over the 
camp and in organizing the mass burials of the dead. By then, the dead 
bodies had begun to decompose. I received instructions to count the bodies 
as we buried them. First, we buried One Hundred and Forty Four, 144, 
bodies inside a trench located near the clinic. This is where we usually 
dumped the clinic disposals to maintain hygiene in the camp. The site for 
this mass grave is located between what used to be the clinic and the 
tailoring workshop managed by Meme Veronica. The other trench was 
much larger; we planned a storage dugout at that site. Five hundred and 
eighty three, 583, bodies are buried in that trench. That one is located in 
the western direction of the camp, at the outskirts of the crop field, 
between the field and Hamaambo‟s place. The total number of the bodies 
buried in the two mass graves, as I counted them, stood at Seven Hundred 
and Twenty Seven, 727. People have been giving misleading and 
conflicting reports about the exact number of the bodies buried in the two 
mass graves. I counted the bodies and recorded the exact figures of the 
dead in the mass graves. After the burials, I gave Tate Uushona alias 
Komanda Yeekomanda (who commanded the SWAPO soldiers from 
Lubango to Cassinga) the printed report, hand-written, of the number of 
the dead bodies buried in each of the two mass graves. It is saddening that 
innocent civilians were killed, but it is also correct that a small number of 
soldiers were also killed. These included the camp administrators and 
some soldiers deployed in Cassinga for the security of civilians. However, 
it is also obvious that a significant number of the victims of the Cassinga 
massacre are not buried in the two mass graves. Many people escaped 
from the camp with terminal injuries and are suspected to have died in the 
bush. Many people also drowned in the big Cubango River – I saw people 
washed away by the strong water. People jumped into the water in 
attempts to swim across the big Cubango River. Most of these victims 
were women and children who could not swim but tried to save their lives. 
 
Not surprisingly, the Boers call the Cassinga massacre a “battle” and a 
“victory” against SWAPO terrorists: because they could make no 
distinction between the SWAPO combatants and noncombatants and 
between children, women and terrorists. Of course, in war-torn Angola, 
they would not have expected SWAPO to abandon its civilian population 
without providing security for them. We had a responsibility to keep the 
civilian population away from the flashpoints of violence. Providing 
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civilians with security was also not a crime, but a humanitarian obligation. 
We also did not use civilians as “human shields” as the enemy alleges, but 
we tried to protect and shield them from the enemy attacks and 
indiscriminate killing. SWAPO fighters were trained to use the guerrilla 
combat tactics. Therefore, it is almost unthinkable that SWAPO kept such 
a large number of combatants at one place, let alone at the war fronts. It is 
indeed quite unnerving when the enemy deconstructs Cassinga into a 
military camp and the victims as combatants. It is hurtful, particularly for 
us who have seen the unfolding horror of the Boers‟ indiscriminate and 
pitiless mass killing of women and children. Eembulu, the Boers did not 
drop in Cassinga to fight any battle, they knowingly went there to 
slaughter civilians. Indeed, for us who witnessed it, what they did to those 
people, most of them very young and the majority of them women 
constitute a war crime. It was indeed political and racial killings. The 
majority of our people died from close range shots, some bayoneted to 
death. However, the SADF chronicling of the Cassinga event is 
deconstructive, intended to obliterate their shameful and inhuman actions 
against the innocent civilians. The official stand taken by the SADF since 
the Cassinga massacre is however not surprising, they had never admitted 
to killing civilians throughout their occupation and militarization of 
Namibia.
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Narration and Violence 
 
For all intents and purposes, Max‟s story is charged with emotional intensity of the brutal 
violence that the narrator witnessed, survived and wants others to experience. However, Max‟s 
testimony introduces another type of violence between the practicality of the Cassinga massacre 
and its narration or storyline. In fact, here, narration is so powerful as it eclipses and completely 
obliterates the referent or subject of the storyline. Hence, the story or text does not “visually 
startle, stupefy us into silence,”206 shock or cause harm to us physically and emotionally as the 
actual violence did, and still does, to the victims of the Cassinga massacre. This is because, 
violence is “cancelled out as it is introduced into the spoken sentence(s) or begins to be recorded 
on a written page(s).”207 
 
This scenario also discloses a kind of brutality or damage happening to the practicality of the 
violence on the ground. That is, violence experiences severe injuries and damage as attempts are 
made to convert it into text or language. As a consequence of this vicious encounter between 
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language and violence, or violence and text, the damage or the injury made to the body of 
violence is so extensive that violence is completely eliminated, “enfolded within the (written) 
language.”208 
 
As a consequence, there is no actual presence or “visual experience” of the real and tangible 
brutal picture of the violence in the text: but conceptual experience, “abstraction” or extracts of 
the edited, detailed storyline attributed to the absence of the actual violence. Here, it is important 
to recognize that it is not, as Leonard V. Smith put it, “the more ghastly the details, the more true 
the testimony.”209 
 
Certainly, empirical reality or objectivity of the Cassinga massacre lies beyond Max‟s testimony. 
Notwithstanding the considerable inconsistency between the practicality of Cassinga and 
testimony, Paavo‟s account above is nevertheless crucial in helping us discern the difference 
between actual experiences and sufferings of the Cassinga victims, which are incommunicable 
by any means, and the different ways of acting out experiences of suffering through the visual, 
oral or written techniques.  
 
Admittedly, it proves very difficult for me to discuss every statement of instability or 
inconsistency between narration and its referent, or put differently, between testimony and 
memory. However, it is important to recognize that although survivors give vivid and substantial 
stories of the terrible things they witnessed and survived in Cassinga, it is nevertheless 
regrettable that every word of their testimonies becomes disentangled from the tangible and 
explicit shocking realities that survivors lament and are desperate to show to others. But, 
whatever the challenges that the oral representation of the Cassinga massacre presents, it remains 
crucial that survivors “recounting of their own historical experience can counter (the packaged) 
official history”210 and contribute more stories to social history of the Cassinga massacre.  
 
Testimony and Facticity 
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In recounting experiences of the Cassinga massacre therefore, survivors experience 
insurmountable inconsistencies between testimony and the actual violence as experienced on the 
ground. In the context of Max‟s account, it became quite lucid that the actual picture of the 
things he narrates as lived experiences is to a large extent undetectable and unaccountable in the 
oral picture he vividly told me for six hours. In the same vein, his endless nightmares and 
traumatic flashbacks of the Cassinga killings have slipped away. Such considerable exclusions 
disclose that the practice of violence on the ground as survivors witnessed and still remember 
vividly is beyond description.  
 
In examining the French Soldiers‟ testimony of the Great War, Leonard V. Smith put it that “the 
meaning of the story lies beyond empirical reality.”211 As such, testimony communicates realities 
that are more ambiguous than what the victim intends unpacking. From the interviews with 
different survivors of the Cassinga massacre, I construe that whatever survivors described as 
testimony of what they experienced in Cassinga reveals the undesirable absence of the tangible 
violence and the subsequent suffering of the victims in the “long aftermath” of the massacre. 
This is not to contradict the fact that testimony carries fundamental pockets of violence. These 
pockets contain some useful ingredients for historical research. In particular, such ingredients are 
fundamental traces which oral historians can rely on in their attempts to dig deeper into 
exploring and examining the relationship between testimony and its referent.  
 
Of course, it is contentious to entirely embrace testimony as solid substance, let alone 
acknowledging it as evidence. However, while testimony is precious, irreplaceable, it is an 
insubstantial subject of the irretrievable experiences of the human ruin in Cassinga and the 
aftermath. This point resonates with Kimberly Nance‟s view that, despite their shortfalls, 
testimony should be treated as “sacred artifacts, something to be zealously guarded and 
preserved in its pristine state (as originally told by survivors) against possible contamination”212 
by writers or readers. 
 
Testimony and language 
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If witnessing the Cassinga massacre entails capturing and preserving the raw data of the things as 
survivors witnessed their actual unfolding on the ground and the troublesome aftermath, then 
testimony or narration is a way of attempting to process such raw data into language. As 
testimony subscribes to the victims‟ efforts to unravel and reveal their suffering to others, 
language becomes the passage through which testimony travels to reach the intended audience. 
In considering that language flows from the inside of the victim‟s wounded body which still 
bleeds profusely, internally, language is expected to elicit, carry and convey the inner pains and 
suffering of the victims‟ body to the surface where others can tangibly feel and understand the 
damage that the massacre incurred on survivors‟ lives. In this respect, language endeavours not 
to elicit the practical experience of the violence but to articulate knowledge and awareness that 
the victims remain emotionally damaged and their ongoing suffering is not recognized by 
society.  
 
Although language is expected to disclose and inform us about the physical and internal 
suffering as experienced or continuing to be experienced by the victims of the Cassinga 
massacre, it is so porous that it allows considerable and essential ingredients of violence to 
escape. In fact, language conceals all the things that the victims intend disclosing as tangible 
evidence through narration or testimony. However, it is possible to recognize segments of pain 
and suffering in the tone and pitch of the victims‟ oral testimonies. For example, during my face-
to-face interviews with Paavo Max and other interviewees, signs of emotional suffering and 
endless pain were evident, but regrettably fall flat when oral testimonies were transcribed into 
written testimonies.  
 
The fact that language as well as any other genre of testimony is not gifted with the art of 
containing and transmitting practical things to others does not imply that testimony is 
insignificant. I am saying this mindful of survivors‟ claim that their testimonies draw attention to 
very complex practices of the now, and the then, violence. That is, though language is 
considerably incapable of retrieving and eliciting practical violence in ways to which the victims 
aspire, its strength lies in unveiling gaps or “lacunae” which can encourage public dialogues 
about disconcerting issues that testimony is yet to disclose and make public. Certainly, the 
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victims are mindful of the fact that testimony cannot elicit the deplorable nature of their suffering 
and pain. They also do not simply aspire to the audience listening to their storylines. But they 
aim for testimony to draw a positive response in ways that assist the victims to possibly deal with 
their ongoing suffering and trauma.  
 
Academic writing as a way of packaging oral accounts to meet a scholarly cohesion is one of the 
factors that completely obliterate particles of violence evident in the victims‟ language. For 
instance, the way I have packaged much of Max‟s unarranged items, as presented in the original 
tape and video recorded interviews. This includes my translation of the interviews from the 
interviewee‟s language, Oshiwambo, including my choice for the excerpts that I have used 
throughout this thesis. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the actual physical violence has been 
eclipsed by the survivors‟ own telling of testimonies and further eroded by my own (re)shaping 
of the data presented to me by the interviewees, the damaging effect of the actual massacre 
remains an everyday of survivors‟ experiences. Put differently, although the actual physical 
violence is not retrievable in the oral or written accounts of survivors, or because the text erodes 
and dissipates oral testimony into nothingness, this does not mean that the impact of the actual 
physical violence is also absent. Hurtful memories remain permanent injuries in survivors‟ lives 
and will forever demand remedies.  
 
Metaphors in survivors‟ testimonies 
 
According to survivors, the Cassinga massacre displaced residents in the camp, each one, in pairs 
or small clusters going in a different direction and route in search of protection. In the interviews, 
survivors narrated that those who found ways to escape from the camp formed small clusters to 
cope with the challenges of the unknown wilderness, panic, confusion, multiple injuries and 
fatigue. Nonetheless, each survivor was an individual in terms of each experience accumulated, 
hence each survivor presents a different account of what unfolded at a particular area of 
witnessing the violence, the type of injuries sustained and so on. Therefore, each survivor‟s 
testimony of witnessing the Cassinga massacre is uniquely different. It is “monofocal” and 
therefore represents pockets of vital ingredients that feed the public about what survivors went 
through and what they actually require now as a way of helping them to deal with their ongoing 
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sufferings. Nonetheless, every victim‟s account introduces the “incoherence” which, according 
to Lawrence Langer, “escapes the appearance of form.” With particular reference to the Cassinga 
experience, the loss “of form” signifies the absence of the organic substance in testimony. To put 
it differently, what survivors experienced in Cassinga is one thing, while the telling of that 
experience is a different thing.  
 
In their search for “truth” and “objectivity” of the brutal Cassinga massacre, metaphors, for some 
survivors, become components of expression of the violent experience. That is, in encountering 
the inconsistency between testimony and the actual violence on the ground, survivors resort to 
the use of metaphor. When I interviewed survivors, some of them used metaphors not as literary 
devices to flavor or spice their testimonies, but to indicate survivors‟ search for an effective and 
powerful way of describing personal experiences of the brutal Cassinga epsiode. This argument 
is evident in the context of Paavo Max‟s argument above. For example, consider the following 
statement: “I experienced a long night of much pain, horror and horrible stench of death.” In a 
similar style, Max described the open terrain from the centre of Cassinga to the periphery of the 
camp, towards the river, as “a rich hunting ground for civilian lives by the Boers.” It was one of 
the scenes where, according to Max “the predators easily hunted down their escaping prey in a 
substantial number,” as people tried to escape death. 
 
In attempts to show the richness and complexity of the referent or the actual situations that they 
experienced, survivors shunted metaphors to the “forefront” of their testimonies of the Cassinga 
massacre. The use of metaphors indicates survivors‟ desperate hunt for the Cassinga organic 
thing that escapes testimony. In other words, survivors‟ use of metaphors signifies the 
inconsistency of testimony and its incapacity to provide practical evidence for the claims that 
they make. Therefore, metaphors of violent death and suffering emerge in various survivors‟ 
accounts as a way of highlighting the narrator‟s concern about the substantial erasure of the 
organic matter that the victims intend showing or want the audience to understand. The inclusion 
of metaphor in the survivors‟ telling of the Cassinga massacre is therefore quite fundamental. It 
serves as a method of procuring numerous ways that attempt to unravel and disclose the 
deplorable nature of the Cassinga violence and its impact on the lives of survivors. This is to say 
that survivors find the use of metaphors helpful in their attempts to situate the reader/listener 
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closer to survivors‟ actual life experiences. Arguably, metaphors appeal to people‟s sensibilities 
with the intent to procure the ground for possible imagination of the enormity of the violence that 
the witness fails to relive and authenticate through the use of plain language.  
 
In fact, survivors use of metaphors suggests that they intent putting their arguments about the 
Cassinga massacre clearly and persuasively to the inexperienced other. Notably therefore, 
survivors‟ attempts to convert the complexity of the different experiences of the Cassinga 
massacre into simplified or familiar meanings does not serve the purpose, to follow Karsten 
Harries, “of escaping from reality” or “as a weapon directed against reality … to falsify the facts 
and, therefore, deceive the readers.”213 But it does suggest that the use of metaphors serves the 
purpose of facilitating deeper imagination, interpretation and drawing a better understanding of 
what the witness fails to unravel and elicit for the experience of the inexperienced person(s).  
 
In describing his deplorable experience of the Cassinga massacre and the aftermath, Ignatius 
Vahongaifa Mwanyekange told me the following: “the picture of the Cassinga massacre is like a 
scene of mopane worms
214
 run over by wheels as they crawl across the road.”215 Mwanyekange‟s 
use of the metaphor of mopane worms to describe the magnitude of the loss of lives and 
mutilated bodies is not about depersonifying or belittling the human loss. Instead, it is a 
desperate attempt to quantify and equate a particular and horrific scene of bloodbath and untold 
suffering of human beings. This suggests that in the absence of accurate or proper language “to 
certify” to the actual violence and trauma, survivors opt for the use of allusions and figurative 
language: not to substitute the organic, but as a way of trying to connect the reader or listener to 
the actuality of the deplorable things that individual survivors experienced and continue to feel as 
excruciating in their lives. In other words, the use of metaphor is supposedly, albeit it is 
immaterial, a substitute for the hidden scenes of human catastrophe. That is, by resorting to the 
use of the everyday metaphors (in local context) survivors aspire to create wider local 
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imaginations and interpretations which may facilitate and help draw out understanding of the 
enormity of the unnecessary loss of lives.  
 
Indeed, the more survivors attempt to construct Cassinga from unfamiliar into familiar terms, the 
better it may help stimulate the desired public response or dialogue around the unresolved issues 
of that episode. Certainly, the Cassinga massacre is not “a metaphor for anything else.” The 
mutilated bodies and pools of blood were actual remains of human wreckage and nothing else 
can substitute them. Nonetheless, the use of the mopane, omagungu, lays emphasis on one other 
salient point I keep on returning to: it signifies survivors‟ desperate hunt for an appropriate 
language to symbolize the unprecedented massacre and capture the imagination of the targeted 
audience.  
 
Mwanyekange‟s use of metaphor also makes a mockery of the pitiless behaviour of the attackers. 
The assailants wielded their weapons, unnecessarily, against vulnerable women and children 
who were destitute: displaced by war and in search of opportunities for a better tomorrow. In this 
context, the use of metaphor becomes significant in bringing to light the landscape of the 
dehumanized bodies: the mutilated human flesh insensibly strewn across the landscape of 
violence like maggots. This is in the context of the fact that human bodies were insensibly 
violated: bayoneted, mutilated and left unattended to in the sun, to rot and spoil like insects; the 
wounded neglected, abandoned and condemned to die as the enemy deprived them of receiving 
urgent medical assistance and early evacuation to hospitals as every interviewee lamented.  
 
Nevertheless, the scenario that the bodies of the dead were violated and humiliated in multiple 
ways, such as bayoneting, should not surprise anyone. The practice of maltreating dead bodies 
and treating the wounded inhumanly was a customary practice of the SADF everyday conduct 
with local populations especially in the former combat zones along the Namibian northern border 
with Angola, especially in Owamboland. The SADF practice of abusing the bodies of the alleged 
SWAPO supporters and guerrillas was endemic in the war zones. Such practices included the 
notorious SADF/ Koevoet parading of dead bodies in public places for public viewing, or tying 
the bodies of dead people to their armed vehicles and driving around with them to scare and 
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intimidate the public
216
 from supporting SWAPO. It was a way of warning the public about the 
consequences of rendering support or sympathizing with those involved in the struggle to free 
Namibia from colonialism and racial rule. It was also a way of intimidating people, especially 
the youth, from joining SWAPO in Angola. Many unlucky Namibians were killed as they tried 
to cross the Namibia northern border with Angola and no efforts were made to hand over the 
dead bodies to their families. In this way many Namibians were killed before crossing the border 
into Angola. To this day many families are in the dark about what exactly happened to their 
loved ones.  
 
In bringing this chapter to an end, it should be noted that “if the function of literary testimony … 
becomes to establish facts or evidence, it grows apparent first of all to the writer (interviewer) 
that he may be demanding of narrative an impossible task. In … asking literature to establish the 
facts … or evidence of events (is to) demand not just that words signify experiences, but that 
they become like (the event).”217 In this relation, since testimony cannot authenticate what 
happened in Cassinga and thereafter, then it is important to note that the purpose of any 
testimony is not to account for the exactness of what happened on the ground or unravel the 
emotional and physical damage, the details of which cannot be “brought back to life, but … the 
understanding of them”218 can. It is extremely difficult for testimony to elicit and “bring back to 
life” violence, because, to narrate is to burn experiences to ashes. Therefore, testimony 
subscribes to the survivors‟ hunt for the particles of practical experiences among the ashes.  
 
Not turning away from the fact that testimony obscures and dissipates reality, it remains crucial 
that every survivor‟s testimony provides intertwined and complex particles of violence which 
researchers must treat with utmost caution and absolute consideration. In fact, as I have pointed 
out earlier, survivors‟ testimonies are crucial raw materials that can feed and inform dialogues 
and interrogations into the undisclosed realities of the Cassinga massacre.    
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Lastly, a few things raised in this chapter are worth reiterating. This chapter has attempted to 
explore the complexities regarding testimony‟s incapacity to elicit the survivors‟ untold pain and 
suffering since the Cassinga massacre. I have attempted to investigate how testimony obliterates 
the physical and emotional violence that the victims intend making explicit. I have also tried to 
explore different techniques and meanings embedded in the use of metaphors as survivors 
attempt to articulate the inexplicable violence. In this context, I have argued that the production 
and construction of testimony (unlike the massacre which was an event) involves the shifting of 
meanings, in conflict with the originality of the massacre. Hence, testimony is understood as 
disingenuous to survivors‟ efforts to disclose their shocking experiences to the inexperienced 
people.  
 
Therefore, any testimony that aims to tell the “truth” or claim to authenticate the Cassinga 
massacre is problematic as no testimony can contain violence. Testimony is trivial, tacit and 
conceals many practical things that the victims of the Cassinga massacre observed on the ground 
and aspire to show to the inexperienced world. The presentation of testimony by the survivors of 
the Cassinga massacre is therefore very problematic, disappointing and frustrating for the 
survivors. This is when considering the fact that testimony reaches the intended audience 
unsubstantiated by the things that survivors rhetorically lament about and want the world to see. 
Tangible evidence falls apart and disintegrates in language and other techniques of attempting to 
disclose the Cassinga violence. In this relation, it is therefore misleading if testimony should be 
accredited with communicating the entirety of the horrific experience of Cassinga and the 
terribly unresolved long traumatic aftermath. Nonetheless, by giving precedence to the victims‟ 
silenced voice, testimony provides crucial residues which serve as an essential support base in 
creating a space aspiring to stimulate conversations, dialogues and debates with the intent to take 
the understanding of the Cassinga massacre beyond the present political confines of this national 
historic event. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE: 
DISCLAIMERS, INTROVERTS AND POLEMICISTS 
 
Apartheid South Africa turned Namibia into a police state. The Fact Paper on Southern Africa 
from 1982 entitled “Apartheid‟s Army in Namibia: South Africa‟s illegal military occupation,” 
reported the following:  
 
In the opening months of 1981 … the number of South African troops in 
the territory had reached 100 000 – approximately one soldier to every 12 
members of the Namibian population. … The actual number of troops in 
Namibia fluctuates considerably, depending on preparations for attacks 
into neighbouring Angola. Before each of these attacks, additional troops 
are mobilized and moved to Namibia. This makes it difficult to reach an 
exact figure for any particular time. South Africa‟s military build-up in 
Namibia has been accompanied by the enforcement of increasingly harsh 
and authoritarian security measures, to the extent that, by 1981, more than 
80 per cent of the population were living under de facto martial law.
219
 
 
In this context, apartheid South Africa needed to repress and wage indiscriminate war against 
unarmed Namibian population groups to sustain its illegal and forcible hold on power in 
Namibia. Indeed, the greater the military presence in Namibia, the higher the rate of violence 
committed, with more people forced to leave Namibia, especially northern Namibia, and more 
loss of support for the SADF among the affected Namibian populations. The SADF and other 
security forces in Namibia were therefore unpopular. It also appears that the SADF was also, in 
general, unpopular among white South Africans. This could be explained by the fact this 
apartheid establishment was largely sustained by military conscripts who served a compulsory 
period of military service including going to “the border.” The SADF also maintained a force of 
military reservists who had served two-year compulsory military service, after which they 
returned to civilian life and waited to be called up any time for military service. The SADF 
appeared to have some trust in the military reservists as they were only called up for special 
operations such as the Cassinga operation. 
                                                 
219
 International Defence & Aid Fund, “Apartheid‟s army in Namibia: South Africa‟s illegal military occupation.” 
Fact Papers on Southern Africa, No. 10 (London: Canon Collins House, 1982), p. 3. 
 
 
130 
 
 
It therefore appears that most of the SADF paratroopers who participated in the Cassinga 
massacre were individuals drawn from the Citizen Force which was made up of volunteers 
serving an initial period of training and active duty, followed by several years of reserve status. 
They rotated into active duty when called upon. According to Breytenbach, a battalion of 370 
men who were involved in the Cassinga operation was referred to as a “composite battalion,” 
that is, the reservists were taken from two separate battalions, from 2 Parachute Battalion and 3 
Parachute Battalion. Parachute Battalions 2 and 3 were reserve units of the Citizen Force, with 
all the officers, non-commissioned officers and men having completed either nine months, 12 
months or 15 months of full-time military training, during which time they served with 1 
Parachute Battalion.220 Jan Breytenbach has produced a list he claims includes all the names of 
all the paratroopers who participated in the Cassinga attack.221 
 
Recently, various pictures of the SADF paratroopers photographed during the Cassinga operation 
have also been surfacing in several publications of the Cassinga massacre, and a few of them are 
available at the former SADF archives in Pretoria. One of such photographs, which I retrieved 
from the SADF archives in Pretoria, appears below:  
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Figure 6. “Jan  Breytenbach used a copy of this photograph in Appendix A of his book, The Eagle Strike. According 
to his caption, this group represents the “first lift of paratrooper companies precipitately lined up for extraction [at 
the parade in Cassinga]” back to Namibia. Source: SADF archive, Pretoria. 
 
I have chosen this photograph to try and tease out the argument that not every paratrooper 
appearing in this photograph or obscured by it agrees with the SADF radical version of history 
that Cassinga was a non-civilian settlement. Regrettably, the techniques that I have used in this 
study such as visual and oral methodologies do not do much in terms of helping this study 
authenticate the things experienced by the paratroopers on the ground, or confirm individual 
paratroopers‟ objection to the SADF meta-discourse of the Cassinga episode. In particular, 
photographs, as I have discussed in Chapters Two, Three and Four frame and silence the organic 
display of the Cassinga massacre by introducing impassable fortifications between the viewer 
and the things that the viewer wants the photograph to show and explain.  
 
Nevertheless, it is still important to use this photograph to see whether it can navigate, to some 
extent, some of the issues I am attempting to explore in this chapter. I have already discussed the 
SADF camera operators‟ deliberate techniques of focusing the camera eye away from the 
disturbing scenes showing the deliberate shooting of refugees, or scenes which exhibit the dead 
bodies of civilians in Cassinga. In this continuum too, the photograph of the group of 
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paratroopers appearing above does not only obstruct the face of the unspeakable human tragedy 
in Cassinga, and conceal individual paratroopers‟ different perceptions of experiencing what 
happened on the ground. Likewise, this photograph also denies the viewer the chance to identify 
and name the more culpable soldiers among them: those who were indeed in Cassinga on a 
business to kill and unconcerned to spare the lives of their unarmed political and racial foes. This 
photograph also alienates the viewer from obtaining a clue about who among the soldiers in this 
group was saddened by the SADF‟s needless actions against unarmed civilians. And, indeed who 
among these soldiers remained unapologetic and unfazed by the killings. The issues pertaining to 
what the SADF photographs of the Cassinga attack conceal and reveal here are obvious in this 
photograph, and I do not intend repeating them, as such issues have already been discussed in the 
preceding chapters, particularly in Chapter Three. 
 
Nevertheless, despite these insurmountable difficulties, through our own sense of the episode and 
various insights gathered from different sources we can virtually ascertain that many of these 
soldiers left Cassinga feeling worried:  some of them indeed inflamed with anger and 
embarrassed by their collective actions against the innocent lives of civilians whom they were 
told, prior to landing in Cassinga, were armed terrorists. In this relation, a former SADF 
conscript told me that “several senior officers left the army after Cassinga … disenchanted with 
the army over the SADF actions in Cassinga.”222 
 
In any military conflict that ends in humiliation, the individual soldier is the “great loser” and 
sufferer in the aftermath of the war. As I have pointed out earlier, the soldiers appearing in the 
photograph, most of whom are not captured by the camera‟s eye or excluded in the process of 
developing and printing the film, are lined up for evacuation from Cassinga to return to their 
families back home. However, many of them returned from Cassinga psychologically damaged, 
muted, some of them embarrassed and at odds with the army and some of their field commanders 
in Cassinga. Yet, a few others appeared “unfazed” or found solace in the “well accomplished 
mission.” This is to say that the experience of the Cassinga massacre has given birth to a 
conflict-ridden relationship among paratroopers following the Cassinga massacre. This argument 
materializes in learning that when the paratroopers returned from the Cassinga attack, none of 
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them (to make a sweeping assumption) told anyone about it, not even their spouses. Consider the 
following statement by the wife of the commander of the Cassinga massacre:  
Eventually my husband came home [back from Cassinga - my insertion] 
… Then twenty five years later I learnt about that day [the day of the 
Cassinga attack] when I typed the manuscript of this book [Jan 
Breytenbach‟s book, The eagle strike]. I read the individual stories … 
sometimes I cried as I read, because on that day, so long ago, I had been 
praying not knowing what they were going through … My tears were 
because I didn‟t know. I didn‟t know what my husband went through 
when he came home because he never told me.223 
This revelation suggests that the experience of the Cassinga massacre was so gruesome and 
inhuman to the extent that paratroopers shied away from disclosing the indiscriminate killing of 
innocent civilians. But what is completely unambiguous is that the SADF silence over or denial 
of the indiscriminate mass killings of civilians in Cassinga has divided and put the former 
paratroopers at odds with one another. This is primarily noticeable between the former senior 
commanders, the so-called professional soldiers of the operation, and their former junior 
officers.224 This conflict surfaces in the way different paratroopers unleash individual accounts 
that contradict the SADF official version of the Cassinga episode, as I will explain later.  
Indeed, most people would have the view that they, paratroopers, all jointly agree with the SADF 
official telling of the Cassinga episode. The fact is, Cassinga paratroopers‟ testimonies of the 
Cassinga episode are much more diverse than what many people would have expected. In this 
relation therefore, this chapter discusses a scenario where Cassinga paratroopers can be divided 
into three dominant categories: disclaimers, introverts and polemicists.  
The Disclaimers 
As I have pointed out earlier, in the run-up to the Cassinga massacre, the SADF was prepared to 
ensure that “credible coverage and immediate release [of the SADF storyline of the Cassinga 
attack] is essential to counter claims of SADF operations against and mass killings of civilians, 
especially women and children.”225 From this statement it appears obvious that the Cassinga 
violence was in all instances foreseeable, and anticipated to unfold into two very distinctive but 
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connected phases. This translates into the short- and long-term “resulting injuries,”226 comprising 
the physical violence (short term) and the rhetorical or emotional violence (long or indefinite 
violence). My task here is to grapple with the later, emotional violence.  
 
In a move to “improve own credibility regarding” the massacre of Namibian refugees at 
Cassinga, the SADF entered a “critical period” of “media feeding,” in attempts to “clinically” 
repair the damage done to the SADF “credibility.”227 This move marked the beginning of the 
SADF public denial of the Cassinga massacre. In fact, it initiated the birth of those who are the 
disclaimers of the Cassinga massacre. This category of paratroopers can be best described as 
politically poisoned: “For the better or worse,” disclaimers are resolutely committed to 
perpetuating verbal, print media and photographic imagery which advocate the absence of any 
Cassinga massacre. They are belligerent, publicly adamant that there was no mass killing and 
maiming of innocent civilians in Cassinga.  
 
The belligerent Colonel Jan Breytenbach is one of the Cassinga paratroopers who is publicly 
obstinate and adamant that paratroopers did not carry out the senseless killings and maiming of 
defenceless civilians.
228
 For instance, in the foreword to Graham Gillmore‟s book, Pathfinder 
Company: 44 Parachute Brigade 'The Philistines,’Breytenbach wrote: 
On Ascension Day, 1978, a composite South African parachute battalion 
jumped onto the tactical HQ of SWAPO's PLAN army, based at Cassinga, 
250 kilometres north of the Angolan border to destroy the facility, their 
logistics, and to wipe out a strong concentration of SWAPO guerrillas. 
The airborne assault, part of Operation Reindeer, was an unqualified 
success; the whole base was destroyed. 608 PLAN fighters were killed, 
with many more wounded which pushed the final SWAPO death toll to 
well over a thousand. We lost only four paratroopers killed in action plus a 
dozen or so wounded. According to airborne experts in Britain and 
Australia, this was the most audacious parachute assault since the Second 
World War; the mounting airfield was well over 1,000 nautical miles 
away. I was the commander of that airborne assault, which although 
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successful above all expectations, also highlighted many shortcomings, 
some of which nearly led to a disastrous outcome.
229
 
 
On a similar note, the then Right-wing Freedom Front Senator Tienie Groenewald, who was the 
military Chief of Staff of Intelligence at the time of the Cassinga massacre, defended the assault: 
"There was no massacre at Cassinga …it was the finest military operation conducted by the 
SADF."
230
 And, during aspecial meeting of Parliament's Defence Committee called to investigate 
the unauthorised parade held by 44 Parachute Brigade in Bloemfontein on May 4, 1996, the 
former National Party Senator Mark Wiley who had been “at Cassinga” was quoted to have said 
that the remarks that Cassinga was a refugee camp are "nonsense."
231
 In line with such 
representations, the disclaimers include individual ex-paratroopers calling themselves “proud 
warriors,” who continue to claim that the Cassinga massacre is a deed of pride and heroism.232 
They are proponents of violence that unnecessarily continues to harm and exacerbate the 
suffering and pain of others, namely the Cassinga survivors and affected families of the dead and 
missing Namibians. This is eminently the case with their unrepentant, ironic and provocative 
statements, for example, arguing that apartheid-colonial violence in both South Africa and 
Namibia was “all worth effort … the proud attainment of all those in the South African uniform- 
those who won… that is why Namibia and South Africa bore almost no scars of war when their 
respective movements towards political settlement began.”233 
Writing about Argentina‟s “Dirty War” junta (1976-1983), Marguerite Feitlowitz asks: “when 
known torturers are said to be heroes, what happens to the minds of those they injured?”234 In 
this relation, this work considers the SADF rhetorical violence as not only hurtful to the victims 
of apartheid‟s uncivilized law and order, but as also generally degrading to the dignity and 
integrity of all the victims of apartheid and colonialism in Namibia as well as in South Africa. It 
is also very worrisome and disreputable of some human beings to entertain a sense of being more 
human than other people are. The disclaimers‟ continuing rhetorical praise song of brutal 
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violence beyond the fall of apartheid-colonial rule, indicates a strategic shift of torture. “Torture” 
is a long-term strategy premeditated by the SADF before attacking Cassinga. In essence, in the 
wake of the collapse or the “breakdown” of the SADF military supremacy,235 proponents of the 
old order resort to emotional or rhetoric “torture” or violence as a way of revenging, in part, their 
military capitulation. This sort of vengeance invokes the continuation of the physical and 
emotional violence, to wound the victims by using a different approach. Thus, rhetorical torture 
is the continuation of the military violence by other means, to adapt Carl Von Clausewitz‟s 
assertion that “war is the continuation of politics by other means.”236 
Thus, this form of long-term torture is, arguably, a strategy that indicates the SADF “passion” to 
increase and transfer the pain and suffering of the victims “beyond the physical to the moral”237 
realm of damage.  This could also be translated in terms of Elaine Scarry‟s observation that 
“torture” is “a parallel act of deconstruction. It imitates the destructive power of war… whereas 
the object of war is to kill people, torture usually mimes the killing of people by inflicting pain, 
the sensory equivalent of death, substituting prolonged mock execution for execution.”238 
Certainly, the essence of this SADF rhetorical torture is a malevolent act against people already 
victimized, particularly the survivors and affected families whose lucky escape from Cassinga 
extinguishes the disclaimer‟s joy and nourishes the disclaimers‟ unease over the lives that were 
not destroyed. Indeed, emotional torture is unlimited and therefore worse than the physical 
violence: it is the extension of the unfinished violence, its project is to inflict heavier and 
prolonged human misery, to alter and misrepresent the voice, pain and suffering of the victims. 
“The day of medals”  
On the SADF calendar, the Cassinga anniversary marks a spectacularly impressive and award-
winning day in honour of the soldiers who participated in the Cassinga attack.  This is while 
Namibians remember and commemorate every anniversary of the Cassinga massacre as a day of 
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mourning and loss of the innocent lives of irreplaceable loved ones.
239
 In the years that followed 
the Cassinga massacre, prior to South Africa democratization, the SADF adorned May 4, each 
year, as a public day of admiration, excitement, jubilation and celebration. It was possibly a 
regular practice in Namibia since the Cassinga massacre, but one of such provocative 
celebrations happened on May 4, 1988, when the SADF celebrated the tenth anniversary of the 
Cassinga massacre with a military parade in the northern Namibian town of Oshakati. During 
that occasion, “General Ian Gleeson, chief of staff of the SADF, boasted that the raid had been 
the most successful paratrooper operation of its kind anywhere in the world since World War 
Two.”240 
On this day of “great jubilations and excitement” for the SADF, individual paratroopers were 
honored with medals and their names pronounced in due respect for their participation in the 
violence at Cassinga. Namibia‟s transition to independence in 1990 pushed such open 
celebrations into silence. However, in South Africa, the SADF kept such celebratory parades 
alive, conducted publicly every year. This practice came to a halt, at least explicitly, when in 
1996, Joe Modise, by then the Minister of the new South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF) declared it “an insensitive act”241 and ordered that “steps should be taken to ensure 
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that no similar event”242 ever takes place in the future. However, according to reliable sources 
connected to the former SADF soldiers, the celebrations of the Cassinga massacre as “a jewel of 
military craftsmanship” still take place in silence. In the following statement, Jan Breytenbach 
acknowledges that “the majority of the Cassinga paratroopers” still celebrate the Cassinga 
massacre as a victory for the SADF: “this order [the ANC order stopping the former SADF 
public celebrations of the Cassinga massacre] is slavishly obeyed by some of our PC [politically 
correct], former comrades but certainly not by the majority and most definitely not by the 
paratroopers who were there.”243 
Once projected as a regional superpower, militarily, proponents of the former SADF are 
apparently not expected to be fever-stricken and die a silent death. The way disclaimers continue 
to pronounce derogatory public rhetoric such as referring to the Cassinga day as “SWAPO‟s day 
of shame,”244 and other provocations which are currently flowing in the “Cassinga string” or 
Facebook provide ingredients for the argument I am making.
245
 This “renewed interest” in the 
Cassinga event mainly receives contributions from the former Cassinga paratroopers. Indeed, the 
paratroopers‟ Facebook is gratuitously created as events which disclaimers “consider pivotal,” 
and asthe “worst of the human viciousness” is purged from the “narrative proper.”  This brings 
into focus the way that such narratives are a “destructive force.”246 As Helena Pohlandt-
Mccormick would put it in the context of apartheid South Africa‟s attempts to silence and erase 
the history of the 1976 Soweto massacre, such attempts intend to “erase(d) the histories of their 
victims …[and] contrived to create a history that deny their culpability…”247 Hence, the intent of 
the “Cassinga string” website (as well as other means of disseminating information) is to obscure 
the SADF role in the violence against civilians. Its less obvious aim is possibly to propel a 
certain distress: to infuriate and prolong individual victim‟s long suffering and unhealed 
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emotional injuries. This is, for example, demonstrated by Ellen Namhila‟s response to Jan 
Breytenbach‟s article which was published in the Sunday Independent (see Appendix H of this 
study). The denial of the Cassinga massacre by some former paratroopers also discloses certain 
war madness and insensitivity on the part of the proponents.  
 
Nevertheless, this sort of extreme, on the other hand, gives the public a conceptual picture to 
think about such violent rhetoric as a reflection of the former SADF‟s brutal actions which have 
coalesced and been eternalized in individual ex- soldiers refusing to yield to change or accept 
that apartheid was evil and unpopular. This unpopularity of course resulted in its political 
demise. Indeed, it is of much concern that such provocations continue to unfold, unnecessarily, 
many years after the fall of South African colonialism and apartheid rule in Namibia. 
Nevertheless, the rising tide of the spoken and printed violence suggests that the disclaimers are 
taking this stand in response to the absence, in both Namibia and South Africa, of a law or an act 
of parliament outlawing and making it criminal to deny the SADF mass killing of Namibia 
civilians in Cassinga and elsewhere. Secondly, the disclaimers are embarrassed by their brutal 
conduct in Cassinga. Hence, they seem to create stories in the way they do, in attempts 
to(ironically) repair their damaged reputation. Thirdly, the disclaimers‟ denials and insults are 
inherent in SADF histories of habitual denialism, its notorious projection and casting of acts of 
brutal violence on to someone else. During the war, the SADF projected the notion that SWAPO 
terrorized its own people. For example, the SADF argued that one of the reasons for attacking 
Cassinga was “to maintain law and order and to protect the Owambo people from SWAPO 
intimidation.”248 
 
In following Larbi Sadiki‟s writing on the recent American military intervention in Libya, 
“protection via war is a perfect oxymoron … The conduct of war for the „protection of civilians‟ 
provides further proof of how war makes no sense even when executed with the best intentions 
in mind.”249 With reference to the Cassinga massacre, the “oxymoron” or “absurdity” of killing 
civilians to protect civilians lives “calls for questioning the context” of the SADF illegal 
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occupation of Namibia and cross-border violations of independent and sovereign states, such as 
Angola. In terms of the discourse operating in the SADF, SWAPO was a terrorist organization, 
and its followers, particularly those who were in exile, regardless of age, gender, career, 
disabilities, etc. were all classified as „terrorists‟. The irony however is that the Owambo people 
whom the SADF claimed to protect from SWAPO intimidation formed the backbone of SWAPO 
at home and in exile. However, the significance of this scenario lies in helping us to think that 
the SADF motive of attacking Cassinga was not to destroy a military camp or headquarters of 
SWAPO, but simply to cause general damage
250
 and effect a level of elimination among the 
civilian populace, the source of SWAPO‟s strength and existence.  
 
Be that as it may, the deeply saddened and non-provocative victims, some of them living with 
physical disabilities from Cassinga and all of them with levels of rage and despair, feel 
undignified when their sense of suffering, trauma and loss of loved ones continue to be 
exacerbated. Such systematic provocations unfold under the watchful eyes of the two 
postcolonial-apartheid states, Namibia and South Africa, and under the ambiguities of national 
reconciliation. The perpetrators enjoy state amnesty, void of any compulsion to acknowledge the 
unacceptable brutal violence against the Namibian civilian population. In this relation, the 
victims of South Africa apartheid and colonial atrocities are extremely sickened and irritated by 
the fact that in spite of the general amnesty granted to them, the perpetrators are not only 
unrepentant of killing untold numbers of Namibian civilians, maiming and causing incalculable 
destruction to property and livelihood, but they also continue, unceasingly, with disrespectful 
and injurious public rhetoric.  
 
Another version that survivors find disconcerting entails, for instance, Breytenbach‟s recent 
pounding denial that “my paratroopers did not carry bayonets or any other sharp instruments 
with which to slaughter women and children.”251 Nonetheless, one thing is unambiguous in this 
regard. That is, with or without bayonets maximum damage could be inflicted on the targeted 
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victims, especially when the targeted persons possess no means of self-defence or were not 
trained to act that way.  
 
In the context of the SADF denial of ever using bayonets to kill and maim, the concern of 
survivors is that the disclaimers are missing the central issue. That is, brutal violence against 
non-combatants in Cassinga is not a question of what weapons were used to kill, maim and cause 
other damage to people and property. What really matters is the undeniable fact that with or 
without the use of bayonets, innocent people were brutally killed, maimed, traumatized for life 
and disappeared without trace to this day. Indeed, it is important to note that even without the 
bayonets, survivors consider the paratroopers, themselves, to be killing machines or instruments 
of torture for the apartheid state violence. They themselves are more lethal than the military 
hardware they possessed. For weapons cannot inflict damage on their own. Violence is 
committed by people, even with their bare hands. In this regard, Elaine Scarry argues that the 
“designation” of “weapons” as “arms” implies an “extension” of the human body. In this way, 
“the human body” becomes “an extension of the weapon.”252 Thus, it is the human body, rather 
than weapons, that perpetuates and executes violence. Indeed, as illustrated elsewhere in this 
study, the SADF were feared for their murderous capabilities, for with or without guns they were 
notorious for causing deadly injuries by means of kicking or even beating people to death.  
 
Nonetheless, the issue of bayoneting civilians and the debate around it raises two important 
points. Firstly, it lays emphasis on the violent and unacceptable maiming and killing of human 
beings in an uncivilized and unreasonable manner by a military force that claimed to be the 
opposite. Secondly, it emphasizes survivors‟ arguments that they did not have the defensive 
mechanisms or strength to keep the attackers at bay:  
I, and many of my friends whom I lost in the bombing were not 
military people. We did not study military matters and did not 
have guns to fight anyone. I can state categorically that Cassinga 
was not a military base.
253
 
 
Conscious of its wrong doings in Cassinga, the apartheid government in South Africa knew that 
it would face intense criticism from the outside world. This compelled the SADF to package a 
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particular version of the Cassinga attack. So, to suggest that the world subscribes to a singular 
version of the “truth” of the Cassinga massacre, as the SADF suggests, is to obscure the multiple 
realities of the Cassinga massacre. Grahame Hayes observes that “truth … (does) not primarily reside 
in the content of … stories, but rather in recognizing the profound breach of human conduct that 
made many of these apartheid stories possible.”
254
 In fact, what disclaimers put on paper actually 
mirrors something that the Cassinga massacre has created. That is, it again reveals the impossibility 
of the massacre to be written on paper or to be told.   
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the “truth” of the Cassinga massacre does not reside outside the 
body that constitutes it, disclaimers claim that what they write or tell the public is not from 
hearsay but from the mouth and pen of those who executed the attack on the ground.
255
 
Interestingly, even before the massacre took place (as I have pointed out earlier), the South 
African government had already meticulously designed and put on paper deceitful ways of 
informing the public about the outcome of the Cassinga attack. Nonetheless, regardless of what 
the SADF official discourse of the Cassinga massacre tells us, it is important to note that such 
statements do not speak to the reality of the Cassinga massacre. Instead, they are issued as a 
mechanism to counter outside pressure and condemnation of the Cassinga massacre, and as a 
way of attempting to exonerate the SADF from any wrongdoing. 
 
In this context therefore, it is crucial to think of such statements as embedded in the practice of 
“deceit and concealment” but which, as in the case of other violence perpetuated by apartheid 
South Africa, also convey a sheer “violent assault on the dignity of (the) victims.”256 As a 
“fundamental fact” of any violence, the SADF attacked refugees in Cassinga to finish them off. 
This is self-evident in the SADF central objective of attacking the camp: to “break the backbone 
of SWAPO”257 by killing as many civilians as possible. And indeed, this metaphor, “the 
backbone of SWAPO,” suggests young people, particularly children who were leaving Namibia 
in a huge and unstoppable exodus to Cassinga, Angola. South Africa perceived the huge exodus 
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of young Namibians as a serious threat to the future political stability and the maintenance of 
apartheid hegemony and colonial rule in Namibia.  
The denial of the Cassinga massacre is also embedded in the early 1990s political turnaround and 
transformation in both Namibia and South Africa that have placed the inflexible former 
servicemen further away from acknowledging responsibility for the violence committed against 
civilians during the period of South African colonial rule of Namibia. In fact, it is humiliating to 
them when the violence that apartheid exported outside the state of South Africa and the quasi-
defeat they suffered at the end of the conflict is said to be “akin to the Vietnam war experience.” 
That is, a public perception that the war was unjustifiable and caused unnecessary and even 
catastrophic conditions for many innocent lives and property, especially in northern Namibia. 
Arguably, those who committed violence and acted as the tools of apartheid‟s cross-border 
aggression benefited nothing from the violence. Instead, their service only earned them an 
undesirable public reputation. It is this undesirable publicity that instills embarrassment and 
uneasiness, in such a way that disclaimers find it extremely unacceptable to publicly 
acknowledge responsibility for the multiple deeds they committed during the course of the 
conflict, especially the indiscriminate killings of civilians, inside Namibia and outside its 
borders.  
In considering that the camp was an easy operation for the paratroopers, one discerns with near-
certainty that Cassinga was not what the disclaimers describe it to be. There are several hints 
even within their own discourse to corroborate arguments that Cassinga was a noncombatant 
facility. Namely, if Cassinga were not a soft target, the SADF would not have decided to drop 
paratroopers deep into enemy territory where the enemy(and this is ironic)could by far 
“outnumber the paratroopers.” For example, Operation Reindeer as it was officially code-named 
consisted of 370 combatants,258 though in some other sources this figure is higher (as illustrated 
in the previous chapters). In this context therefore, it is almost unthinkable for this small number 
to parachute into the territory of more than “4000 armed fighters” and miraculously get away 
without incurring significant casualties, except losing less than five men.259 The crisis in this case 
is not that the organic picture of the Cassinga massacre remains mysterious. But it is a new zone 
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of mystery that unfolds when disclaimers dismiss other Cassinga narratives as untrue. In fact, the 
“truth” of the Cassinga massacre is what the disclaimers conceal and try to obliterate as 
previously discussed.   
As I have put it earlier, disclaimers exploit Facebook and other social network spaces to package 
the SADF version of the Cassinga massacre. They appear to be more self-absorbed than thinking 
of the effects on Namibians. In fact, it can be argued that for this category of former soldiers, the 
victims of the Cassinga massacre do not matter as they do not exist as people for them. But 
whatever importance the disclaimers attach to the text as the absolute “truth” of the Cassinga 
massacre, this is indeed inconsequential and incompatible with the ordeals experienced on the 
ground and which continue to torment the lives of many people in Namibia today. In other 
words, for the disclaimers, the concept of telling the “truth” means the untelling, reconfiguring or 
unravelling of what is virtually unrepresentable. Because in every text or spoken language, 
“truth” falls flat, it is suppressed and obliterated.  
The “embattled self” 
In the preface to Eagle strike! Jan Breytenbach noted the following:  
It certainly was a day of violent death, a day when eagles descendent 
from the sky above Cassinga to wreak terrible vengeance on the 
occupants of what was considered to be a major SWAPO base by the 
SADF and a refugee camp by SWAPO.260 
This statement sets out a number of pertinent issues. The first issue is the narrator‟s retreat from 
the militaristic terms that Cassinga is associated with by the SADF. Arguably, the escape from 
the usual singular SADF rhetoric of referring to Cassinga as a “military base” into a more 
inclusive “considered to be a major SWAPO military base by the SADF,” might appear to 
legitimize Breytenbach‟s personal experience of things on the ground. Secondly, this statement 
unpacks something important with the term “considered.” In other words, the decision to destroy 
Cassinga was based on a perception, which translates into a semi-acknowledgement that it was 
not yet a military camp. Hence, the Cassinga massacre was not aimed at destroying a military 
facility, but the attack on Cassinga was embedded in the SADF fear that the majority of the 
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young people in the camp were potential SWAPO fighters. Ironically, most of the children who 
were in Cassinga did not make it to military training. Instead, many were sent to non-military 
schools in different countries around the globe, in particular to Cuba. Indeed, when examined 
closely, disclaimers‟ reports of the Cassinga massacre unleash, as I will explore below, personal 
accounts which deviate from the SADF framed picture of the Cassinga attack.  
In another article entitled “Airborne assault on Cassinga,” Breytenbach retreated from the SADF 
framed description of the Cassinga trenches as the “defensive facilities” from where SWAPO 
combatants launched defensive attacks against the advancing paratroopers. Consider the 
following statement: The trenches constituted a space where the SADF performed the most 
sinister, “horrific slaughter [or caused] horrendous death toll”261 of unarmed civilians. He further 
stated that, the trenches were “filled to the brim with escaping SWAPOs.”262 These 
acknowledgments are important for three reasons. Firstly, they corroborate survivors‟ 
testimonies that women and children clogged the trenches where they were ordered to seek 
protection from the aerial bombardments. The paratroopers caught up with civilians in the 
trenches where they bayoneted and shot them at point-blank range.
263
 Secondly, the “escaping 
SWAPOs” corroborates survivors‟ arguments that the victims were unarmed and posed no threat 
to the paratroopers, nor did they intend confronting the paratroopers as they had no weapons. 
What is then particularly disturbing is the order that Breytenbach needlessly issued for the brutal 
massacre of the harmless and defenceless “SWAPOs” in the trenches.  
In the following statement Breytenbach discloses the command he gave for the indiscriminate 
killings in the trenches:  
Johan Blaauw had requested my permission to clear the trenches - facing 
him - immediately … [because as] the AA [anti-aircraft] guns were put out 
of action for good - the clearing parties - moved with more freedom to 
clear the trenches still occupied by SWAPO. The two clearing parties 
(Johan Blaauw and Tommy Lamprecht platoons) met in the middle … the 
subsequent slaughter was horrific ….264 
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Thirdly, such indirect acknowledgments suggest that the perpetrators of the Cassinga massacre 
knowingly killed and maimed civilians “willfully and wantonly.”265 The two adverbs “willfully 
and “wantonly” infer acts of knowability and reckless action intended to cause greatest loss to 
lives and property. Therefore, the authorization to use “deadly force against” helpless civilians 
clogging the trenches as their last hope of surviving the killings put the SADF official discourse 
of the Cassinga attack to a litmus test. Indeed, such conduct “amounted to a criminal 
culpability.” 
 
It would seem in fact that the deplorable things that the paratroopers committed against civilians 
in Cassinga are so colossal that the attempts to contain and hide everything become almost 
impossible. Arguably, the more the disclaimers attempt to deny the unnecessary killing of 
civilians, the more their statements fall flat or become contradictory, thereby making concessions 
to the things they attempt to obliterate and conceal. The following statement corroborates the 
argument I am making:  
There was a massacre … I was the one who led my paratroopers 
through an orgy of killing women and children.
266
 
 
Since the experience of individual paratroopers in Cassinga enters the public space through the 
SADF-constructed and packaged genres of testimony, it is possible to think differently about the 
exterior landscape of experiencing violence in Cassinga: as that which unsettles, contains and 
renders invisible the awful experiences on the ground. But, it also means that irrespective of the 
disclaimers‟ attempts to conceal the unacceptable horror of the Cassinga massacre, it is almost 
impossible to “hide everything.” Instead, the perpetrators‟ persistence in trying to conceal 
unacceptable violence is a way of leaking and disclosing conflicting narratives. These 
contradictions are important indicators. They suggest a presence, yet subtle, of multiple and 
terrible undisclosed realities of the Cassinga massacre. Nevertheless, the “real” witnesses of the 
Cassinga massacre were the paratroopers, not the survivors who were beleaguered with fear, 
panic, shock and confusion. Likewise, “the best source of evidence on the scene of any crime is 
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always the perpetrator himself … who almost always wants to confess”267 in ways and manners 
that are subtle. Therefore, it is common that when reading the disclaimers‟ statements against the 
grain, one can be almost certain to spot aporias and ambiguities: because, when writing about the 
Cassinga massacre which was so deplorable, it becomes almost impossible to forge a language 
that can completely hide and silence everything that the perpetrator intends to suppress and 
conceal. Such residues of the untold practicalities should be considered as important indicators of 
the missing realities on the ground. Importantly, since such aporias testify to these missing 
realities, they help navigate social science researchers towards exploring and closely examining 
the complexities and difficult issues that disclaimers attempt to hide and destroy.  
 
The Introverts 
 
These are the former paratroopers who are generally tight-lipped about the Cassinga matters. 
Since they are reticent, it is difficult to locate them and listen to their individual stories. 
Generally, they appear not to entertain the idea of sharing issues of the Cassinga event with 
people falling outside the former SADF niche. Nonetheless, their dormant positions or low 
public profile pertaining to issuing individual accounts of experiencing the Cassinga massacre, 
may be deciphered in terms of several other meanings.  
 
In the first place, their silence may be understood as a way of protestation and of distancing the 
self from the SADF mainstream of the official discourse of the Cassinga massacre. That is, these 
individuals may be disenchanted with what happened in Cassinga and hence prefer to stay out of 
the Cassinga public spat. Their silence may also suggest compliance with the former SADF 
enforced restrictions that forbade individual soldiers or any other person from making public 
statements about personal experiences of violence in the war zones. In fact, Section 118 of the 
South Africa Defence Act states, among other things, that: 
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no person shall publish in any newspaper, book or pamphlet, or by radio or 
any other means … any information relating to the composition, movement 
or dispositions of the SADF … or any statement comment or rumour 
calculated directly to any member of the SADF or any force or any activity 
of the SADF … calculated to prejudice or embarrass the government in its 
foreign relations or to alarm or depress members of the public, except where 
publications thereof has been authorized by the Minister or under his 
authority.
268
 
 
However, it appears implausible to link this prevailing silence to former SADF conventional 
norms of repression against those found guilty of contravening the stringent codes of the Army, 
such as the unauthorized disclosure of censored and restricted sensitive information about the 
possibly deplorable things that the SADF carried out in conflict zones. It is also difficult to 
accept that the stringent code of conduct or service in the SADF should have any effects today. 
However, I would like to think of it, silence, as acting in response to the individual moral values, 
peer influence, negativity about the foregone political and ideological orientations as well as 
disappointment and embarrassment with the old order of doing things in the name of apartheid 
and colonial oppression. I am thinking this way because of the barricades and challenges, 
outlined below, I encountered in trying to find and interview soldiers in this category of 
paratroopers. I would have loved to sit down with the ex-paratroopers and listen to their 
individual stories of the Cassinga experience. Because, it is possible that what is written and 
spoken through the media or other medium of communication about them, as a collective, could 
break up into dissimilarities when narrated by the participants themselves as individuals.  
 
The number one challenge in trying to find them, the “introverts,” has been where to locate the 
former Cassinga paratroopers more generally. The second issue has been how to establish a line 
of communication, or how to introduce myself to them in such a way that they would welcome 
and trust me as someone they can openly talk to about their divergent experiences and 
interpretations of the Cassinga event. The third and most difficult challenge has been how to 
introduce my background to them, possibly unacceptable to many of them: namely telling them 
that I grew up in the SWAPO camps and I am a former PLAN combatant, perhaps a “terrorist‟ 
still to them. At the time of completing this study I have only succeeded reaching out to a few of 
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the former Cassinga paratroopers‟ through intermediaries. The reception from a few who 
responded through emails was generally embarrassing and discouraging. I felt rejected by the 
apprehensiveness and sometimes unfriendly responses from some of them. This emerges in the 
email correspondences I exchanged (via intermediaries) with some of the paratroopers.  
 
One of the introvert paratroopers, for example, notified me through an intermediary that he 
would accept the interview on the condition that I meet certain requirements as elaborated in the 
following excerpt:  
I take note of your request in a positive light. Can you 
please, however, give me more details about yourself, e.g. 
ID no: R.S.A.; Namibian or Angolan; Date of birth; 
Domicile; Religion; Academic and Military background 
etcetera, as well as your planned meeting place with me … 
I could agree to be interviewed on the condition that no 
questions are asked about how many people I killed at 
Kassinga.
269
 
 
It appears that, among other issues, the introverts‟ uneasiness about openly accommodating 
others and unpacking what happened in Cassinga carries the aura of disgrace embedded in the 
gruesomeness of the violence. As it emerged from my correspondence with individual 
paratroopers as well as by reaching out to a few of their immediate family members, the 
Cassinga massacre left many paratroopers riddled with psychological problems. This trouble is 
evident in some of the responses, which I received from individual paratroopers, harboring 
strong or inflammatory language. In one of such email correspondences, the correspondent 
promised menacingly to “fuck [me] up before he speaks to (me)”270 or accept an interview. In the 
logic of things however, this individual‟s verbalized anger does not intend doing to me what it 
exclaims it will do or intends doing. Instead, this genre of verbal assault can be ascribed to the 
fact that following the fall of apartheid, ex-service men were abandoned, many of them suffering 
from emotional and psychological trauma.
271
 There had never been “formalized counseling” or 
support for the soldiers who returned from the war zones. Many of them returned perturbed by 
the senseless violence they committed or carried out. The SADF did nothing to stop the onset of 
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Post Traumatic Disorder (PTSD),
272
 especially in considering the soldiers who were returning 
from places where extreme violence was unleashed, such as in the case of the Cassinga 
massacre.  
 
It is also important to note that the SADF was a ruthless entity even to its own employees and 
their families. This relates to the fact that the public and indeed many families remained (even to 
this day) in the dark
273
 about what their family members experienced or went through at the 
fronts. Consider the following statement:  
My wife did not understand the context or the logical sequence. 
She knew I had been in the war, but knew I didn‟t speak about 
it. By writing it (post-war), it‟s given both of us a better 
understanding.
274
 
 
Since nobody was expected to say anything about the madness of war, it was impossible for 
friends and families, including spouses, to suspect that returning soldiers were suffering from 
difficult memories that required individual families‟ understanding and finding ways to help and 
assist the victims. Instead, many families, it appears, interpreted that their family members were 
proud and happy when they returned from the front. Consider the following naive interpretation 
by one of the spouses upon her husband‟s return from the Cassinga massacre:  
Eventually, my husband came home … he was wounded (on) his wrist … 
The paratroopers talked often about that day and their experiences and I 
did not always take in what they said. But, I knew that this was a day in 
their lives they would never forget but somehow I thought it was just 
another episode in their military lives. Something they were proud of 
because they are not only soldiers of the best quality but paratroopers 
prepared to go and do their duty and lose lives for the sake of others.
275
 
 
One assumes that many other families and women married to soldiers in the service of the SADF 
shared perceptions and experiences such as that of Mrs. Breytenbach. Ironically, soldiers 
                                                 
272
 A statement by Cliff Holt, “Soldiers relive apartheid war in surge of writing: post traumatic stress prevented 
many from talking about it till now,” Weekend Argus, 14 October 2006, p. 15; Karen Batley (ed.),A secret burden: 
memories of the border war by South African soldiers who fought in it (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 
2007). 
273
 Jan Breytenbach, Eagle strike, pp. 384 - 387. 
274
 A statement by Cliff Holt, “Soldiers relive apartheid war in surge of writing: post traumatic stress prevented 
many from talking about it till now.” In the Weekend Argus, 14 October 2006, p. 15. 
275
 Statement by Jan Breytenbach‟s wife. In Jan Breytenbach, Eagle Strike, pp. 384 - 387. 
151 
 
returning from the war front or episodes like Cassinga were not “proud of their duty” as their 
families perceived them to be. Crucially important however is noting that the predominant 
presence of psychological problems, presumably among many ex-SADF members, is not only 
confined to the suffering of individuals alone. Such individual problems discharge far-reaching 
negative effects within the radius of family circles, workplace and other interactions in the public 
space, such as in the response I got from Dolf that he would “fuck” me up before he accepts that 
I interview him.  
 
An anonymous daughter (name withheld) of a former Cassinga paratrooper disclosed in email 
correspondence through an intermediary, that her father is “very angry with the SADF … (he 
was) heavy handed … and exceptionally strict on (us) when (we) were growing up.”276 
Nevertheless, this lady now in her early thirties, does not understand or know the things that 
made her father particularly angry with the SADF or why he had been harsh with his children. 
An anonymous former SADF conscript suspects that the absence of the “peace of mind” of this 
former paratrooper means that this individual probably “carries a burden of having killed 
excessively for many years. If he can speak up he would find some peace of mind.”277 But it is 
also important to note that the former SADF paratroopers‟ anger and discontent with the SADF 
also reflects the fact that there has been no acknowledgment for what they (ex-SADF members) 
did in service, and no mourning for their losses. And, as things turned around at the end of the 
conflict, it became apparent that the SADF did not only lose the war but also fought “an 
unpopular war - one that was not politically correct.”278 
 
The polemicists  
Jan Breytenbach is perhaps the greatest proponent of the SADF version of the Cassinga event in 
the present time. However, in considering that every “narrative practice has its own requirements 
which undermine” the presentation of “truth” as experienced on the ground, or in ways “truth” is 
conveyed in “a juridical sense,” it becomes evident that “in a true war story nothing is ever 
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absolutely true.”279 In fact, the “truth” of war or violence is not inherent in any “narrative 
practice,” but “truth” of the matter resides, as I have already pointed out, in what the proponents 
of the Cassinga massacre seek to undermine.  
The polemicists category of the Cassinga paratroopers, therefore, consists mainly of individuals 
whom Mike McWilliams rightly describes as “emotional about the facts being published [by 
senior officers] because (such facts) do not match”280 individual paratroopers‟ experiences of 
witnessing Cassinga as it took place. Polemicists aspire to narrate and present testimonies of the 
previously untold individual stories of paratroopers‟ experiences of the unfolding of the Cassinga 
attack on the ground.
281
 However, polemicists risk victimization and ostracization by the 
disclaimers for disclosing in public things that the SADF wants to keep concealed. The 
disclaimers accuse the polemicists of being disloyal, disrespectful of the army and their former 
commanders, and ridicule them as “junior officers (who) suffer from delusions of adequacy.”282 
The fact of the matter is, since the advent of democracy in South Africa, there has been a “surge 
of publications … on the internet … and unofficial servicemen„s websites ...”283 In addition, the 
veterans of the war are, according to an „anonymous former senior citizen force officer,‟ 
“seeking fellowship privately rather than publicly.”284 One example is the Operation Savannah 
veterans‟ organization that consists of members of the SADF who took part in Operation 
Savannah in 1975 and 1976. Other associations include former members of the 61 Mechanized 
Battalion Group as well as individual former soldiers with stories about their experiences of the 
border war.285 
In this context, in recent times, there have been explosive exchanges of conflicting accounts of 
the Cassinga experience among the Cassinga paratroopers themselves. This tension is 
recognizably between the extreme paratroopers, disclaimers, who deny the massacre (and require 
individual paratroopers to keep the secrets), and the moderate paratroopers who feel that they 
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“have spent a long time digesting” their bitter experiences of the Cassinga attack. The moderates 
or polemicists are unhappy with what they call the “astounding accounts” of Cassinga by senior 
officers. These debates unfold in newspaper articles, journals, books, and the SADF veteran 
websites such as the South African Infantry Association website.
286
 In one of such instance, 
Reconnaissance Commando Lt HP (Pierre) Hough (retired) rebuked the absence of the “many 
defining moments” in the paratroopers‟ published accounts and writings of the Cassinga 
massacre. Hough argues that:   
Cassinga Day is overshadowed by its tragic results: many innocent women 
and children or non-combatants died! … Unfortunately, it is surprising 
that the paratroopers‟ published materials on Cassinga … all missed … 
first-hand evidence … on the defining moments at Cassinga.287 
 
The central argument in this study regarding the impossibility of any text to elicit tangible 
evidence of brutal violence, is in fact one of Hough‟s major concerns. He is particularly 
“dismayed” and astonished by the fact that the paratroopers‟ articles and memoirs omit practical 
realities on the ground. For example, he is specifically concerned with Jan Breytenbach‟s book, 
the Eagle Strike, which he describes as not an “honest reporting”288 of what actually unfolded on 
the ground in line with what individual paratroopers experienced at different corners and 
outskirts of the camp.  
 
On the contrary, Cassinga disclaimers want the public to believe that no paratrooper disagrees 
with the SADF official version of the Cassinga massacre. This is the context of the following 
statement:  
Except for one senior paratrooper, a Brigadier General [Edward George 
McGill Alexander] and so - called „Master jumper‟ … not a single 
paratrooper from among the 367 who took part in the Cassinga “massacre” 
had stepped forward to confess that his conscience had finally forced him 
to spill the beans.
289
 
  
Breytenbach and others are stuck in the argument that the disclaimers‟ version of the Cassinga 
event is the “fundamental truth … unvarnished by the wishful and supine thinking of some 
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contemporary ex-soldiers and politicians.”290 Interestingly, disclaimers argue that any narration 
of the Cassinga event that falls outside, or is critical of the SADF official version, is untrue and 
misleading. For example, when Mike McWilliams learned about Hough‟s intentions to write his 
own account of what he actually experienced in Cassinga, he rebuked Hough because he would 
never articulate or divulge any tangible truth through descriptive writing of the Cassinga 
experience. Why? Because, “words …cannot … tell it.”291 
 
Similarly, in a case involving Brigadier General McGill Alexander‟s (the same as Brigadier 
General Edward George Alexander) MA thesis, “The Cassinga Raid,” Jan Breytenbach was 
“perturbed” when the author (a former paratrooper) raised issues of the paratroopers‟ ruthless 
killing of women and children in Cassinga. Breytenbach argues that Alexander:  
Failed to research this aspect (Cassinga) usefully and 
critically as any researcher should have done. Instead, he 
ignored what I and my paratroopers had to say about the 
matter by lending his ears out to hysterical accusations 
from the opposition, including the new SANDF in which 
he had served while preparing his thesis. Irremediable 
damage had already been done to the good name of the 
paratroopers and the Air Force of the old SADF and 
Alexander (formerly a respected paratrooper) blatantly re-
inforced the damaging perception that we acted like a 
bunch of blood thirsty murderers and rapists. How do we 
rectify it? I doubt if we can ever put the record straight.
292
 
 
Breytenbach continued with the following lines:  
In my mind he (Alexander) has no loyalty [for breaking 
the silence] to his former paratrooper comrades in arms. 
As a paratrooper myself, I therefore, no longer wish to be 
associated with Brigadier General McGill Alexander 
because of a Masters Cum Laude degree he had acquired 
at the expense of the good name of the paratroopers of 
which he too was once a commander.
293
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The trouble here involves one central issue. Why anoint it as the “fundamental truth” when 
Cassinga is constructed as part of a military infrastructure, but ridicule it as “false” when other 
paratroopers express concern that the SADF official version is “overshadowed” by not conceding 
the spilled blood of “many innocent women and children”? These attacks illustrate the bitter 
relationship between disclaimers and polemicists who do not agree with the SADF official 
version of denying the killing of innocent women and children in Cassinga. These are some of 
the complicated issues that this chapter has attempted to explore and thereby challenge the reader 
to pursue to the next level. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the higher the rank or 
commanding role that one played in making Cassinga a success for the SADF, the greater the 
degree of negativity towards acknowledging that Cassinga was a massacre.  
 
Lastly, it should be noted that the systematic mass killings of civilians in Cassinga did not only 
result in the victims‟ never-ending emotional suffering. Individual paratroopers also left 
Cassinga with painful and disquieting memories about the inhumane and unacceptable violence 
which they unleashed on defenceless civilians in Cassinga. The following statement by one of 
the paratroopers illuminates this scenario:  
There were just too many wounded …. Some conscious, some were 
not. We found this woman clutching her screaming baby … (with) 
terrible wounds inflicted by an Air Force bomb. There was no hope 
for her. I had to shoot her … I don‟t know how many people I shot 
that day. … I can never describe what it did to me. It was too much. 
I later broke down.
294
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
THE AFTERMATH AND THE VICTIMS‟ LONG OVERDUE JUSTICE 
 
If the Cassinga attack has left the perpetrators emotionally wounded, as suggested in the 
statements of the anonymous paratrooper above, how much damage and suffering did it cause to 
the victims of the Cassinga massacre? This chapter explores the damage, effects and unresolved 
issues affecting the victims, in general, since that terrible episode. As I have pointed out earlier, 
the SADF‟s killing of innocent civilians in Cassinga was a deliberate plan.295 According to the 
TRC reports, the Cassinga massacre amounted to “a breach of humanitarian law.”296 In this 
context, following the collapse and fragmentation of colonial rule in Namibia, which also 
arguably signaled the eminent fall of apartheid in South Africa, the victims of war and other 
forms of colonial violence hoped that independent Namibia would pursue humanitarian issues 
and make accountable those who perpetrated such violations under apartheid rule in Namibia. 
 
However, it turned out that the importance of shielding and protecting the perpetrators from 
possible prosecution for the alleged violence against civilians overwrote the victims‟ demand for 
legal action. With particular reference to the theme of this study, the survivors and victims of the 
Cassinga massacre are unhappy about a number of things. The following are the key issues that 
exacerbate the Cassinga victims‟ anger and suffering: (1) reconciliation without justice; (2) the 
impassable frontier between the Cassinga mass graves and the affected family members. 
 
As I have pointed out earlier, the Cassinga massacre is one grain of sand among many other 
untold killing and disappearances of innocent Namibians inside and outside the country during 
the South African colonial rule of Namibia. Prior to discussing the pertinent areas of unhappiness 
of Cassinga victims, it is very important, to bring into context the broader picture of brutal acts 
                                                 
295
 Chief of the SADF (Top Secret), “PSYAC Planning Directive No. 3 \ 78, Operation Reindeer, Phase Three 
(Media coverage), 25 April 1078,” Source: The SANDF Department of Defence Documentation Centre, Archive, 
Pretoria. 
296
 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, “The state outside South Africa between 1960 and 
1990,” Vol. 2, Ch. 2 (1998), Cape Town, pp. 50 - 58. 
157 
 
of violence and suffering perpetrated against Namibians by apartheid South Africa and 
colonialism more generally.  
 
To start with, the issue of the Cassinga massacre contains some echo of the twentieth century 
genocide (1904 - 1908) of the Hereros by the German troops of colonial occupation in what the 
imperial government then called German South West Africa. I make this argument with 
reference to Lieutenant-General Von Trotha‟s extermination order of the Herero population. Of 
course, Cassinga was not a genocide in terms of what actions officially constitute a genocide, 
whereas the case of the Hereros was genocidal, conducted over an extended period and across 
the length and breadth of the “Herero nation” which paid dearly in terms of lives and property. 
More than eighty thousand of the known total Herero population were killed, displaced and 
starved to death as their means of survival, predominantly cattle, were confiscated, deliberately 
killed and the few water points in the “dry desert sands” or Omaheke, of the Kalahari Desert 
where the Germans mercilessly drove the Hereros were poisoned.
297
 The point here is that there 
is a parallel between General Von Trotha‟s extermination order then, and the order to 
exterminate Namibians in Cassinga in 1978 by Peter. W. Botha, the Minister of Defence at the 
time of the Cassinga massacre and later Prime Minister and State President of South Africa.
298
 
 
Franz Fanon refers to decolonization as “the meeting of two forces, opposed to each other by 
their very nature, which in fact owe their originality to that sort of substantification which results 
from and is nourished by the situation in the colonies.”299 In the context of the recent Namibian 
war of national liberation from apartheid South Africa, two armed confrontational sides were 
involved. These were the largely unpopular SADF on one hand, and the People‟s Liberation 
Army of Namibia (PLAN) fighters on the other.  
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Between 1966 and 1989 PLAN fighters, with the assistance of local communities, waged a 
protracted guerrilla warfare campaign against the powerful South African Army of colonial 
occupation. Though clandestine by necessity, SWAPO fighters received a great deal of support 
among local communities in the former war zones, particularly in Owamboland. Nevertheless, in 
the nature of every armed conflict, it would be practically incorrect to discount PLAN fighters 
from practices of violence against civilians. The reality is that, in many instances, SWAPO 
combatants were accused of executing civilians suspected of being informers or collaborators 
with the colonial government.  
 
Within apartheid South Africa, “necklacing”300 was used as a weapon to root out enemy 
collaborators within the population of the oppressed. In similar ways, the killing of omapuli by 
SWAPO fighters served the same purpose as the “necklacing” of perceived enemy collaborators 
in South Africa. Chris Hani described this violent device, “necklacing,” as a “revolutionary 
method of dealing with collaborators … to remove the cancer of collaboration of the puppets.”301 
 
In the case of Namibia, civilians did not openly exercise “summary executions” of the suspected 
enemy informers. But they reported people in their communities suspected of being “enemy 
puppets” or collaborators to PLAN combatants. Alleged South African collaborators were locally 
called omapuli or epuli in the singular form. Omapuli were executed, killed violently, or have 
disappeared to this day. However, the practice of knowing and identifying who was actually an 
epuli was a complicated exercise. To this day, it remains very difficult to identify and provide 
evidence about who actually was in the secret payroll of the SADF.  
 
There is also a concern that some accusations emerged because of personal jealousy and other 
unethical practices among different categories of people and class in society. Another danger was 
that there were also South African trained secret police, locally known as Iikengelela. These 
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were the equivalent of the South African Askaris,
302
 who committed atrocities against civilians 
while disguised as SWAPO combatants.  
 
In efforts to suppress and pacify the Namibian opposition to colonial rule and the illegal 
occupation of Namibia, the SADF and other South African security forces killed thousands of 
innocent Namibians in the “operational areas and across the Namibian border.”303 In most cases, 
such killings were deliberate acts of reprisal against civilians who were suspected of being 
SWAPO supporters or followers. The SADF security forces did not only create violence, but also 
put in place proactive mechanisms to deny or justify (and, it is debatable whether any act of 
violence is justifiable) acts of violence. For example, sometimes when the SADF planned and 
carried out mass murders of innocent civilians (SWAPO followers) it deliberately created 
counterfeit “grave incidents.”304 Such dangerous war strategies were necessary to create the 
impression that SWAPO was terrorizing and murdering civilians, namely “its own people.”  
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Incidents of this kind include murders of civilians especially prominent figures in different 
communities. This was a necessary pretext to “create (the public) impression that retaliatory 
actions (against „terrorists‟ supporters/followers) were not only justifiable but necessary.”305 In 
this context, prior to the SADF attack on Cassinga, it was crucial to create “an impression of 
increasing SWAPO military activities in the operational area(s).”306 Such “grave incidents” were 
designed to “… reach a high intensity by D minus 2 (that is, 2 days before the Cassinga 
attack).”307 
 
Therefore, in examining the Cassinga massacre, I have argued that the victims‟ unending 
suffering and anger are not only testimonial to, and belated or extended traumatic experience of, 
the Cassinga event alone. Their memories are also linked to a hybrid of other traumatic 
experiences across the landscape of violence in Namibia and in the neighbouring countries where 
many Namibians sought refuge. For example, many of the Namibians who returned from exile 
had the misfortune to find their families killed and their homesteads destroyed.
308
 Civilians, 
particularly in the operational areas, the former war zones in northern Namibia, Owamboland,
309
 
were frequently and deliberately killed, harassed, intimidated, beaten and their homesteads and 
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property destroyed by the South African security forces. This was especially so of the 
Koevoet.
310
 
 
Koevoet was a counter - insurgency unit, based on the Rhodesian Selous Scouts model.
311
 Its top 
echelon was comprised of the battle - hardened veterans of the Rhodesian war - among them 
Colonel Eugene de Cock and Eric Winter, Captain Sakkie van Zyl and Beachball Vorster, 
Lieutenant Frans Conradie and Warrant officer Snakes Greyling. The Koevoet unit was arguably 
responsible for numerous human rights abuses, before Namibian independence, and operated 
with impunity.
312
 
 
Troubling stories are told about how the South African Security Forces
313
 stopped at nothing to 
force information out of people. They razed homes, abducted people from their homes, tortured 
and shot civilians at will, stole and killed domestic animals. Especially when the Security Forces 
discovered the tracks of SWAPO guerrillas, the local people were intimidated and tortured to 
disclose the whereabouts of the “SWAPO terrorists.” Captured SWAPO fighters who refused to 
cooperate with the security forces were tortured badly, often unnecessarily shot dead,
314
 or ended 
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up in notorious places such as the Oniimwandi detention camp east of Oshakati. The former 
Oniimwandi military and detention camp is where, according to oral sources, many victims who 
were suspected of rendering assistance to SWAPO fighters as well as captured SWAPO soldiers 
were harshly interrogated, severely tortured and many of them disappeared.  
 
In particular, the police unit Koevoet (crowbar), a counter-insurgency unit set up by Brigadier 
Hans Dreyer of the South African Police's Security Branch in June 1979 - was widely perceived 
as more brutal than the SADF “because of its bounty or cash for corpses policy.”315 Each 
Koevoet involved in the killings received a monetary reward. According to the TRC reports, 
between R 1000 and R 2000 kopgeld or “cash-for-corpses” reward was paid.316 The TRC also 
reported that:  
At the height of the war, in the early to mid-1980s, Koevoet alone 
claimed a kill rate of around 300 to 500 people a year, for which its 
members were paid a bounty per corpse ... Koevoet … kept no proper or 
official records of the identities, numbers or whereabouts of people it 
killed … These practices were confirmed by journalists who were 
allowed to travel with security force units … As the war progressed, 
South African security forces, especially Koevoet, resorted increasingly 
to summary executions of captured combatants. The payment of bounty 
served as an incentive for the extra-judicial murder of captives. The 
representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross in South 
West Africa said in 1981 that „it simply does not happen in any conflict 
or battle that you have a clash with 200 people and forty-five killed and 
no prisoners or wounded are taken.‟317 
 
The mutilated dead bodies were displayed publicly as a psychological weapon to intimidate local 
populations from supporting SWAPO. In his amnesty application in December 1996, Lance 
corporal Sean Callaghan described his experiences of serving with the Koevoet in the operational 
areas in northern Namibia as follows:   
I can remember loading bodies onto and off casspirs (armed military vehicles). 
After a contact, we tied bodies onto spare tyres,
318
 bumpers, mudguard, and left 
there until we got back to the base camp, until they could be unloaded. This 
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could be (after) days of driving through thick bush, and the skin could be worn 
right off the bodies.
319
 
 
When I carried out interviews about the secret war graves in northern Namibia between 2000 and 
2005,
320
 interviewees who witnessed the exhibition of mutilated and spoiled bodies in northern 
Namibia by the security forces showed me different places where unknown people had been 
buried in these secret graves, many of them in unmarked shallow mass or single graves. In most 
cases, according to oral accounts, when the SADF dumped spoiled bodies of alleged SWAPO 
fighters near Cuca shops or school grounds, security forces forced the public to view them and 
sometimes instructions were given for the corpses not to receive burials.
321
 
 
A number of international organizations also confirmed such horrific reports. For example, in 
1981 a delegation from the British Council visited Namibia and “conducted extensive interviews 
with church and community representatives. They reported that torture and intimidation were 
widespread. Their documentation of more than twenty individual cases included incidents where 
corpses of alleged guerrillas were dragged through villages behind military vehicles.”322 
 
As many civilians feared for their lives, numbers abandoned their homes and communities and 
fled or attempted to flee the violence to neighbouring countries, such as independent Angola. 
Frequently, the SADF went after them in pursuit with massive force to capture or eliminate 
them. In either case, civilians had always been, by and large, the victims. The SADF also carried 
out regular air raids of the settlements where displaced Namibians established themselves into 
organized communities of exiled civilian populations. Such communities in refugee camps, 
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particularly in Angola and Zambia,
323
 received logistical support from the international 
community, including the significant role played by UNICEF and the UNHCR, who sponsored 
many Namibian refugee children to complete their studies in foreign countries.  
 
“Reconciliation without justice is meaningless”  
 
The Namibian policy of national reconciliation may be applauded from outside as genuinely 
working and exemplary for other nations emerging from political, racial or ethnic conflicts. But 
since independence the majority of the Namibian population who suffered South African 
colonial occupation and brutality have expressed great resentment about the national policy of 
reconciliation. For many Namibians, in general, the Namibian model of reconciliation means 
reversed violence. This claim is embedded in an acknowledgement that the genre of Namibian 
reconciliation inhibits the victims of South African colonial violence demanding social justice 
for the untold damage of apartheid-colonialism in Namibia. Hence, reconciliation means another 
genre of emotional torture of the majority population groups that already bear the historical brunt 
of apartheid and colonial violence.  
 
As illustrated below, the majority of the Namibian population feels that reconciliation is not an 
equitable project. It is accused of bias and favoritism by way of offering preferential treatment, 
such as the provision of protection to those accused of involvement in heinous crimes against 
innocent Namibians.  
 
In October 1990, a National Consultation of Churches was held in Windhoek, Namibia. Its 
theme was “Mission of the Church: reconciliation and nation-building in independent Namibia.” 
In its closing statements, the church groups outlined that “National reconciliation without 
confession was … meaningless.” The consultation called upon the “oppressors, particularly the 
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white society, to confess their active role in promoting and defending colonialism and apartheid; 
to confess the sinful attitude of viewing black humanity as inferior…”324 
 
When they reviewed the political situation “shortly before the implementation of UN Resolution 
435
325
 at its meeting in Luanda from 8 – 11 February 1989, SWAPO‟s Central Committee felt 
that a reconciliation policy was necessary to „enhance the chances of peace in Namibia‟ and to 
„heal the wounds of the war.‟ The CC‟s press statement of 23 May 1989 announced its resolution 
to adopt a policy of „national reconciliation.‟”326 Certainly at independence, as a standard 
requirement for any nation emerging from war, “the focus immediately shifted from winning the 
war to winning the peace.”  
 
SWAPO moved quickly to declare the policy of national reconciliation. Although Namibia has 
been remarkably peaceful since independence, reconciliation, which is politically perceived as 
the cornerstone of the prevailing peace and stability, is seen by the formerly oppressed in 
Namibia as irreconcilable with the practice of equitable justice.
327
 This is unambiguous in the 
voice of the church to which many Namibians are spiritually affiliated. In fact, reconciliation is 
“just a rhetorical concept and a tool” for maintaining racial, class and economic inequalities in 
society.
328
 In fact, reconciliation is a political tool: in the Oshiwambo language, reconciliation 
translates into edhiminathanopo lyopapolitika. This translation infers that reconciliation is a 
political project, one that is concerned with advocating political forgiveness.  
 
When I conducted interviews with survivors of the Cassinga massacre most of them bemoaned 
the national policy of reconciliation. One of the issues they raised is the daunting character of 
this policy. It coerces the victims into submission and compromises their dignity and humanity. 
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The victims are compelled to repress
329
 and contain trauma without alternative provisions for its 
remedy. In a broader sense, this way of shielding the war-time perpetrators of violence betrays 
the fundamental principles of SWAPO as a liberation movement. In fact, liberation movements 
across Africa were spearheaded by “compassionate” national projects embedded in the promise 
of national liberation, restoration of justice and human dignity which colonial rule jeopardized.  
 
Richard Falk bemoans the way former liberation movements abandoned and betrayed the 
people‟s cause following the attainment of political independence:  
The great transformative struggles of the past century involved a series of 
challenges throughout the global south to get rid of the European colonial 
empires. But, political independence did not bring an end to the more 
indirect, but still insidious, methods of control designed to protect 
economic and strategic interests. Such a dynamic meant reliance on 
political leaders that would sacrifice the wellbeing of their own people to 
serve the wishes of their unacknowledged former colonial masters.
330
 
 
Chris Tapscott‟s analysis of the “symbolic gestures of national reconciliation”331 in Namibia puts 
it this way:  
While the policy of national reconciliation has been lauded internationally 
as a mark of political maturity … (and) while (it) has played an important 
role in overcoming the immediate political, racial and ethnic tensions of 
the past, for many Namibians the policy is also seen to be entrenching the 
status quo by protecting the pre-independence gains of the minority and by 
legitimizing patterns of social differentiation that had persisted in the 
colonial era.
332
 
 
To this end, Henning Melber adds the following:  
National reconciliation and no institutionalization … declared the past 
would be left behind without being publicly debated for remembrance and 
conscious dialogue over the injustices committed.
333
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In considering these views, there is a fertile ground to argue that other than its “rhetorical 
concept” or the falsely painted outside picture that is politically packaged, reconciliation is 
problematic and unpopular among the actual victims of colonial violence in Namibia. Whether 
issues confronting Namibia today in relation to its colonial past can only be addressed 
satisfactorily through the “institutionalization” of the policy of national reconciliation (such as in 
the case of the failed TRC project in South Africa), or open dialogues over the injustices 
committed by South African apartheid and colonial rule in Namibia, is debatable. What appears 
obvious however is the fact that the Namibian policy of national reconciliation is a political 
commodity initiated by external powers (as I will elaborate later) to deny Namibia‟s victimized 
population groups their inalienable rights and justice.  
 
The effective collapse of justice in the application of the Namibian model of reconciliation is 
tantamount to breaking down the victims mentally and emotionally. In a similar vein, Mahmood 
Mamdani has discussed “the collapse of a paradigm of justice” in postcolonial equatorial Africa 
and the “ascendancy” of a problematic paradigm by the name of reconciliation in the case of the 
1994 postapartheid South Africa,
334
 with “no built-in mechanism for a mandatory reciprocity.” 
Mamdani‟s formulation echoes the undesirable end result whereby both postcolonial Namibia 
and postapartheid South Africa legalized reconciliation without necessarily seeking to prosecute 
and punish perpetrators of the premeditated and systematic killings of civilians.  
 
Echoing the same concern, Paul Conway writes that reconciliation in Namibia “implie(s) 
amnesty or forgiveness but without any process that allowed for a sweeping investigation of war 
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crimes … prosecution of unrepentant criminals, or compensation to victims.”335 In this respect, 
postcolonial Namibian reconciliation is oblivious to the will of the people and obviously 
intimidates and prohibits the victims from laying claims against the well-known perpetrators of 
apartheid-colonial violence. As I have already said, this disturbing scenario suggests the 
persistence of the colonial and racial mentality of privileging and treating colonial masters 
preferentially and as superior and untouchable.  
 
In this context, above, the Cassinga victims‟ pervasive suffering and anger are partly embedded 
in the disappointment, frustration and despair when considering the numerous injustices that 
reconciliation is associated with, promotes and defends. For example, the victims are unhappy 
with the sweeping amnesty granted to the perpetrators, irrespective of the crimes they are 
suspected to have committed and many of whom remain unrepentant. Think about Colonel Jan 
Breytenbach (and others) who, despite his commanding role in Cassinga is publicly unapologetic 
and, vocally, continues to cause further suffering to survivors and families of the missing people 
by publicly and continuously denying the Cassinga massacre.  
 
The general feeling among the victims is that genuine forgiveness and reconciliation are 
unattainable without a fair trial of perpetrators, as long as they continue to deny the 
defenselessness and innocence of the Cassinga victims. The amnesty granted to the perpetrators 
is thus ineffective as it is biased against the victims. This is also the case in South Africa where 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established to hear the crimes committed 
by the SADF and the apartheid government in general, but the commission ended rather 
inconclusively. That is, it ended without holding the perpetrators accountable for the numerous 
acts of brutal violence committed against civilians during apartheid rule in South Africa.
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Except for the granting of “conditional amnesty,”337 which did not, as Juan E. Mendez put it, 
“apply automatically but for which potential defendants must make a formal application. The 
benefit (was) granted only in exchange for full and truthful confession.”338 
 
The TRC as a process of enforcing the victims and perpetrators of apartheid to make “truth 
confessions” is implausible in practical terms, therefore it serves more of a transitional political 
function. This requires further discussion, but I should leave it here as it implies a different 
trajectory. Nonetheless, the way the TRC dealt with issues of the “victors‟ justice”339 in 
postapartheid South Africa can be argued as having been highly influential in Namibia‟s own 
process of dealing with issues of justice and reconciliation. This is taking into consideration the 
fact that the political landscapes of the two countries are inextricably connected and intertwined 
since South African rule in Namibia. Thus, the failure or success of reconciliation in South 
Africa would have meant the same in Namibia too.  
 
The TRC and Namibia  
 
“In 1997, South Africa‟s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) requested that hearings be 
held in Namibia …The Namibian government formally rejected that request.”340 Nonetheless, 
Namibia‟s rejection of the South African model of reconciliation was on the basis of the 
argument that the country is “sovereign and independent.” Some officials of the Namibian 
government were quoted to have argued that Namibia should not simply copy what might or 
might not be done in South Africa.
341
 Politicians also argued that Namibia understands its past 
better and could visualize negative consequences which were likely to result from “simply 
copying” and pasting other countries‟ formulas for dealing with their unique pasts. Such political 
                                                 
337
 Ifi Amadiume and An Naim Abdullahi (eds.), The politics of memory: truth, healing and social justice, 2000, p. 
134. 
338
 Juan E. Mendez, “Latin America experience of accountability.” In Amadiume, Ifi and Abdullahi, An Na‟im 
(eds.), The politics of memory: truth, healing and social justice, 2000, p. 134. 
339
 Mamdani, Mahmood, “The truth according to the TRC.” In Ifi Amadiume, and An Na‟im Abdullahi (eds.), The 
politics of memory: truth, healing and social justice (2000), pp. 176- 183. 
340
 Paul Conway, “Truth and reconciliation: the road not taken in Namibia.” Online Journal of peace and conflict 
resolution, Vol. 5/1 (Summer 2003), p. 5. 
341
 Paul Conway, “Truth and reconciliation: the road not taken in Namibia.” In the Online Journal of peace and 
conflict resolution, Vol. 5/1 (Summer 2003), p. 66 - 76. 
170 
 
statements however appear vague, ironic and should be challenged by the realities outlined 
below.   
 
Namibia‟s refusal to bring the perpetrators to account for the violent crimes committed in 
Namibia touches on a decolonization problem, as it were. It is reported that “SWAPO had signed 
an agreement with the then apartheid South African government not to take legal action against 
individuals for their role during the liberation war.”342 In view of this secret agreement, whatever 
its content, it can be argued that the decision taken by SWAPO prior to independence “not to 
take legal action” against individual perpetrators can be interpreted as an unfair political 
decision, one that does not work in favour of the majority of its people. The secret bilateral 
agreement between SWAPO and the “then apartheid South African government” is inconsiderate 
of the apartheid victims‟ aspirations and expectations. Such a decision should be perceived as 
one of those painful compromises that SWAPO had to adhere to, in exchange for Namibian 
independence - without justice.  
 
One should also take note of the fact that even if the SWAPO-led government would have 
viewed it as ethical to follow and pursue possible prosecution of individual perpetrators, there 
are also fundamental issues that could backfire and implicate SWAPO leaders one way or the 
other. Such issues point to fundamental deterrents for the SWAPO majority-led government‟s 
refusal to encourage an ethos of fair trials and prosecution of those accused of brutal violence 
during the war for Namibia‟s independence. I am thinking this way with regard to the fact that 
SWAPO as a liberation movement, to agree with Paul Conway, “was betrayed by numerous 
spies and informers collaborating with South Africa‟s apartheid regime just like the African 
National Congress (ANC) had been. Some SWAPO officials were undoubtedly overzealous in 
their efforts to discover, discredit and destroy spies within the (SWAPO) ranks.”343 
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Evidence is, in most cases, difficult to ascertain and verify when dealing with historical records, 
especially oral narratives. Nevertheless, most survivors told me that the destruction of Cassinga 
and the loss of so many lives involved the work of alleged enemy spies within the exiled 
population. It is also told, orally, that SWAPO suspicion and detention of the alleged spies 
started in the immediate aftermath of the Cassinga massacre. In this context, individuals in the 
SWAPO leadership who issued orders to detain and interrogate the arranged spies, in attempts to 
root out suspected enemy hibernators and protect the Namibian revolution from collapsing, also 
face accusations that such actions constituted a violation of human rights. And, I would like to 
believe that this is one of the reasons or challenges that explain why the SWAPO government 
pretends to be happy with the type of the reconciliation that the majority of Namibians consider 
unpopular. 
 
Nevertheless, although the TRC did not meet expectations of many victims in Namibia and 
South Africa, it however made some important pronouncements. For example, the TRC findings 
spelled out that Operation Reindeer:  
Violated the territorial sovereignty of the Republic of Angola and resulted in 
the gross human rights violations against the civilian occupants of the 
Cassinga camp. This entailed deliberate planning on the part of the following 
persons: Prime Minister BJ Vorster in his capacity as Head of State; Minister 
of Defence PW Botha in his capacity as political head of the SADF; General 
Magnus Malan in his capacity as chief of the SADF; Lieutenants General 
Constand Viljoen and RH Rogers in their capacities as chiefs of the Army and 
Air Force respectively.
344
 
 
The TRC also pronounced that the SADF Air Force use of fragmentation bombs while fully 
aware that the camp hosted civilians constituted an “indiscriminate and illegitimate use of force 
and a violation of Protocol 1 to the Geneva Convention of 1949. The foreseeable killing of 
civilians ... was therefore a breach of humanitarian law.”345 Paradoxically though, perpetrators of 
the Cassinga massacre merited no trial in a law court. The only loophole was the request made 
by the TRC to give testimonies to the Commission, mainly on matters concerning the crimes of 
apartheid committed in South Africa, and in return they would receive amnesty from criminal 
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prosecution. That is, they should testify before the Commission in exchange for “official 
forgiveness,” which is not the same thing as the pardon and forgiveness by the victims of the 
violence.  
 
Not surprisingly, apartheid era leaders who appeared before the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission were all acquitted without admitting to state-sanctioned atrocities. In his second 
submission to the TRC dated the 23rd of March 1997, in reply to the questions that the 
Commission submitted to the National Party on 12 December 1996, F.W. de Klerk stated that the 
National Party is “not prepared to accept responsibility for the criminal actions of a handful of 
operatives of the security forces of which the Party was not aware and which it would never have 
condoned."
346
 Paradoxically, this statement exists face to face with the fact that those who 
carried out gross violation of human rights such as in the case of the Cassinga massacre were 
politically decorated and honoured with medals and others, as discussed in previous chapters. 
Consequently, forgiveness without justice in an independent Namibia is seen as “a tool in the 
manipulation of power relations, making the oppressed even more victims of justice… in such a 
way that it strengthens [the perpetrators‟] position and weakens that of the victim.”347 
 
I am not saying that the prosecution of the alleged perpetrators can excise the damage, recuperate 
the wounds or bring the dead back to life. But I am trying to show the victims‟ alarming 
concerns that the “general amnesty,” granted to the perpetrators of the Cassinga massacre, has 
been a very painful experience to many victims. In the context of this discontentment, there is an 
implicit link between the perpetrators‟ impunity from prosecution and the uninterrupted 
continuity of survivors‟ ongoing pain and suffering.  
 
According to survivors, a slow and transparent process should have preceded reconciliation, to 
foster genuine forgiveness and acceptance of each other. That is, a moderated process committed 
to the public hearing of testimonies of violence from both sides. This should go hand in hand 
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with the full course of the law, namely litigation, against those found guilty of perpetuating 
violence against civilians. In the absence of such processes, survivors feel that the unconditional 
exemption of perpetrators from prosecution, regardless of the brutal atrocities they committed, 
implies that the perpetrators are considered more human while the victims are treated 
superficially and as inferior or lesser beings.  
 
The victims also feel strongly that there should have been legislation that makes it illegal for any 
explicit denials of the Cassinga massacre to be made. Since Namibia has no specific act or law 
declaring any denial of the Cassinga massacre (explicitly or implicitly)  to be illegal and a 
violation of human rights, individual members of the dismantled SADF feel empowered to 
continue, as discussed in Chapter 6, with euphoric parades on the occasion of the Cassinga 
anniversary. In the same vein, unapologetic perpetrators who try to repair their damaged public 
reputation also exploit the prevailing state of silence arising from Namibia‟s apparent 
indifference to dealing with or prosecuting the disclaimers of the Cassinga massacre. Indeed, it is 
painful for the survivors of the Cassinga massacre and families of the dead and the missing when 
an architect of the Cassinga massacre, such as Lieutenant General Constand Viljoen, remarks 
that “the SWAPO government has been very quiet about Cassinga in recent years because they 
knew that, in truth, no massacre had occurred”348as Lieutenant General Constand Vijoen put it. 
Paradoxically, Viljoen, the then chief of the South African Army at the time of the Cassinga 
attack, flew to Cassinga to see it for himself.
349
 And indeed, one can argue that Cassinga was 
Viljoen‟s project.  
 
While initially the SADF considered Cassinga a politically sensitive target if attacked militarily, 
Viljoen initiated it, designed it and defended it irreversibly. For example, as I have pointed out in 
Chapter One, prior to the Cassinga attack, Viljoen locked horns with other senior officers who 
advised that Cassinga should be excluded from the list of the SWAPO bases drawn up for the 
SADF attacks at the turn of 1978. As the Chief of the Army, Viljoen threatened to bring to a halt 
other SADF operations in Angola if the decision to wipe out Cassinga received no approval.
350
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Nevertheless, as indicated earlier on, such deliberate acts of verbal violence take advantage of 
the prevailing state of the sweeping impunity granted to the perpetrators without any conditions 
or restrictions attached to it. Why the Namibian model has not worked to address these issues of 
the “victors‟ justice” could be influenced by the following political factors.  
 
The Namibian negotiated settlement and SWAPO compromises 
 
Apartheid South Africa and her political and economic allies (especially in the west) had a major 
influence in packaging the content of the policy of national reconciliation with the intent to 
protect the strategic interest of the minority whites, at the expense of the victims of apartheid in 
both Namibia and South Africa. Writing about enormous compromises that SWAPO made in the 
process of diplomatic negations leading to Namibia‟s independence, Lauren Dobell observes that 
“there is little evidence, however, to suggest that SWAPO leaders made any efforts to protect the 
Movement‟s 1976 Political Programme for post-independence development from dilution.” 351 
Indeed, the pursuit of justice for all was one of the key issues of this 1976 SWAPO political 
programme.
352
 Dobell went on to say that the SWAPO leadership “would have been under 
enormous, perhaps irresistible, pressure … having placed all their eggs in the diplomatic basket, 
SWAPO leaders may have perceived no option but to accede to the compromises demanded by 
the other parties to the negotiations brokered by the Western Contact Group (the USA, Canada, 
France, UK, and West Germany).”353 The western brokers all had strong ties with the apartheid 
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government in South Africa.
354
 Indeed, as Peter Katjavivi puts it, the five western members of 
the UN Security council had “consistently blocked any moves to compel South Africa to 
withdraw from Namibia.”355 
 
Dobell‟s argument corroborates Kadar Asmal, a leading ANC activist who disclosed that, 
following the fall of apartheid in South Africa, he and others “campaigned for a South African 
equivalent of the Nuremberg trials, until faced with the reality of a negotiated revolution which 
ruled out imposing victors‟ justice.”356 There is an underlying identical analogy between the 
“negotiated revolution” in South Africa and the Namibian negotiated political settlement which 
disappointingly followed “the 1982 Constitutional Principles drafted by the Western Contact 
Group,”357 rather than being influenced by SWAPO‟s political programme for an independent 
Namibia. This was confirmed:  
On the first day of the constitutional deliberations when Nujoma opened 
the talks by proposing that, in the interests of making speedy progress, the 
newly elected Constituent Assembly adopt the 1982 Constitutional 
Principles as the basis for a new constitution. The unanimous approval of 
the proposal hastened the drafting process significantly, but at the price of 
circumventing debate on many fundamental issues.
358
 
 
Certainly, as outside influences and interests determined the emerging Namibian independence 
constitution process, the victims of apartheid and colonial violence paid heavy concessions. In 
essence, the way the process leading to the independence of Namibia was constructed, protracted 
and then finally hijacked by the Western Contact Group has had detrimental consequences on the 
lives of the victims of apartheid and colonialism in Namibia. In particular, as justice is not on the 
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side of the victims of the Cassinga massacre, grief, trauma and other forms of suffering continue 
to leave survivors in solitary victimhood. Put differently, when expectations for social or 
“restorative justice” have been violated or silenced by the constitution as the supreme law of the 
country, the victims‟ traumatic memories continue “ruminating.” That is, routinely generating 
intrusive harmful memories which unremittingly slide the victims back into the unbearable dark 
moments of apartheid and colonial ferocity.  
 
Rumination as such, infers the frequent return of traumatic memories, as I shall explain further 
below. And whereas survivors are of the opinion that unwanted thoughts can be suspended 
temporarily, the traumatic memories return relentlessly in obstinate and harmful ways. This 
disconcerting recurrence of bitter resentment and anger is therefore, among other issues, due to 
the victims‟ betrayed and devalued expectations that SWAPO compromised in the process of 
Namibia‟s independence.  
 
During the first SWAPO Congress in independent Namibia that was held on 6 - 10 December 
1991, whose theme was “From National Liberation Movement to Political Party - Solidarity, 
Freedom and Justice,” the issue of reconciliation came into the spotlight. Lauren Dobell reported 
the following:  
The government‟s policy of national reconciliation … came under the 
fiercest fire from delegates, who perceived it as shoring up an unjust 
status quo. Reconciliation … was too high a price to pay for stability 
… if it continued to be seen to benefit the „haves‟ at the expense of the 
„have nots.‟359 
 
In an interview with Lauren Dobell about what the nation was to expect from the Congress, the 
former Deputy Minister of Information and Broadcasting, the late Daniel Tjongarero, said the 
following:  
We will obviously have to deal with the question of dissatisfaction among 
the rank and file of the whole issue of national reconciliation … obviously 
it is our responsibility to explain why we have done certain things, 
[otherwise] the opposition, if it doesn‟t find fault with what you are doing, 
it instigates your own supporters against you, saying „Look, these people 
have done nothing to help your lot.‟ But once you start talking to people 
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about the limitations you have, and also about their own responsibilities to 
take control of their own lives, then I think it becomes much easier.
360
 
 
Regrettably though, more than twenty years since the SWAPO first congress in independent 
Namibia which was expected to make significant changes and amendments to the party 
programme and constitution “from the one previously (constitution) ratified in 1983,”361 the 
nation still waits for the government to explain the “limitations” and hindrances linked to 
reconciliation which have betrayed the victims of apartheid and colonialism since independence. 
Indeed, the government appears to be buying time in dealing with the issue of reconciliation by 
taking advantage of the victims‟ culture of “passive victimhood.” In the context of this notion 
that Namibians are reluctant to open up their political anger and frustration, SWAPO 
backbencher at that time, Danie Botha, observed that:  
The only way these problems (regarding general unresolved issues of the 
past) to be resolved is for the links to be strengthened between the 
leadership and their supporters. Because of our historical situation these 
are not as strong as they should be - but again the onus is on us 
(politicians) to look critically at ourselves … We are lucky here that the 
people are … not so terribly critical [as they are in South Africa], but we 
must not misuse that openness and accepting kind of spirit…362 
 
On “the impossibility of telling,” Felman, Shoshana & Laub Dori observe that Holocaust 
survivors do not:  
Find peace in silence, even when it is their choice to remain silent. 
Moreover, survivors who do not tell their story become victims of a 
distorted memory, that is, of a forcibly imposed „external evil,‟ which 
causes an endless struggle with and over a delusion.  The „no telling‟ of 
the story serves as a perpetuation of its tyranny. The events become more 
and more distorted in their silent retention and pervasively invade and 
contaminate the survivor‟s daily life. The longer the story remains untold, 
the more distorted it becomes in the survivor‟s conception of it, so much 
that the survivor doubts the reality of actual event.
363
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In exploring the silences of the victims of the “social and political conflicts”364 which engulfed 
apartheid South Africa, Helena Pohlandt- McCormick coined the concept of “collusion between 
violence and silence.”365 In my study, this reality, the collusion between violence and silence, 
translates into the obvious reciprocal relationship between people‟s experience or memory of 
violence and the ongoing public silence regarding the violence, which continues in the private 
spaces of the victims.   
 
This reciprocity, tied up with “passive victimhood,” is thus repressive and recycles undesirable 
repercussions. Thus this vulnerable situation denies the victims a voice, courage and strength to 
bring forth the individual or collective experiences of violence, or to try and create public 
dialogues around issues of the political torture inherent in the collusion between the political 
injustices of yesteryear and of today. In a different context Elaine Scarry writes that torture, like 
any other act of brutal violence, “is such an extreme event … and the pain it brings about is so 
real that there is a reluctance to place it in conversation by the side of other subjects. But this 
reluctance … increases [the victims‟] vulnerability to power.”366 
 
 Indeed, “if sufficiently pervasive and enduring … violence moves beyond the harm to 
individuals and coalesces …”367 in such a way that it suppresses, obscures and impairs the 
victims‟ ability to collectively open up and demand justice which each victim desperately needs. 
Because as Pohland-McCormick puts it, “while the collusion between violence and silence might 
appear to disrupt or, worse, destroy the ability of individuals to think– the individual historical 
actor can and does have the will to contest and engage with collective memory and official 
history.”368 As a consequence, the victims‟ endurance of pervasive violence results in a regular 
rumination of violence.   
 
Emotional rumination 
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In view of the above situation, it is ironic that survivors and affected families are under the 
political obligation to forgive and reconcile. Nevertheless, it is unambiguous in survivors‟ 
testimonies that their resentment for the perpetrators of the Cassinga massacre have not 
diminished. Instead, they act under the political condition of coercion that suppresses their 
discontentment, silences it and attempts to obliterate it. Therefore, in the absence of the victims‟ 
justice, genuine forgiveness is on trial. Survivors demand justice for the victims, which for them 
transcends the political drive to forgive and reconcile while side-stepping justice and fairness. 
These unbearable degrees of uncertainty are nurturing further damage in the everyday lives of 
survivors and make healing almost impossible when the aftermath of the Cassinga massacre 
remains largely unresolved. 
 
In attempting to contextualize some of the issues raised above, I argue that the post- Cassinga 
intensity lies not so much in the victims‟ remembering of the traumatic past. The recurring 
intrusion of survivors‟ distressful moments is connected to post-colonial Namibia‟s own hiatus. 
That is, Namibia‟s failure to deal with the victims and the perpetrators of apartheid in unbiased 
ways. This state of affairs, promoting the ongoing drive of emotional trauma, causes rumination, 
which refers to survivors‟ regular reflections on the difficult and unwanted traumatic experiences 
or moments of the Cassinga massacre and its aftermath. In this context, rumination relates 
predominantly to the survivors‟ disappointments about their unfulfilled expectations. Such 
emotional pain about the victims‟ disrupted expectations activate and bring around - or cause to 
ruminate - memories of traumatic experiences. The derailing of the victims‟ expectations, 
therefore, has negative implications on survivors‟ aspirations to come to terms with the Cassinga 
killings and contain ongoing human suffering. This disruption creates the bond between 
traumatic violence and the evolving emotional anger. For example, the failure of the state to 
demand from the perpetrators an official acknowledgment and apology for the massacre 
unravels, time and again, the “traumatic knot,” thereby creating an enabling space for the 
survivors‟ endless suffering.  
 
Literally, without political will on their side, the victims find themselves pushed into formidable 
and precarious situations. Their individual tenacities and strength of “active coping” with 
traumatic stress succumb to the prolonged existence of emotional and physical suffering in 
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isolation. This is contrary to the victims‟ aspirations to free their lives from the burden of 
traumatic memories and emotional distress which gives rise to rumination arising in response to 
the blocking of valued goals. To put it differently, traumatic emotions arise “when schemas are 
disrupted.” In this case it is the broken “schemas” of unfulfilled victims‟ beliefs and expectations 
following the end of violence. Hence, when post-violence conditions are in conflict with 
established expectations or beliefs of the victims, emotional impulse is generated. This brings 
around unwanted traumatic memories. And therefore, once the victims‟ expectations have been 
disappointingly interrupted in this way, traumatic experiences are reconnected, reactivated and 
stay active as long as the machinery that evoked the human suffering is let loose or not held 
accountable.  
 
It is also important to recognize that although the tension created and sustained by the victims‟ 
disrupted expectations are emotionally traumatic, such tensions also serve as useful “impetus in 
seeking solutions” to unresolved traumatic experiences. In other words, tensions emanating from 
disrupted expectations can draw the victims closer to each other and encourage them to 
collectively respond to issues of collective suffering and seek common ways of dealing with the 
sources of the recurring emotional traumas.  
 
The issue of the abandoned mass graves 
 
When the process of repatriating home 41 000 Namibian exiles
369
 began in June 1989, under the 
auspices of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), SWAPO and the 
international bodies involved in this exercise appeared to have not outlined measures regarding 
the preservation and protection of the permanent homes – in a sense irreplaceable assets of our 
national heritage - of Namibians who died in exile from war and natural causes, especially in 
refugee camps in Angola and Zambia. Perhaps the issue of dealing with the welfare of the war 
graves and human remains in exile awaited the attention of the government of an independent 
Namibia. Sadly, over twenty years into independence and the human remains of those Namibians 
killed in the course of the liberation struggle, particularly with regard to the Cassinga mass 
graves, have not yet received the recognition and treatment they deserve. The route that Namibia 
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has taken is contrary to the United Nations General Assembly Resolution that calls for every 
nation emerging from violence to abide by the protocol of accounting for the graves of missing 
persons after hostilities end and thereafter protecting them.
370
 
 
As Cassinga enters a vague future with layers of unresolved issues piling on top of one other, the 
burden of the human remains of the Cassinga victims is one of the issues which place the 
heaviest weight on the people affected by the entire episode. It is one of the emotional issues that 
survivors and affected families want resolved. During the Cassinga commemorations held at UN 
Plaza, Katutura, in Windhoek on May 2006, Agnes Kafula, a survivor of the Cassinga massacre, 
asked the “government to consider allowing survivors to visit the mass grave(s) of those who 
died”371 at Cassinga. During the 2007 Cassinga commemorations in Windhoek, she (Agnes) 
again, speaking on behalf of other survivors, “urged the government to take the initiative to bring 
back the remains of those comrades who perished in the liberation struggle so that they [can] get 
a proper burial.”372 
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Figure 7. A photographic scene of one of the Cassinga mass graves. This photograph was taken in 2009. It suggests 
that the Cassinga mass graves are in a poor and abandoned condition. Photographer: Jo Ractliffe. 
 
The Cassinga mass graves are not only in very poor condition
373
 but they are also abandoned and 
disconnected from the living world related to them. The families, relatives and comrades of those 
thought to have died in Cassinga and buried in the mass graves have not visited them since their 
burial there. The survivors urge that the government should coordinate things in ways that “allow 
survivors” and families “to visit the mass grave(s.)” This request is entrenched in the prevailing 
disturbing disconnectedness between the dead and their loved ones, as well as a reference to the 
victims‟ improper and dishonourable burial in the mass graves. Generally, survivors and many 
families whose loved ones disappeared during the war and who suspect that the Cassinga human 
remains could be those of their missing relatives and friends feel they have the obligation to visit 
the dead and connect with them physically and spiritually.  
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In fact, it is wrong to perceive the identities of the Cassinga human remains as belonging to 
unknown Namibians. Although the victims buried in the Cassinga mass graves are generally 
unknown to many Namibians, the fact remains that everybody killed in Cassinga was knowable 
to individual survivors. But it is also valid to point out that the violent manner in which the 
killings unfolded damaged survivors‟ knowability of their comrades killed in the massacre and 
the ways they could ascertain their burial in the mass graves.  Nonetheless, the mental picture or 
“mental snapshots” of friends and comrades‟ names and faces remain: they survived the physical 
damage and extinctions of the victims‟ dead bodies. It is this preservation of the survivors‟ 
mental pictures, reflective of the individual identities and names of the comrades, that survivors 
want to maximize in reclaiming the presence of the dead.  
 
While the Namibian government is yet to pronounce its commitment, long overdue, for those 
who feel bereaved and unconsoled, it is survivors generally who initiate making contributions to 
the preservation of the Cassinga historic site. They initiate breaking the silence and anonymity 
surrounding the myth of the nameless people who disappeared as a result of the Cassinga 
massacre, and who did not return home when the violence ended. As an agency entrusted with 
different obligations by the dead in different individual capacities, survivors are enthusiastic 
about listing the names and ages (as most of them were children) of their comrades who are 
missing following the massacre. It is the preferance of most that the retrievable names and 
photographs, as traces for the missing physical identities of the dead, should be inscribed at the 
site of the mass graves. In this way, the Cassinga historic site could possibly rise above the 
existing silences and disconnectedness from the living world into a rich and fathomless 
exploration ground of the missing people, their identities and their untold traumatic experiences.  
 
It is also important to add emphasis that the search, albeit in vain, for those people, mainly 
children, whose fate remains unaccounted for ever since the end of the conflict that divided and 
displaced families particularly in northern Namibia, is a way of attempting to find remedy for the 
injuries that are still open. Further, the initiative to turn the Cassinga mass graves into a quest for 
a ground or space consecrated to the missing people‟s identities and untold narratives of their 
terminal injuries and painful deaths is reflective of the SWAPO declaration in the immediate 
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aftermath of the Cassinga massacre. On June 1, 1978, Sam Nuuyoma, the founding president of 
SWAPO and first President of Namibia stated the following:  
The names of hundreds of Namibian men, women and children who were 
murdered in cold blood by the fascist troops of racist South Africa at 
Kassinga … will forever remain imprinted in the pages of Namibia‟s 
history as heroes and martyrs of freedom and human dignity.
374
 
 
Literally, there is a remarkable degree of softness or flatness in the way the Namibian ruling 
party, SWAPO, appears to have compromised the liberation struggle ideals concerning the 
preservation of the Cassinga historic site. Thus, while SWAPO as a liberation movement 
promised “social justice” for the victims of colonial violence when Namibia became 
independent, it is however unfortunate that postcolonial Namibia is naively sitting on these 
unfulfilled issues. The issue is not that the suffering and traumatic memories of Namibians 
affected by the massacre have dissipated. But the two periods, the liberation struggle and 
postcolonial Namibia, appear to be remarkably characterized by a set of dissimilar values and 
meanings attached to those who sacrificed their precious lives for a free Namibia.  
 
Culturally, as well as biologically, it is difficult for the bereaved families to find closure and 
serenity in the presence of the frontiers of divide between the world of the dead and of the living. 
Furthermore, it is believed that the bodies of the dead cannot “rest in peace”375 until they speak, 
connect with and feel the recognition and warmth of the living world. But by contrast, the 
Namibian government naively perceives the issue of the Cassinga human remains, iipongo, as 
not a priority of the state:  
In respect of the heroes and heroines who died at Cassinga, [the] 
government has already done its part in collecting the soil from 
the mass graves in southern Angola and placing it at [the] 
Heroes Acre in the capital.
376
 
 
Generally speaking, the majority of the people affected by the Cassinga massacre do not agree 
with the government‟s stance regarding the issue of the Cassinga human remains. In particular, 
                                                 
374
 Sam Nuuyoma‟s Foreword. In the “Massacre at Cassinga: climax of Pretoria‟s all out campaign against the 
Namibian resistance,” Special bulletin of the South West Africa People‟s Organization SWAPO, 1978. 
375
 Thomas M. Hawley used the concept of “rest in peace” in reference to the body remains of the unknown 
American soldiers of the Vietnam war: Thomas M. Hawley, The remains of war: bodies, politics, and the search for 
American soldiers unaccounted for in Southeast Asia (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2005), p. 4.   
376
 See, “Don‟t scrap Cassinga Day,” in Appendix M of this thesis. 
185 
 
the metaphor of the “soil,” a symbolic gesture, as a substitute for the dead as the state appears to 
argue, undermines the spiritual and physical connections between the living and the dead. In the 
context of Namibia, such a practice is therefore unethical: it does not conform to any of the 
Namibian local cultural practices and is therefore unrecognizable and cannot help comfort 
individual families still knocked down by the Cassinga massacre. The point of concern, however, 
is that survivors and affected families were not consulted in this regard. The government did it 
alone without any consultations made with the public for opinions and consensus about how best 
Namibia can pay tribute to the human remains of the liberation struggle. Consultations with the 
public and also with specific expertise should not have been overlooked, since the loss of human 
lives affects individuals, families and clans (some with unique norms of burying and paying 
tribute to members of their clans) more than it is a collective or a national responsibility.  
 
Nonetheless, the appropriate ways that should be followed in honouring the dead at Cassinga 
received varied proposals from survivors and relatives of the missing victims with whom I have 
raised this issue. There are those who feel that the proper way of paying tribute to the Cassinga 
victims is by exhuming the human remains, identifying the bones, repatriating them to Namibia 
and giving them a proper burial in the “home soil,” closer to their families and communities. 
However, others contest the initiatives to dig up the mass graves, exhume and repatriate the 
human remains back home. They are of the opinion that if a monument is constructed at the site 
where the violence was committed and in the neighbourhood of the original burial sites of the 
dead, visitors would feel more connected to the actual suffering and experience of the dead. 
Unfortunately, the fact that the Cassinga human remains are across the border of another 
sovereign state suggests that the Namibian government may experience some challenging 
bilateral issues and limitations in developing this historical site the way it wants and at its own 
pace.  
 
While it proved extremely difficult for the comrades and affected families to visit the Cassinga 
mass graves during the Angolan civil war that lasted until 2002, this is no longer the case. 
However, any project aimed at developing and preserving the Cassinga heritage site depends on 
the support and willingness of the Angolan government to allow Namibians uninterrupted access 
to utilize and develop Cassinga into a place of documenting and preserving the history of that 
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historic site. In this context, I also feel that Cassinga should be treated, counted and recognized 
as an international shared space where people of different nationalities lost their lives and loved 
ones. I am thinking in the context of the fact that not only Namibians died during the Cassinga 
attack. Angolan civilians who lived in the area of Cassinga also died during the massacre. 
Equally so, the Cuban international forces also lost many soldiers who tried to come to the 
rescue of Namibians.
377
 And South Africans, according to their sources, reported their own 
human losses in Cassinga. Therefore, not only Namibians lost their loved ones there, but 
Cassinga is coupled with shared transnational traumatic memories.  
 
The perpetrators and the “search for closure?”  
 
The war for the independence of Namibia and the end of apartheid rule in South Africa ended 
with distinctive “winners and losers” on the political front. Indeed, this political turn around 
disparaged the hard-nosed ex-soldiers in the SADF. In fact, this category of soldiers had “their 
array of stresses” emanating from the unpopular war which ended in complete humiliation. This 
is unambiguous in considering that some of the hard-nosed ex-soldiers of the vanquished army 
continued with euphoric military parades celebrating “historic victories” of the SADF such as 
that of the Cassinga massacre.
378
 Yet, it is also evident that for some soldiers the “defeat” of the 
apartheid army by SWAPO, ANC and their allies, predominantly the Cuban international forces, 
marked the beginning of the end of most soldiers‟ service, most of whom were conscripted into 
the unpopular apartheid security forces.
379
 
 
In fact, the end of the war marked the beginning of a process of self-retrospection into the 
injustices and crimes committed during the war. It marked the beginning of individual journeys 
in search of closure which for many of the ex-servicemen is difficult to find: because as Jan 
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Breytenbach put it, “closure is a strange concept … without realizing it I have probably „found‟ 
it long ago!”380 
 
There is no ambivalence in Breytenbach‟s statement regarding the meaning of closure. 
Fundamentally, the search for closure exposes impassable frontiers which disconnect the 
“embattled self” from the SADF official discourse of the Cassinga massacre. The trouble is, 
“closure” becomes a “strange” thing, inconceivable or “unrealizable,” as Breytenbach puts it, 
when the hunt to find it often proves to yield no fruition.  
 
The un-selfconsciousness pertaining to finding closure suggests that perpetrators of the Cassinga 
massacre are weighed down by emotional pain and suffering. It also discloses the perpetrators‟ 
endless victimhood and fixation in the belated emotional violence. The uninterrupted emotional 
suffering since the contemporary moment of the actual Cassinga massacre materialize in the 
perpetrator‟s urge to make physical returns to the mass graves of the innocent people killed in a 
gruesome manner (see below). This return seems indisputably embedded in the individual 
perpetrators‟ hunt for closure. But it is also a return that, objectively, would not lead to any 
emotional closure. Instead it would make a strong public statement about the unsettled issues of 
the Cassinga massacre which the perpetrators are circumventing and dodging.  
 
The critical moment of self-retrospection 
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Figure 8. Colonel Jan Breytenbach is photographed here during his 2009 trip back to Cassinga. The author has not 
been able to access photographs where Breytenbach is photographed at the site of the mass graves. But according to 
sources who were with him he wept as he related the Cassinga attack to his team members when they visited the 
mass graves. Source of this 
image:http://www.google.co.za/images?hl=en&gbv=2&tbm=isch&sa=3&q=Jan+Breytenbach+Cassinga+TRIP 
 
In May 2009, Colonel Jan Breytenbach, the commander of the Cassinga massacre, made a 
decisive retreat from attempts at political manipulation. He and seventeen others, according to an 
anonymous source who was in the group, visited the Cassinga mass graves in the Huila Province, 
Angola. The motives for Breytenbach‟s and others‟ return to Cassinga are self-evident.  But 
several historical truisms pertaining to the cruel behaviour of the SADF presence and their 
operations in Namibia and Southern Angola (particularly between 1975 and 1989) can help us 
unpack and translate this visit as a search for closure.  
 
Breytenbach‟s visit to Cassinga followed the launch of his publication, The Eagle Strike in 2008, 
in which he blatantly denied the Cassinga massacre, attacked critics of the Cassinga massacre 
such as Edward McGill Alexander, and audaciously and unapologetically defended his role as 
the ground commander of “Operation Reindeer.” When examined closely, Breytenbach‟s 
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publications, including several articles about the Cassinga attack,
381
 and his visit to Cassinga 
posits important but conflicting meanings. His written accounts of the Cassinga attack, on one 
hand, refute that there was ever a massacre of civilians at Cassinga. This is whilst his visit to 
Cassinga can be translated as a therapeutic search for the ongoing suffering, caused by the 
immense bloodshed and loss of lives of hundreds of innocent civilians. Indeed, as the ground 
commander of the Cassinga massacre, the unacceptable violence against civilians affected him 
precisely. So, whatever the case, it is without a shred of doubt that he considers himself totally 
and individually implicated in the killings of so many innocent Namibians.  In a literal sense, the 
initiatives to kill or not to kill when confronted with the practicality of noncombatants in the 
camp rested squarely on him.   
 
Therefore, seeing Breytenbach through different spectacles and performances, as a disclaimer of 
the Cassinga massacre and also as a self-constructed visitor to the mass graves of the people 
killed under his orders, is testimony to the “embattled self.” Put differently, these different 
pictures situate Breytenbach in the complex and parallel positionalities of victim, perpetrator and 
witness. Whilst the different pictures of the perpetrator and witness mirror Breytenbach‟s role of 
executing and experiencing the horrible massacre, at the same time, it is the simultaneous 
position of the “victim” that is most interesting here.  
 
The concept of the perpetrator as a victim of the violence that he orchestrated is important to 
explore. The important question would be: What is the significance of Breytenbach‟s unexpected 
visit to the Cassinga mass graves? Why did he make such a surprise return to Cassinga? In 
examining testimonies of the French soldiers of the Great War, Leonard V. Smith suggests the 
following: “the experience of violence [that] … Cendrars … lived was never „overcome,‟ in the 
sense of being comfortably resolved.”382  In this context therefore, Breytenbach‟s return to 
Cassinga thirty-one years after the killings, appears to confide something of his struggle with the 
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burden of the never-overcome emotional distressfulness and the urge to find “closure” for his 
role in the Namibian armed conflict since 1966.
383
 
 
This scenario also means that since traumatic events are unbearable in their horror and intensity, 
perpetrators‟ long-term suffering and struggle with traumatic memories of the crimes they 
committed compel them to consider taking a new path, perhaps towards accepting their wrongs 
in subtle ways. The visit to Cassinga by a group of former SADF members also heralds the 
former soldiers‟ attempts to understand violence beyond the political frontiers that manipulated 
former soldiers and compelled them to repress and digest painful violent experiences. 
 
It is also important to see this visit in the context of the fact that the SADF has abandoned its 
soldiers
384
 when the conflict ended on a fragmented chapter of apartheid rule of South Africa and 
colonialism in Namibia. As such, individual soldiers are left alone to seek individual ways of 
dealing with their postwar predicaments. This scenario also explains that many former SADF are 
frustrated and angry with the way the SADF told them lies during the war about the “enemy” 
they were fighting.  
 
In an interview with the Cape Times Newspaper, some former soldiers said they were 
brainwashed by the apartheid rulers to believe that SWAPO, like the then-banned African 
National Congress, posed a terrorist threat. Now that the two movements are ruling in Namibia 
and South Africa respectively, former soldiers have come to realize that they were fighting for 
nothing:  
We were fighting the swart gevaar (black danger) and 
communism. But now SWAPO and the ANC have the most 
democratic constitutions in the world, a former Koevoet 
member, Herman Grobler, said … And the people we were 
fighting against weren‟t communists. They were ordinary people 
… It was our war we forced on them … The memories of the 
past and the public condemnation have taken their toll [on the 
ex- SADF members] … some have had nervous breakdowns, 
and many have committed suicide ... They felt that they had no 
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purpose in life … Nobody thinks you have any right to exist. It 
is the Vietnam syndrome. You are not being acknowledged for 
who you are - that you fought as a soldier for your country.
385
 
 
 
In this context, above, former SADF soldiers, at least those with resources, are in search of ways 
to deal with and come to terms with individual traumas of the war that betrayed their cause. 
Nevertheless, the scenario of perpetrators visiting Cassinga also challenges, ridicules and 
reminds Namibians of their long-overdue obligation to visit, which has not been publicly done 
since the Cassinga massacre, and pay tribute to their own people. It is also a rebuke to the poor 
state of the mass graves. In view of this embarrassing state, Brigadier-General Dick Lord who 
was interviewed in 2009 on the SABC radio show about their trip to Cassinga in Angola, 
indicated that some of the former Cassinga paratroopers have initiatives to raise money to erect a 
memorial at Cassinga to honour the dead. Not underestimating the complexities and 
contestations that may arise from different quarters of the public with regard to the perpetrators‟ 
initiatives to erect a monument at Cassinga, the initiative itself challenges the way Namibia and 
specifically the Namibian government has, for very long, neglected and abandoned the Cassinga 
historic site.  
 
What is however important to reiterate, as I approach the end of this chapter, is that the former 
South African soldiers‟ experience of the “border war” and their realization of coming to terms 
with emotional traumas by opening up to the public has given birth to several websites. This is in 
fact important for Namibia, with its rich, but largely untold, traumatic stories of colonial 
violence. One example of such sites is the 61 Mechanised Infantry Battalion Group Veterans 
Association, which I have noted earlier in the preceding chapters.
386
 
 
Such projects, which are dedicated to the collection of the ex-soldiers‟ stories of the border war 
experiences, vindicate individual soldiers‟ attempts to deconstruct and disconnect their 
individual experiences from political realities. Crucially important is noting that such stories, 
regardless of their side or inclination, stir up new opportunities that can accommodate different 
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dimensions and realities about contested events
387
 such as Cassinga, in such a way that they 
inspire critical public dialogues. For example, reading different accounts of war experiences by 
different former SADF soldiers inspires inquisitive interrogations to explore why, for instance, 
certain individual paratroopers continue to deny the violence while others disclose emotionality 
about the unpleasantness of the border war experiences. The dissemination of such accounts also 
invites different responses from the other side, in such a way that both sides can open up to each 
other, place the past and the present in the face of each other, engaging each other in debates, 
encouraging more public openness and finding a common ground for the understanding and 
acceptance of each other beyond the political divide. 
 
Another obvious element exuding from the public dissemination of the ex-servicemen‟s 
heralding of the war experiences is that it allows individual efforts to find solace in each other‟s 
shared experiences of the violence. As individuals, abandoned and forgotten by apartheid, they 
aspire to make their individual traumas less burdensome by drawing strength from others‟ 
similar experiences and ways of coping with individual traumas of the apartheid war and 
violence. As human beings, we can generate strength and courage in confronting our challenges 
in life when we, for example, learn and become aware that others do experience similar 
challenges in life. This brings me to another salient point, as this chapter ends. That is, the 
dissemination of the war stories is not only a way of helping each other, as ex-soldiers, to 
manage the traumatic memories of the war. But it does mean that some of these ex-soldiers feel 
that sharing their stories, testimonies of the war and violence, with the wider public could be a 
way of acknowledging one‟s mistakes and of seeking public acceptance and forgiveness. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Violence against unprotected civilians such as at Cassinga is arguably done with the intent, as 
Brian Fishman writes on the recent Norwegian attack, “to disrupt and destroy institutions or 
symbols of a political order they despise … to intimidate people not touched by the attack 
directly.”388 Indeed, the experience of the Cassinga massacre on the ground was a short-lived and 
devastating event. But it “ends not as an event but as a process,”389 which in the long run does 
not destroy a particular political order and legacy, but inflicts permanent damage and emotional 
suffering on the lives of the affected people.  
 
This study has grappled with a number of complicated and challenging issues, particularly 
arising from the ongoing pain of the victims in the long aftermath of the Cassinga massacre and 
the challenges they face in the attempt to disclose their deep and enduring suffering through the 
medium of testimony. What has come to the fore in this study is that survivors‟ narration of the 
Cassinga experience is about confronting contradictions, obscurities and unhappiness. In this 
regard, the difficulties of eliciting the experience of violence and subsequent suffering of the 
victims through visual and oral techniques has formed the centrepiece around which critical 
issues in this study have rotated. In concluding this study, it is crucial to revisit some of the key 
problematic areas with which this study has grappled. 
 
Let me start from the end matter of this study, Chapter 7. The Cassinga massacre represents the 
darkest chapter in the history of the Namibian liberation struggle.  In particular, survivors of the 
Cassinga killings continue to bear the brunt of that deplorable moment. Yet, the perpetrators 
walk freely. Sadly, those I term „disclaimers‟ of the Cassinga massacre, in particular some of the 
paratroopers who were personally involved in the Cassinga massacre, continue to enjoy the 
gruesome moment of their killing-spree. They are obstinate about coming face to face with 
others‟ reality. They do this by flatly denying, publicly, the brutal killing of innocent civilians.  
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For the survivors of the Cassinga massacre and affected families, the ongoing war rhetoric is 
another form of violence. The denial of the Cassinga massacre inflames the victims‟ anger and 
bitterness, and makes it difficult for these people to accept the national policy of reconciliation as 
genuinely fair. Ironically, the political stability that Namibia experienced since independence is 
attributed to the so-called working policy of national reconciliation. On the contrary, the reality 
of the Namibian policy of reconciliation is perceived by many Namibians as entrenched in the 
erroneous “power of enforcement.”390 The victims of colonialism and apartheid brutality insist 
that the policy of reconciliation without litigation is brutally violent: one which compels the 
wounded body and memory to become a mere political tool; one which is shrouded in political 
hypocrisy, as it does not recognize the dignity of the victims but obliges them to dance to the 
tune of the perpetrators of colonial violence.  
 
In this context, many perceive the Namibian national policy of reconciliation as a façade, one 
that is politically correct but which, in reality, is patronizing and hurtful to many people, 
repressing the victims‟ voices so they do not raise issues of social justice. The victims raise 
genuine concerns, yet their issues and protestations are largely individual and circumvented by 
being confined to private spaces. Clearly therefore, there is a “collusion” between reconciliation 
and the injustice of the supreme laws of the land. This is especially so when reconciliation 
deprives the victims of their rights to appeal to, and even sue, the colonialist government for the 
untold damage to human beings and property.
391
 
 
It is worth reiterating that although the victims are conscious of the fact that reconciliation is 
biased against their sufferings, they are entangled in the chains of “passive victimhood.” There 
are two factors, among many others, that I would like to attribute to creating this precarious 
situation. In the first place, the state of passive victimhood means that the victims emerged from 
the Cassinga violence too debilitated, till now, to resist the post-Cassinga pathos and the 
enduring suffering which causes prolonged pain than the actual massacre that was short-lived. 
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Secondly, the notion of suffering in silence is inherent in the culture of enduring pain quietly 
during decades of colonial violence. Brutal violence unleashed by the SADF against the local 
population of civilians, particularly in the former war zones, was an everyday experience.
392
 
Nevertheless, the perpetrators were untouchable. They were beyond questioning, let alone 
prosecution.  
 
The fact that apartheid and colonialism had for decades suppressed the victims so that they 
endure their suffering in silence appears to have a strong influence on the victims today. That 
culture is arguably central to the interrogation and understanding of the prevailing passive 
victimhood of the formerly colonised. This is notwithstanding the fact that the victims do freely 
raise their suffering in one-to-one conversations, such as when I approached them to tell me their 
stories. When speaking to those willing to listen, survivors aspire to reach a wider audience, in 
particular the government. This is an indication that the yoke of traumatic memories is heavier 
for each survivor in isolation, and it requires public hearing and possible intervention on issues 
of concern for the victims.  
 
One of the things that trouble survivors and they would like communicated to the government is 
that they register great unhappiness about the sweeping amnesty extended to the perpetrators of 
the Cassinga massacre. Consider the following scenario:  
These people have permanently damaged our lives beyond 
repair. We did not do them any wrongs and they must apologize 
for what they did to the innocent people ... Why don‟t they bring 
them here [in Namibia]? They [the perpetrators] owe us so 
much, we have so many unsettled issues with them … we want 
to communicate with them, to remind them of the merciless and 
racial killings of the unprotected civilians and the maiming of so 
many of us… we want to remind them that we did not provoke 
them in any way, but they were brutally violent and 
indiscriminately killed defenseless people including babies and 
pregnant women … should they have done that to fellow 
                                                 
392
 “Before we are all wiped out,” Dateline: Namibia, Issue No. 3 (New York: New York Times Company, 1982). 
Interviewed about his visit to Namibia and South Africa, Carl Mau, the General Secretary of the Lutheran World 
Federation stated that “the South African government and its forces in Namibia are committed to eradication and not 
giving up - with very little conscience anymore … They are now determined to go forward and care very little 
anymore about who gets hurt in the process …The present administrator general … has very little sensitivity 
anymore to the massive human suffering going on in the territory for which he bears responsibility”. In Dateline: 
Namibia, Issue No. 3 (New York: New York Times Company, 1982).  
196 
 
whites? Most of the victims were women and children and the 
enemy knew that plain fact … they have damaged so many 
lives. Justice must prevail if we are to forgive them.
393
 
 
It is particularly painful for the victims that the perpetrators are given political pardon without 
acknowledging and apologizing for the untold crimes
394
 they committed against innocent 
Namibians. In spite of the deplorable issues that the victims of the Cassinga massacre raise, 
things are not co-ordinated beyond the confines of the individual. There is no open platform 
where the victims can coherently and collectively express their disappointments and difficulties.  
 
Nonetheless, the deeper meaning as to why post -colonial-apartheid laws in both Namibia and 
South Africa are lenient towards the perpetrators of apartheid violence must be explained by the 
uncompromising ties or relationship between politics, law and economy. The 19th Century 
French philosopher and politician, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, characterized laws as follows:  
We know what they [laws] are, and what they are worth! They 
are spider webs for the rich and mighty, steel chains for the 
poor and weak, fishing nets in the hands of the government.
395
 
 
For many victims of the Cassinga massacre, these words resonate. In our democratic state – 
Namibia - it is virtually the elite who exercise influence on the laws and politics of the country. 
Hence, in the case of Namibia and South Africa, those with financial and economic power, 
mostly the formerly ruling minority whites and their external allies, as well as the emerging or 
already well established black elites and politicians, have the power to influence and navigate the 
laws and the political landscape of the state in ways that suit the welfare of the minority - the rich 
and powerful. Nevertheless, the question whether social justice (for example, if the perpetrators 
were to be prosecuted, pay reparations for the damage incurred) can bring about recovery and 
reduce the recurrences of traumatic memories is a topic for a different research undertaking. 
 
On memory and testimony, my focus has been specifically limited to the application and 
understanding of the two concepts in relation to the interviews conducted with survivors of the 
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Cassinga massacre. I have struggled to draw the distinction between the two concepts in 
accordance with the challenges and insurmountable difficulties which survivors experienced as 
they tried to unpack violence through different ways of narration. The process of interviewing 
survivors presented me with the discovery of considerable differences or distinctive separations 
between testimony and memory. This dichotomy became evident when the interviewees‟ 
attempts to elicit violence through testimony proved contradictory and unworkable. That is, 
when survivors encountered insurmountable limits to show the world the empirical picture of the 
violence as knowable to each individual witness. Thus, while memory stands for the tangible 
picture of the violence which continues to hurt the victims, causing repeated injuries and 
perforating old wounds, testimony, on the other hand, belongs to the range of unsuccessful 
techniques such as narration or storytelling which survivors used in attempts to elicit the actual 
world of endless injury and pain. Testimony is unacceptably “annoying,” according to survivors, 
it frustrates them deeply because it is in conflict with what they want the world to see and 
understand.  
 
Survivors describe testimony as considerably shallow, immaterial and inauthentic. It is trivial, 
tacit and conceals many practical things which survivors observed on the ground and aspire to 
show the inexperienced world. Testimony reaches the intended audience unsubstantiated by the 
violence that survivors bemoan and want the world to experience and understand. In the same 
vein, survivors‟ endless nightmares and traumatic flashbacks of the Cassinga killings become 
slippery when survivors attempt to show these pictures to those of us who might be skeptical of 
these everyday experiences since Cassinga. In view of the inconsistency between testimony and 
memory or the organic picture of the Cassinga massacre and the excruciating aftermath, the 
public should not embrace testimony as communicating the entirety of the horrific experience of 
the Cassinga massacre and the terribly unresolved long traumatic aftermath. While testimony 
fails to represent Cassinga precisely, I contest Leonard V. Smith‟s position that it is “possible to 
think about it [testimony] coherently and analytically.”396 But here it is critical to listen to the 
victims‟ voice of trauma, previously silenced, as a way of stimulating conversation, dialogue and 
debate with the intention to take the Cassinga massacre beyond the political misrepresentations 
and ongoing polarizations.  
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On photographs, the central argument has been that visual images obscure many secrets. 
Photographs, be it those taken by the SADF or by SWAPO allies during, or in the immediate 
aftermath of, the Cassinga massacre can eclipse and hide more than what they disclose to the 
viewer. Since the available photographs of the Cassinga massacre obscure the untold experiences 
and memories of the dead, they produce shadows of darkness rather than disclosing the 
memories and narratives of the particular scenes of violence they claim to represent. In this 
context, I have argued that to photograph violence as in the case of the Cassinga open mass grave 
in Chapter 2 and elsewhere, is not to capture the reality of the actual mass graves. Instead, to 
photograph is to frame, and to frame is to taint and obscure the face of the natural violence.  
 
The tainted images that photographs of the Cassinga massacre promulgate evaporate evidence 
and nourish inconclusive dialogues between different witnesses, writers and commentators of the 
Cassinga event. Therefore, in working against the eclipsing of the untold violence that the 
photographs of the Cassinga massacre entails, the viewer should become aware that the actual 
experience of the Cassinga massacre on the ground was more diverse and complex than the 
marginal realities which photographs show. Instead of embracing photographs as authentic and 
unpacking the things or states of world they appear to designate, photographs should be instead 
examined as standing in front of the material world they intend to designate.  
 
In this continuum, since photographs are problematically related to the referent or the real things 
that they claim to represent, theories that perceive photography as authenticating violence should 
be contested. For instance, the “truth” that the photograph of the Cassinga open mass grave 
claims to represent is challenged by survivors who told me that the photograph of the mass grave 
is a mediocre portrayal of the deplorable experience of brutal violence on the ground. 
Nonetheless, this is not to say that this photograph and other pictures of the Cassinga massacre 
“are stilted or unconvincing. However composed and staged, they bear witness to real events.”397 
They are in some sense testimonies to the actual SADF heinous violence against civilians, so 
brutal and enormous that the camera eye developed cold feet to capture any more, or because the 
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camera could not see and encompass, at the same time, violence as it unfolded at different 
corners of the camp.  
 
On the contemporary situation of the Cassinga mass graves, I have argued that injury and pain of 
the victims have not waned. Instead, emotional trauma and pain have waxed since the Cassinga 
massacre. In essence, survivors‟ trauma and suffering have been reinvigorated and coalesced into 
passive victimhood since Namibia‟s political independence in 1990. Namibian democracy has 
closed its eyes to a number of things that the formerly oppressed population groups consider 
problematic to ignore. One key sensitive issue pertains to the dividing wall between the Cassinga 
mass graves, family members and Namibia in general. The mass graves are monumental sites in 
the history of the Namibian liberation struggle. For many Namibians, generally, it is 
inconceivable that the mass graves remain inaccessible since Namibia became politically 
independent. Surprisingly, this happens as Namibia marks every anniversary of the Cassinga 
massacre as a national mourning day. Perhaps this suggests that the recitation of the Cassinga 
stories is more significant than the tragedy and victimization of the dead in the apparently 
forgotten Cassinga mass graves.  
 
In this regrettable situation, it is ironic to remember, commemorate and mourn this historic day 
while the wishes and expectations of the victims, including the dead, are dishonoured. It is of 
course possible that the belated internal armed conflict between UNITA and the MPLA 
government may have been a defeating factor for families and comrades not to visit the mass 
graves since the bodies were buried there in the manner of paupers. However, it is deeply 
saddening and injurious for those who are sensibly touched by the Cassinga massacre. This is 
because, regardless of the return of peace to Angola in 2002, Namibia is yet to initiate any 
paying of tribute and upgrading of the status of the Cassinga mass graves.  
 
In drawing a more general picture, Namibia‟s approach to the remains of the war for Namibia‟s 
liberation is shockingly disappointing, if not shameful. I am saying this in response to many 
troubling questions at the back of my mind. For example, is there a marked grave(s) for the 
hundreds of people (both civilians and SWAPO military cadres such as Wilbard “Nakada” 
200 
 
Tashiya and others) killed during the raid of the Vietnam camp on May 4, 1978? What about the 
remains of the Oshatotwa attacks in Zambia?  
 
Equally so, what is the state of the graves of thousands of Namibians who died of natural and 
other causes in camps such as Cassinga, Kwanza-Sul, Ndalatando and at different other places 
(mainly in Angola and Zambia) where Namibians settled in exile? Graves of several SWAPO 
cadres are identifiable in Angola and Zambia,
398
 but if Namibia cannot follow South Africa‟s 
route of repatriating cadres home what can be done to give such Namibians proper burials and 
reunite them with their families? The historic burial sites in exile are not the only important sites 
which postcolonial Namibia is idly watching fall apart and disintegrate. At home, sites of 
traumatic memories of the liberation struggle collapse and disappear inside the country. This is 
while Namibia shamefully watches on. Some of these historic sites include the unmarked graves 
of PLAN combatants who died fighting inside the country and were secretly buried by local 
communities in the areas where they operated.  
 
There is also a concern that when initiatives were taken to mark some of the war graves in the 
former war zone, things were done without proper consultation with the people involved in the 
burials of the PLAN combatants. As a result, in many ways the plinths marking the grave sites 
are misleading as they simply read, “a Namibian hero is resting here” when, in many cases, more 
than one person is buried at the site.
399
 
 
In coming to the end of this study, it is important to emphasize the concern that Namibia‟s 
unresponsiveness to the demands and expectations of the victims of violence and trauma serves 
to reinvigorate and consolidate emotional trauma and suffering of the people already wounded. 
To think that colonialism and its encompassing violence are the things of the past is to be naïve 
                                                 
398
 These include, to list very few of them, Putuse Meekulu Apollus, Lineekela Hailundu Kalenga, Peter Eneas 
Nanyemba, Greenwell Matongo, Kapuka Nauyala, David Kamwi, Jason “Wanehepo” Hamutenya Ndadi, Augustus 
“McNamara” Nghaamwa, Isack “Pondo” Ndeshitiwa Shikongo, Natalia Ndahambelela Mavulu, Nabot Helao Nafidi, 
Homateni Kalweenya and many other. Some names of the people who died under the SWAPO care, their causes and 
places of death (in some cases) are listed in the SWAPO Party publication: Their blood waters our freedom: glory to 
the heroes and heroines of the Namibian liberation struggle (Windhoek: Namib Graphics, 1996). 
399
 Vilho Shigwedha, “turning in their graves.”InThe Namibian Weekender, 24 August, 2001; Vilho Shigwedha, 
“Commemorating the Combatants,” online at http://www.namibweb.com/commemorate.htm; Vilho Shigwedha, 
“Ondeshifiilwa.” Online at: http://www.namibweb.com/ondes.htm 
 
201 
 
about the trauma and continuing suffering of the victims of apartheid and colonial repression. 
Likewise, to think that “reconciliation without justice” is capable of mending past injustices and 
heal the open wounds is to aggravate the suffering of the victims of unforgiveable war crimes 
against the vast majority of the civilian population, especially in the former war zones.  
 
Critically, the ongoing suffering, unhappiness and despair of the victims of apartheid‟s brutal 
violence in Namibia should not be simply understood as belated relics of the dark moments or 
trying times when apartheid unleashed violence on civilians to prevent black rule and the 
independence of Namibia. Such pathos should be read as firmly anchored in the painful 
memories of postcolonial Namibia‟s failure to deal with the aftermath of the Cassinga massacre 
in an unbiased and fair manner. In particular, there is a need to deal accordingly with the 
obstinate and arrogant disclaimers who for no justifiable reason continue to disseminate the 
denial of the Cassinga massacre in different public avenues.  
 
The pervasive practices of the perpetrators and their ongoing “assaults” on the victims of 
colonialism and oppression not only unveil the impracticality and the uselessness of the 
Namibian policy of national reconciliation in terms of rebuking and holding perpetrators of 
violence to account. Of much concern is that the unshakable disclaimers‟ arrogance is 
unacceptably injurious to the whole body already in pain. They reinvigorate and reactivate 
trauma that the victims battle so hard to switch off as they do not want their lives to be 
preoccupied with remembrance of the traumatic memories of the Cassinga massacre. Hence, the 
understanding of the experience of the Cassinga massacre best translates into the never ending 
present which is “increasingly likely to overwhelm any foreseeable” futures.  
 
So, as the spectres of apartheid‟s brutal violence threaten to cast a pall into the future, it is 
important to attempt to get to the bottom of some of these difficult issues and conditions. It is 
necessary to interrogate the situations and mechanisms which reinvigorate the ongoing suffering 
of survivors and affected families of the missing people. In view of some of the survivors‟ 
registered worries and demands there is, among them, an urge for Namibia to revisit things, to 
juxtapose the past and present to make them interrogate each other and do things based on reason 
and frankness. This does not only call for a collective and united voice of the victims. Above all, 
202 
 
political will and commitment is pertinent. Nonetheless, it is critical that the victims are 
consulted and regarded as experts in matters concerning their damaged lives.  
 
It is also crucial that the victims‟ ongoing suffering and trauma, especially in the case of 
survivors of the Cassinga massacre, should rise above the concept of a “shared heroic sacrifice.” 
This understanding is political and therefore problematic: the notion of the “heroic sacrifice” 
suggests closing the chapter of the unresolved issues of the violence. This is because the 
embedded political association or marriage between the shared violence and political heroism 
constitute an urge to discourage survivors and affected families from pursuing justice for the 
violated rights of the victims. This is one reason why so many years of prolonged silence have 
elapsed as survivors embrace “passive victimhood” due to political manipulation. This perilous 
situation overlooks the fact that when traumatic memories experience repression for a 
considerably protracted period of time, the burden of memory becomes heavier for the victims to 
manage. And, with time, these ticking bombs will definitely explode. The Herero issue with the 
Germans regarding the 1904 - 1908 genocide which is now simmering is a lesson here.
400
 In this 
regard, the way many survivors are showing an interest in narrating their individual experiences 
of the massacre and the aftermath can be interpreted as a way of attempting to respond to the 
unaddressed issues regarding the forfeited “survivors‟ justice” since independence.  
 
Most importantly, the victims of the Cassinga massacre, affected families and their offspring 
have every right to rise above the lines of political subordination, exploitation and abuse of the 
victims‟ inalienable human rights. They have all the right to demand that the South African 
government acknowledges and takes responsibility for the “collateral damage" permanently 
inflicted on the lives of innocent people. Otherwise, legal channels to sue the government of the 
Republic of South Africa for the severity of the unacceptable acts of collateral damage to 
civilians and their property should be explored and debated. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
Statement by the Administrator-General for SWA, Judge MT Steyn.  
 
Through consideration of all possible factors and the requests of various politicians in this area I 
have consulted with the South African government and with their permission have asked the 
army to launch a limited operation in South Angola to destroy certain terrorist bases. The 
pressure exerted from the northern leaders like Pastor Njoba and Mr. Alphens Majevero have in 
recent times increased after members of their tribes came under terrorists attack by members of 
SWAPO. I have repeatedly invited SWAPO on numerous occasions- and I am still doing it- to 
participate peacefully in the political process of this country, but such a process can‟t take place 
if headmen are kidnapped, women are assaulted, scholars kidnapped and members murdered by 
people that come across the border. I would not be able to do my duty if I did not give adherence 
to law and order in this country. I trust that the world will realize that we can resolve the 
problems in this area democratically and around a confederation table that will be mutually 
beneficial to all the inhabitants as well as to ensure prolonged stability. The security forces that 
are represented here will at all times adhere to law and order and will not tolerate any 
intimidation or any other form of terrorism. In this case there were no measures taken against 
SWAPO, but against those elements in SWAPO that were revolutionary in controlling this 
country through violence and who hold no respect for country borders. I trust that everyone who 
considers the welfare of the inhabitants of Southwest Africa/Namibia to be of importance will 
support me in the decision I am forced to take. My thanks, and thanks to the peaceful people and 
to each member of the army that fights in our interest against the forces of anarchy and the 
revolution.  
 
Source: Chief of the SADF (Top Secret); PSYAC planning directive No. 3/78, Appendix B to 
PSYAC No. 3 / 78, SANDF Archive, Pretoria. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Statement by the Commander General, Commander Southwest Africa, General Major JJ 
Geldenhuys, S.M. 
 
On request of the Administrator-General … Southwest African troops (sic) and troops of the SA 
Army initiated a limited operation several hours in Southern Angola with the instruction to 
destroy bases occupied by terrorists. The troops (including parachute troops) received 
instructions not to act under any circumstances against members of the local population or 
against any of their property. It was also relayed to our troops to avoid any confrontation with the 
Angolan government forces. Notwithstanding the reasons given by the Administrator general for 
this drastic action, the patience of the security forces have been tested in recent times to the 
utmost extremes by a large number of illegal border crossings and acts against our patrol guards 
and temporary bases near the border. Terrorists have initially avoided contact with the security 
forces and were determined on intimidating and damaging business of the local population, but 
in recent times they have acted in larger patrols against smaller SA patrols-to ensure safe passage 
over the border. … We trust that in a couple of hours that everything will be finished and that the 
Angolan troops will abstain from becoming involved in this … internal case. Gradually as the 
operation is progressing news will be available on a regular basis to the press.  
 
Source: Chief of the SADF (Top Secret); PSYAC planning directive No. 3/78, Appendix B to 
PSYAC No. 3 / 78, SANDF Archive, Pretoria.  
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APPENDIX C 
Suggested approach for statement by Minister of Defence & The Guidelines for statement 
by GOC SWA.  
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Source: Chief of the SADF (Top Secret); PSYAC planning directive No. 3/78, Appendix B to 
PSYAC No. 3 / 78, SANDF Archive, Pretoria.
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APPENDIX D  
Some photographs taken by the SADF during the Cassinga attack. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. No caption. Source SANDF Archive, Pretoria. 
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Figure 2. No caption. Source SANDF Archive, Pretoria. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. No caption. Source SANDF Archive, Pretoria. 
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Figure 4. No caption. Source SANDF Archive, Pretoria. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. No caption. Source SANDF Archive, Pretoria. 
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APPENDIX E 
  
Extract from the transcription of the author‟s interview with Rev. Samwel Mateus 
Shiininge about his experience of the „Vietnam‟ attack. 
   
In the interview, Rev. Samwel Mateus Shiininge told me that he was born on September 10, 
1923 at Onakayale in Ombalantu, northern Namibia. At the time of the „Vietnam‟ attack, he was 
the head of the Evangelical Lutheran Owambokavango Church (ELOC) - now known as the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia (ELCIN) - mission at Oshikango shaPopawa. This 
place is located about 25km from the Angolan south western border with Namibia. Rev. 
Shiininge was sent there in 1974 to, according to the interview, “plant the seeds of Christianity” 
among communities in southern Angola.
401
  
 
Oshikango Shapopapwa, also called Osheetekela is the same place where SWAPO established 
the „Vietnam‟ military camp. The area was suitable for the SWAPO combatants in considering 
its proximity to a perennial water point, etale, and a dense forest called omufitu gwaSheetekela or 
the jungles of Sheetekela. SWAPO military camp at that place was strategically located as it was 
closer to the Namibian border. For that reason, it provided a reception to many civilians (before 
they were transported to Cassinga) who were escaping from Namibia by the north western route 
entering into Angola.  
 
The Lutheran Mission home and the church were located a stone‟s throw from the SWAPO base 
at Vietnam. Rev. Shiininge recounted his experience of the SADF attack of the SWAPO camp at 
Vietnam as provided by the following excerpt:  
 
The attack took place on the Ascension Sunday, May 4, 1978. I had just 
returned home from the church that afternoon. And, as I was lying down, 
for a siesta, on a mat or oshiinda, under a pawpaw tree shade I was 
awoken by a thundering noise. I got up quickly … bombs were exploding 
all over the place and dust was oozing everywhere. The attack was 
unexpected. The SWAPO soldiers were loosely in and outside the camp. 
Some of them were at the kitchen when the attack happened as it was 
lunchtime ... The bombers retreated towards the northeastern direction of 
the camp and never returned … as soon as the bombing planes left, a 
reconnaissance plane moved in and began circling the camp continuously. 
At the same time, the ground forces moved in with armed vehicles. A 
heavy fight erupted between the Boers and the SWAPO soldiers. Some of 
my family members and I escaped from the mission home … we went to 
                                                 
401
 “The Evangelical Lutheran mission work began in southern Angola led by the Rhenish missionary A. Wulfhorst 
from 1891 to 1915. Due to political circumstances, the Lutheran Christians left Angola in 1915 for northern 
Namibia, thinking that they belonged to the same ethnic group as the people located south of the Namibia border. In 
1933, Angolan Lutherans returned to Angola and were served under the administration of the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in Namibia (ELCIN). In 1954 Simon Ndatipo became the first ELCIN pastor to work in Angola 
permanently, and in 1962, Rev. Noa Ndeutapo of ELCIN replaced Rev. Ndatipo. The Evangelical Lutheran Church 
of Angola erected its first church building at Shangalala in 1965. It became a member of the Lutheran World 
Federation in 1997 and today has 29,000 members.” Visit: http://www.elca.org/Who-We-Are/Our-Three-
Expressions/Churchwide-Organization/Global-Mission/Where-We-Work/Africa/Angola/Mission-History.aspx 
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hide in the middle of the omahangu field. It was a good harvesting season 
and the tall and thick omahangu stalks provided good cover for us but not 
protection.  
 
While hiding in the omahangu field, the fight intensified and we felt very 
much unsecured … A group of young girls also joined us. The crowd was 
getting bigger …  we feared that the enemy might find us there, but it was 
also unsafe to move away … When the fight subsided … we decided to 
vacate that position. I suggested that the best place to find protection was 
to run inside the thick forest that surrounded the camp … but my wife, 
meme Hilya Martin [late], warned against possible dangers inside the 
jungles. That idea was revoked … alternatively, we decided to take the 
direction where we could find Angolan homesteads … We came to the 
homestead of Nghidulika Komukwiyu, but no one was in the house … 
People fled for fear of their lives … We came to the second homestead, 
which belonged to Paulus and still we found no people in the house. Late 
in the afternoon, we found a man, his name was Ndongili. He was riding a 
horse … I did not remember to take my shirt and shoes when I fled from 
the house and as it was getting cold … Ndongili gave me a shirt and left us 
there ….  
 
From there, we went to the homestead of Sarafi yaNangombe. He 
accommodated us for weeks. He also gave me shoes and clothes to wear… 
The big trouble was my mother-in-law, Ruth Shooya [late] who was not 
with us. We left her inside the missionary home when we escaped. She 
was very old and we could not take her with us … Two days later, my 
conscience compelled me to go back to the camp to try and find her. I was 
escorted by two villagers, members of my parish … I also wanted to 
assess possible damage to the church and to the mission home … we 
found the church and the homestead completely destroyed … some people 
went inside the church for protection, thinking that the attackers would not 
tamper with and cause harm to the church building. They were mistaken 
as the church and the mission house were all bulldozed and razed to the 
ground by the casspirs and other armed vehicles.  
 
My mother-in-law was nowhere to be located … We searched all over the 
camp expecting to find her body … we later learnt that the Boers, 
attackers, found her in the homestead. They accused her of being a 
SWAPO‟s medicine woman - a witch or omulodhi. She was an elderly 
woman, but they tortured her so badly and took her back to Namibia. We 
stayed in the dark about her whereabouts for months… we presumed that 
she was killed in the attack. Months later, I got a clue, through our mission 
station at Oshaangalala, that she was alive but kept in prison in Namibia 
… she did not receive proper medical treatment for her injuries while in 
prison. As a result, her health deteriorated while incarcerated … the 
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church intervened and she was released after spending about a year in 
detention …  
 
After her release, she lived with Simon Ndatipo in Ombalantu, but her 
health deteriorated further. In 1980 I sent for her to come and stay with us 
at Osheetekela. But her health did not get any better. She died in 1982 and 
we buried her there in Angola (Vietnam) … Anyway, I should tell you that 
what I saw in the camp when I went back to the mission church and house 
is very difficult to describe … people‟s bodies were scattered everywhere 
in the camp … What exactly happened to their bodies and whether the 
bodies of prominent commanders whom I knew like Nakada (Wilbard 
“Nakada” Tashiya), Mbango and others were ever recovered for burial I 
do not know, as I did not go back there until things settled … 
 
Source: Rev. Samwel Mateus Shiininge‟s interview with the author, 
Etunda, 2007. 
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APPENDIX F 
 
UNICEF report on Namibian refugee at Cassinga before the attack.  
 
In mid - April 1978 - just three weeks prior to the South African attack - a delegation from the 
United Nations Children‟s Fund (UNICEF) visited Kassinga. They observed a flood of refugees 
coming directly from Namibia under pressure and repression from the South African army, 
which is currently attempting to establish a non-man‟s-land on the Angolan - Namibian frontier. 
The delegation estimated the number of Namibians between 11, 000 and 12, 000. With regard to 
the composition of the refugee population, the mission found that the young population, that is to 
say, adolescents, children and infants constitutes the majority. The percentage of women also 
seems to be considerable. Thus, the mission concluded, the vulnerable groups apparently 
represent approximately 70 per cent of the total population […]. The remainder […] is composed 
of adults, with very few elderly persons. The school going population was estimated close to 2, 
500. As would be expected in any rapidly growing refugee settlement, the UNICEF mission 
identified a number of problem areas, however, it was positively impressed by SWAPO‟s 
organization and administration, as well as by the determination shown by the refugees: one is 
struck by the organization of their health services, their education and sanitation … 
[programmes]. Therefore, in the rational essence of the actuality of Cassinga, it is evident that it 
was indeed a Namibian refugee centre, administered by SWAPO with the assistance of the 
United Nations and protected by a small SWAPO military force, which included a senior 
SWAPO commander. Representatives of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and 
the World Health Organization who visited Cassinga three weeks after the raid … verified on the 
ground … the extreme savagery, the attempted annihilation, and the systematic destruction 
wrought upon a group of refugees under the protection of the High Commission for Refugees. ... 
That these people were civilians is attested to by all the evidence that this UN mission has been 
able to gather ... All the facts (on the ground) that this UN delegation have been able to verify 
reveal that what happened in Cassinga must be described as criminal in legal terms and savage in 
moral terms.  It reminds us of the darkest moments of modern history.  
 
Source: Tor Sellström, Sweden and national liberation in Southern Africa: solidarity and 
assistance 1970 - 1994, volume 11: solidarity and assistance 1970 - 1994 (Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet, 2002), pp. 352 - 363. 
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APPENDIX G 
 
“Cassinga battle account reveals biased claptrap: a former SADF Colonel who led forces in 
controversial battle speaks out”  
 
I have followed the Sunday Independent letters between Mike McWilliams and Randolph Vigne 
of Cape Town concerning the Battle of Cassinga. I am totally in agreement with Mike 
McWilliams since I too was there – in fact, as Mike‟s commander on that fateful day.  
 
Concerning Annemarie Heywood‟s accusation in her The Cassinga Event: An Investigation of 
the Records, it can be stated categorically that the battlefield was carefully prepared by South 
West Africa People‟s Organisation (Swapo) and People‟s Armed Forces for the Liberation of 
Angola (FAPLA) troops before the international press arrived. Thus, there was no reliable 
evidence to be obtained from a subsequent photograph of a so-called “mass grave” to show the 
bodies of “the great majority of women and children” slaughtered by the paratroopers or the Air 
Force.  
 
Nor could there be because there never was such a grave to photograph. There was and still is, 
however, one photograph – and one only, of a so- called mass grave, which shows a great 
majority of men, all them combatants, with only three women barely recognizable among the lot 
and, significantly, without any evidence whatsoever, of dead or mutilated children.  
 
This is the photograph that is used by Heywood, Vigne and others to accuse my paratroopers of 
butchering women and children indiscriminately, pregnant women having their stomachs ripped 
open by bayonets, after they had been raped, of course, to get at the unborn as well.  
 
If there had been a photograph sent into the world showing a huge heap of women and children 
massacred by the “Boers”, John Vorster‟s government would have become history overnight and 
the concerned five western nations would have given up the whole attempt to come to a peaceful 
solution for the South West Africa Namibia problem.  
 
They and others would have instituted a water-tight sanctions plan, perhaps even a blockade of 
the South African and South West African coastlines, even used military force to kick the South 
African Defence Force (SADF) out of South West Africa Namibia. And even the Security 
Council would have been driven to accept Swapo as the only legitimate government of SWA / 
Namibia.  
 
But there was no such photograph of hundreds of massacred innocents, if not the thousands, 
because the rumoured mass grave had, unfortunately, already been covered up before the first 
camera arrived on the scene.  
 
It would, of course, have been sacrilege to reopen the grave of such a tragic event just for the 
sake of photographic evidence. So they had to make do with what they had and rely on 
Goebbels-type hype and propaganda to sway the ignorant masses and their “not-so-ignorant” 
leaders by embroidering the alleged atrocities committed by barbaric, crazed paratroopers.  
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The only photograph they could produce had to serve, but no matter. An energetic propaganda 
offence would change the shortcomings of this photo, as pointed out above, into an instrument of 
almost gospel truth.  
 
For Vigne‟s information, my paratroopers did not carry bayonets or any other sharp instruments 
with which to slaughter women and children, a fact he could have verified with General 
Constand Viljoen himself, since he had taken the infantry‟s bayonets away some years before 
Cassinga.  
 
Incidentally, Viljoen also arrived on the scene of battle, unexpectedly, and the least Vigne could 
have done was to confirm his perceived details with the general who started it all, a man who 
was pronounced by Nelson Mandela himself as one of a very few totally honourable and honest 
men he has ever dealt with during his remarkable life.  
 
I nevertheless refer Vigne, again, to the extremely prejudiced Cassinga Event, authored by 
Heywood, which he unequivocally favours, and specifically to the photograph I have mentioned, 
which is the only one ever used to accuse us of a genocidal massacre.  
 
Then there is, of course, also the Truth and Reconciliation Commission report Vigne can go and 
dig up. He will discover that even the biased truth commission found that there was no 
substantial evidence, in spite of Heywood‟s accusations, that we, the paratroopers, had wiped out 
a refugee camp while pretending to attack a Swapo base.  
 
If that is not enough information for him, I, as honourary colonel of the Legion of Associated 
Airborne, Republic of South Africa, invite him to a night out with paratrooper veterans in 
Benoni, or here in Sedgefield, to have a snort or two and to discuss his reservations with men 
who were there. I can assure him that the men are always on their best behaviour so that he [sic] 
need not fear being given a torrid time.  
 
A less dodgy approach would have been to buy an older colleague, namely Willem Steenkamp, a 
malt whiskey and to tap his brains on many aspects of the border war.  
 
Vigne is perhaps ignoring the fact that Steenkamp was a brilliant war correspondent for the Cape 
Times and that he wrote a book called Border Strike which covers, among others, the Reindeer 
and the Cassinga battles extensively.  
 
This is by far a much more reliable and balanced account from the pen of a cool and calm 
reporter with impeccable integrity - compared with the prejudiced horror story told by a biased, 
almost hysterical Heywood.  
 
So Vigne‟s excuse that only Heywood‟s less-than-salubrious effort should be considered is, to 
tell the truth, dishonest and holds no water at all with me.  
 
Vigne knows about Steenkamp, where he comes from and where he can be found. What is more, 
Steenkamp is a Capetonian and thus easily accessible to a fellow Capetonian like Vigne.  
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On the other hand, Vigne can wait for my own telling of the Cassinga event to see the light of 
day in the near future. In this book, which he will have to buy (no freebies from me), I have gone 
out of my way to expose the manufactured evidence Heywood had used to project a deliberately 
skewed account into the world with the specific objective to discredit the whole SADF as baby 
killers and thus to cover up the vitally important fact that Swapo had badly lost the most strategic 
battle, ever, up to that point, in the history of the border war.  
 
Unfortunately, the author of the masters thesis referred to by Vigne also relied, to some extent, 
on Swapo and Heywood claptrap, especially in some critical areas, to substantiate a somewhat 
watered down “accidental” killing scenario of civilians – the so-called “collateral damage” 
profile the Americans are so fond of using when justifying especially bombing raids, while 
discussing events during the Vietnam and Iraq wars.  
 
My book has been written specifically to contradict the “baby killer” tag and a host of other 
serious accusations made by the author of the masters thesis and, by extension, by Heywood et al 
– thus also by people like Vigne who make ill-considered statements without proper research and 
cross-checking.  
 
I have meticulously researched my book over a much wider spectrum than any previous 
pontificators on the Cassinga battle with the almost inevitable result that none of us really come 
out of the Cassinga battle smelling of roses. Nevertheless, we emerge with our humanistic 
reputations and our pride, as paratroopers and air men, still very much intact.  
 
Lots went wrong on that day, up to a point when imminent disaster became almost a certainty, 
but the fighting spirit of all my paratroopers and some very brave pilots and aircrews pulled us 
through, so that we could go home more or less intact to claim a most remarkable victory.  
 
Colonel Jan Breytenbach was first commander of 44 Parachute Brigade and commander of the 
paratroopers during the Cassinga battle. 
 
Article authored by Colonel Jan Breytenbach. Source: Sunday Independent 3 February 2008.  
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APPENDIX H 
 
Ellen Namhila‟s response to Jan Breytenbach‟s article 
                        
“I was at Cassinga and it was not a military base” 
 
I refer to the correspondence in your columns re: Cassinga. 
I am a Namibian survivor of Cassinga, which was a Swapo refugee camp attacked and bombed by 
the South African Defence Force‟s (SADF‟s) air force and paratroopers on May 4 1978. 
I was there when it was bombed and I, and many of my friends whom I lost in the bombing 
were not military people. We did not study military matters and did not have guns to fight 
anyone. I can state categorically that Cassinga was not a military base. 
We had run away from Namibia because of apartheid repression. Swapo established a 
refugee camp for us at Cassinga. It was a camp for children and youths like myself, and there 
were elderly people who were responsible for cooking our meals and doing the administrative 
work of the camp, such as nurses, gardeners and teachers. Our teachers did not carry guns. 
The SADF is fully responsible for its own casualties, which might have been due to their own 
miscalculations. We the residents of Cassinga did not have guns to kill anyone. The air force 
dropped bombs all over the place and put the life of their own personnel in danger. 
Why didn‟t they attack Swapo military camps? What did we do to them to be bombarded like 
that? 
It is strange that in today‟s world we still have people who are trying to earn their glory out of 
merciless killings of innocent lives and that newspapers such as yours should give space for a 
disgraceful regime to claim the glory over those of us who are still recovering from the trauma 
of the Cassinga massacre. 
 
Ellen Namhila, Namibia 
 
Source: Sunday Independent, 9 March 2008, p. 6. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
“Bullets do not lie,” Jan Breytenbach‟s response to Ellen Namhila‟s letter.  
                          
 
 
Source: The Sunday Independent, 16 March  2008   
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APPENDIX J 
 
Jan Breytenbach‟s role in regional and other conflicts  
 
Jan Breytenbach was the SADF number one [paratrooper], experienced, of proven ability and 
deserved all respects of the SADF. According to Edward George Alexander, the Chief of the 
South African Army, General Constand Viljoen tasked Jan Breytenbach “to plan the „assault‟ on 
Cassinga and to train the troops for it. … There was no one else (in the SADF) with the proven 
combat leadership of Jan Breytenbach. … In 1966 he (Breytenbach) commanded the paratrooper 
contingent that participated in the first action of the war in Namibia when a helicopter assault 
was carried out on the SWAPO base at Ongulumbashe…. In 1969, he and three other hand - 
picked paratroopers who were under his command, were sent on a top-secret mission, 
masquerading as mercenaries, to assist the Biafrans in the Nigerian civil war. For his part in 
(Biafra) War Breytenbach was decorated by the President of Gabon. This adventure led directly 
to the founding of South Africa‟s first special force units, 1 Reconnaissance Commando („The 
Recces‟) with Jan Breytenbach as its commander. In this role he led clandestine operations into 
Zambia, Tanzania (raiding Dar-es-Salem harbour from a submarine), Angola and Mozambique 
… On 22 January 1974, Breytenbach and five of his Recces parachuted into Mozambique with 
35 Rhodesian SA paratroopers in an operation against ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National 
Liberation Army) guerrillas only weeks before the coup in Portugal. … When South Africa 
became involved in the Angolan civil war in 1975, Breytenbach was the first training team 
commander sent to assist the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola - National Front 
for the Liberation of Angola). He formed the battalion of FNLA forces known as „Bravo Group‟ 
and led them as part of Task Force Zulu, participating in phenomenal advance across southern 
Angola to the coast, then up towards Luanda, fighting one battle after another, first against the 
MPLA and then against the Cubans. … When the South Africans withdrew from Angola, 
Breytenbach brought Bravo Group with him and eventually engineered their absorption into the 
SADF as the notorious 32 Battalion. He commanded them … conducting … counter guerrilla 
operations into Angola … At the time of … Cassinga … Colonel Jan Breytenbach was probably 
the most experienced combat commander in the SADF. Certainly he was the most highly 
decorated soldier in the SA Army and one of the very few to have first hand experience of 
parachute operations. He had an intimate knowledge of the fighting capabilities of SWAPO, the 
MPLA (and) the Cubans.”  
 
Source: Edward Alexander, “The Cassinga Raid,” pp. 96-102. 
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APPENDIX K 
 
The SADF torture and deliberate killing of the suspected SWAPO fighters as told by Lance 
Corporal Sean Callaghan & Warrant Officer John Deegan, former SADF soldiers: 
 
“The third specific incident that I remember is chasing a SWAPO unit commander or political 
commissar. We picked up his spoor and chased him for two days … this was typical of the style 
of contacts that I was involved in. Five Casspirs, fifty men chasing one or two people running on 
foot. We finally did catch him, hiding in a kraal. The unit commander … lined up a bunch of 
Koevoet people next to the hut he was in and drove over the hut with the Casspir. Everyone then 
fired into the rubble … The SWAPO commissar was pulled out of the rubble and given to me to 
keep alive. He had been shot in the arm and the leg and had been driven over … because he was 
a commissar, he would have been carrying a handgun. John [Deegan, acting unit commander] 
started to interrogate him while I was putting up a drip. The purpose of this interrogation was to 
find the handgun … We never found the handgun because John shot him in the head out of 
frustration while I was still attending to him. The incident and the face of this SWAPO 
commissar haunted me in dreams for years.” [Statement by Lance Corporal Sean Callaghan, 
amnesty application, December 1996].  
 
“[The SWAPO commissar] was a veteran … he would have been an excellent source of 
information but he was so fucked … each team had an army medic and Sean started patching up 
this guy while I was busy interrogating him … and he was just going „kandi shishi‟ (I don‟t 
know anything), even at this stage he was denying everything … and I just started going into this 
uncontrollable fucking rage and he started going floppy and I remember thinking „how dare you, 
I‟m talking to you, how dare you ignore me…why don‟t you answer me‟ and then this is what I 
was told afterwards. I had my 9 mm in my hand and I was just pushing my way through the team 
… and apparently what happened was I started ripping … Sean had put a drip into the guy‟s arm 
and started plugging the bullet hole to get him together … he would have pulled through … I 
ripped all the bandages, the drip off the guy, pulled out my 9 mm, put the barrel between his eyes 
and fucking boom I executed him … and they told me afterwards I was just screaming, I was 
raging … ” (Statement by Warrant Officer John Deegan).  
 
Source: Lance Corporal Sean Callaghan & Warrant Officer John Deegan - accounts of an 
incident to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission‟s conscript hearing, Cape Town, June 
1997. In the “Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume Two, 
Chapter Two, The State outside South Africa between 1960 and 1990.” 
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APPENDIX L 
 
                              “Cassinga events need to be documented”  
 
It wasn't the first time the story had been told, but judging from the age of many in attendance 
and the silence during its telling, one could have believed that it was. 
“We heard a strange sound coming from the south-eastern side of the camp,” Cassinga 
massacre survivor Agnes Kafula started, recounting the events of 28 years ago, which left 
hundreds of Namibians dead. Kafula was speaking at the annual commemoration of Cassinga 
Day in Windhoek yesterday, which was held at the UN Plaza in Katutura. She recalled how they 
quickly learned that the sound came from South African Defence Force (SADF) aircraft which 
proceeded to drop bombs onto the southern Angolan town, and send in forces. 
“Many were shot at close range. Small kids thrown against trees and big stones,” she 
said, losing her voice at times. “Our wounds have healed,” she finally said after narrating how 
she, along with other survivors, some of whom stood behind her holding candles, managed to 
escape the onslaught. “But our scars remain. May their souls rest in peace.” Kafula asked the 
government to ensure that the history of Cassinga was documented “in the form of a booklet” to 
ensure that what happened does not become lost to future generations. She also asked 
Government to consider allowing survivors to visit the mass grave of those who died, while 
asking that those who were instrumental in saving the lives of survivors be recognised as 
national heroes and heroines. 
Former Prime Minister Hage Geingob also stressed the need for this part of Namibia's 
history to be documented, regardless of how painful it might be.  “Many want us to forget what 
we went through. They want us to believe that Namibia started on March 21 1990. But history is 
about everything, the good and the bad,” Geingob said. “We must be careful in this country not 
to play down certain events. We must not take our reconciliation for granted.”  In conclusion, 
Geingob cautioned Government to become more proactive in addressing issues of land and 
economic empowerment, in order to avoid possibly dangerous consequences. “There are many 
Namibians who are angry. Angry also with their leaders who say let‟s forgive and forget. Let‟s 
address the land issue, the economic issue, before it‟s too late,” he said. The plaza was filled with 
Namibians young and old, who sang songs of remembrance between the speeches.  
 
Source: The Namibian, 5 May 2006. 
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APPENDIX M 
 
                                                 “Don‟t Scrap Cassinga Day.”  
 
Windhoek - Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Libertina Amathila outrightly dismissed some public 
sentiments that Namibian holidays, including Cassinga Day, should be scrapped because there 
are too many holidays, arguing that the country's independence came at a very high price. 
Addressing hundreds of Namibians at the UN Plaza in Katutura on Cassinga Day on Friday, 
Amathila stressed that each citizen must never forget that the independence that they have 
enjoyed for the past 17 years was won the hard way by those who died in the war of liberation. 
“We will not allow their sacrifices to be forgotten or be reduced to insignificancy and we will not 
reduce holidays. We value our freedom and we value the contribution made by our fallen heroes 
and heroines,” said Amathila. 
The latest sentiment by the Deputy Premier, who was addressing the crowd on behalf of 
President Hifikepunye Pohamba, comes in light of some suggestions from various quarters in the 
country that there are too many holidays. It is being suggested that these holidays be scrapped, 
including Cassinga Day. However, Amathila was quick to dismiss these suggestions. “I wish to 
use this opportunity to dispel those suggestions with the contempt they deserve and I want to 
remind those persons making these suggestions that the blood of the victims of Cassinga as well 
as other victims of the liberation war, waters our freedom!”  
The significance of Cassinga Day dates back to 29 years ago, on May 4, 1978, when 
thousands of innocent Namibian civilians were brutally attacked and hundreds killed by the 
South African apartheid military forces at Cassinga, a Swapo refugee camp in southern Angola. 
The commemoration on Friday was graced by the presence of the Founding Father of the Nation 
Dr Sam Nujoma. Amathila noted that the hard-won independence and sacrifices made should not 
be taken for granted, but rather respected through hard work. “As people, we must always be 
mindful that the virtues of peace, tranquility and political and social stability are building 
foundations for a prosperous and strong nation. We must never take these virtues for granted,” 
said Amathila. Cassinga Day should be seen as a day of reflection on the country's historical 
journey to freedom and for looking at the way ahead in addressing the daunting challenges of 
poverty, unemployment and social disparities. “It is about reminding ourselves, individually and 
collectively, about the challenges we still need to address and to re-awaken our sense of national 
consciousness and dignity,” she said. In respect of the heroes and heroines who died at Cassinga, 
government has already done its part in collecting the soil from the mass graves in southern 
Angola and placing it at Heroes Acre in the capital. Steps are also under way to construct a 
monument at the mass gravesite at Cassinga, in memory of those who died for the liberation of 
the country. 
Earlier that day, Amathila laid a wreath in honour of the Cassinga heroes and heroines at 
Heroes Acre. Speaking on behalf of the group of close to 20 Cassinga survivors present at the 
commemoration, Councillor Agnes Kafula said the 4th of May was a very sad day in the history 
of the country. “This was a barbaric act of cowardice by the South African apartheid regime 
Although our wounds are healed, the scars remain and the pain and anguish that we have gone 
through 29 years ago is still fresh in our minds,” said Kafula. She added that as Cassinga 
survivors, the spirit of those who sacrificed their lives in the liberation struggle such as at 
Cassinga would not rest until their remains are brought back home. “Therefore, we urge our 
government to take the initiative to bring back the remains of those comrades who perished in 
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the liberation struggle so that they get a proper burial,” said Kafula, adding that plans are under 
way to set up a Cassinga Trust. 
 
Source: New Era, 7 May 2007 
 
 
